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T HE title of this year's Article provides a distinctive clue to the wide
ranging changes taking place in the field of compensation law. Al-
though the legislature has decreed that the Compensation Act' shall hence-
forth be called by a new name,2 this new name cannot veil the old problems
nor quiet the debate surrounding possible federal compensation of injured
workpersons. 3 Continuing threats of pre-emptive federal legislation have not
only generated rapid legislative and judicial changes but also increased the
controversy and debate surrounding this country's oldest form of social
insurance. This Article discusses the status of federal pre-emptive legisla-
tion as well as recent legislative enactments and judicial interpretations
which occurred during this last survey year.
I. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The extensive revisions of the Texas Compensation Act in 1971, 4 19735
and 19756 are directly traceable to a desire by the United States Congress to
pre-empt state compensation programs .7 The federal attempt to replace state
control of the compensation process with a system of national workers'
compensation has been spurred by the report of the National Commission
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws 8 as well as increasing criticism
from labor and some industry spokesmen. 9 The reasons for the growing
concern are economic, in terms of both premiums received and benefits
paid:
* B.B.A., LL.B., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306, 8307, 8309 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1978).
2. The name has been changed from Workmen's Compensation to Workers' Compensa-
tion. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § I (Vernon Supp. 1978).
3. The author respectfully requests the reader's permission to refer to workpersons, both
male and female, as workmen throughout the remainder of the article. While this may well be
inappropriate in view of the increasing number of women in the labor force, it is simply easier to
write and read the more familiar "workmen" than the stilted, stiff "workperson."
4. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306, 8307, 8309 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
5. Id. These amendments as well as the 1971 amendments are noted and discussed in
Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 183 (1975).
6. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306, 8307, 8309 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The 1975
amendments are noted and discussed in Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 213 (1976).
7. The history of federal workers' compensation bills in Congress is noted in Sartwelle,
Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 259 (1977).
8. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, THE REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (July 1972). The
Commission was created by Congress in 1970. 29 U.S.C. § 676 (1970).
9. See Odlin, The Workers' Compensation Controversy: A Status Report, 5 JOB SAFETY
AND HEALTH, April 1977, at 16. Job Safety and Health is the official magazine of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.
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The social security administration reports that compensation payments
for job-related injuries in 1975, the latest year for which complete
figures are available, totaled $6.5 billion, including $1.4 billion paid by
the federal government. The latter payment included $957 million paid
to sufferers of pneumoconiosis (black lung) ...
The American Mutual Insurance Alliance (AMIA) estimates that the
cost of workers' compensation insurance grew to $8 billion in 1976.
Benefits between 1972 and 1976, the Alliance estimates, increased 125
percent, while premiums grew by 100 percent.' 0
Despite the tremendous cost to employers, a cost which is passed on to
the consuming public, there is mounting criticism that compensation pay-
ments do not keep pace with the cost of living and are not uniform in
benefits, enforcement, or administration from state to state. 1 Although
federal legislation has not yet been passed by Congress, it may only be a
matter of time. Since 1973 bills calling for a national compensation act have
been introduced at every session of Congress. 12 Legislation calling for a
national workers' compensation act has again been filed in 1977.13 Moreov-
er, in addition to the study by the National Commission on State Workmen's
Compensation Laws there have been no less than five other lengthy studies
of the compensation system since 1970: two by United States Senate sub-
committees; one by a House sub-committee; and two in the federal execu-
tive branch.' 4 The most recent report was issued in January 1977 by the
policy group of the inter-departmental workers' compensation task force.'
5
The task force recommended that the states be given more time to
strengthen and upgrade their compensation programs before establishing a
federal minimum standard or other reform measures.16
While it is perfectly evident that state compensation programs need to be
revised and updated, it is also evident that improvements have been made in
these programs since the National Commission's report. 17 Numerous groups
10. Id. at 17. Estimates for 1974 indicate that employers, insured or self-insured, spent $7.8
billion to insure their work injury risks. This was estimated to be over $1 billion more than the
amount spent in 1973. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL ANALYSIS OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 3 (1976 ed.).
II. See Odlin, supra note 9, at 17-18.
This [nonuniform benefits] may have been more acceptable in an era when
there were more marked differences in the cost of living in different geographical
areas. With most goods and services now provided by companies marketing on a
multiterritorial basis, the prices are generally uniform. A refrigerator, a suit of
clothes, or a carpet is likely to cost as much in Mississippi as it does in New York,
for example.
Id. at 17.
12. S. 2008, 93d Cong., ist Sess. (1973); H.R. 8771, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); S. 2018,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 15609, 94th Cong., lst.Sess. (1975).
13. H.R. 2058, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). For a summary of this bill see Report of the
Committee on Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability, 8 FORUM, Oct. 1977, at 114(Special Issue). Forum is the official publication of the section of insurance, negligence, and
compensation law of the American Bar Association.
14. Odlin, supra note 9, at 17.
15. M.
16. Id.
17. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 51. This annual
report contains a chart summarizing the compliance evaluations for each state made by an ad
hoc committee of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws formed
in February 1975. Although unofficial, this committee focused on the Commission's 19 essen-
tial recommendations and attempted to chart each state's progress toward compliance with the
essential recommendations. Id. at 51-52. See also Odlin, supra note 9, at 20-21.
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including the National Commission' 8 itself oppose federal legislation. 19 De-
spite this strong opposition, despite the significant improvements in almost
all state programs, despite the lesson of history teaching us that federal
programs are not panaceas for all of our social ills, 20 it seems likely that the
federal bureaucracy, in the near future, may succeed in preempting state
control of workers' compensation programs. Unless all concerned with the
compensation system, individually and collectively, work to revitalize this
historically sound and effective approach to industrial injuries, we may well
lose control of yet another aspect of our daily lives to the amorphous
"they.' '21
II. STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
The 65th Legislature adopted twenty-three amendments affecting the
Workers' Compensation Act. 22 One of the first amendments passed added
article 8306b, sections 1 and 2,23 and amended article 5.76 of the Insurance
Code 24 to simply change the name of the Act from Workmen's Compensa-
tion to Workers' Compensation. The remaining amendments increased both
indemnity and nonindemnity benefits available under the Act, corrected
procedural anomalies, and expanded government employees' benefits.
By amending article 8306, section 29(c) 25 the legislature solved a complex
problem involving the calculation of increases in the minimum-maximum
compensation rate as related to the published annual average weekly wage
of manufacturing production workers in Texas. Through the addition of the
words "cumulative" and "cumulatively" in one key sentence, compensa-
tion benefits are anticipated to increase as originally intended by the legisla-
ture when this section was first added in 1973.26
A new section, article 8309, section 6, provides coverage for the services
of doctors of podiatric medicine. 27 Such services surprisingly had not been
covered by the term "medical aid." 28 A podiatrist, however, is specifically
excluded, unlike a chiropractor, from being appointed by the Board to
18. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, supra note 8, at
126.
19. These groups include the American Bar Association, National Association of Manufac-
turers, National Council of Self-Insureds, American Mutual Insurance Alliance, Compensation
Section of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Workmen's Compensation Lawyers
Association, and many others. See Millus, Is Federalization of Workmen's Compensation
Inevitable, 62 A.B.A.J. 1010 (1976), Odlin, supra note 9, at 17-21; 62 A.B.A.J. 1629 (1976).
20. Millus, supra note 19, at 1014.
21. Aside from the local versus federal issue there is the cost factor of federal control. The
postal service and social security administration, to mention only two, are the classic examples
of inept federal bureaucracies. One observer has been quoted as saying that a federal takeover
of compensation programs could send costs up "five times as much and twice as fast." Odlin,
supra note 9, at 20.
22. All of the amendments will be noted and discussed infra except TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 8309g (Vernon Supp. 1978), which was an appropriations bill authorizing $1.7 million
to the attorney general for the payment of claims made under the workers' compensation
program for state employees.
23. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306b, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
24. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.76 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (the assigned risk pool).
25. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 29(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
26. Id.
27. Id. art. 8309, § 6.
28. Id. art 8306, §§ 7, 7a, 7b; see id. arts. 4567-4575a.
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participate in a "medical committee" examination 29 or autopsy 0 in a claim
for occupational disease.
Article 8306, section 7-e 3 ' which regulates the insurer's liability for artifi-
cial appliances, prostheses, was amended to make the carrier liable for the
replacement and repair of the prostheses for the employee's life rather than
merely for one satisfactory fit as under the old statute.32 This raises the
question whether an employee entitled to this lifetime benefit can compro-
mise and settle his right to future repair and replacement. Since an employee
may compromise and settle his right to future medical benefits, 33 it would
seem he could also compromise and settle his right to lifetime prosthetic
replacement or repair. Since the right to lifetime medical and lifetime artifi-
cial appliances appear in two distinct and separate sections of the Act,
however, it would behoove a carrier to explicitly include references to both
rights when attempting to close nonindemnity future benefits.
The legislature also increased funeral benefits from $500.00 to $1,250.00. 31
Funeral benefits are payable to any person who incurred the expense of the
burial.35 If there are no beneficiaries or relatives, the statute places the
burden on the carrier to secure burial and cover expenses up to the max-
imum $1,250.00.36
The legislature has also expanded the coverage of the Act to include not
only employees hired in Texas but Texas residents recruited in Texas as
well. 37 The wording change in the statute was the addition of the phrase "or,
if a Texas resident, recruited in this state," 38 in the first sentence, and the
addition of the phrase, "or where the employee was recruited" 39 in the
29. Id. art. 8307, § 13 (Vernon 1967).
30. Id. § 14.
31. Id. art. 8306, § 7--e (Vernon Supp. 1978).
32. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 7--e (Vernon 1967).
33. See, e.g., Finch v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 535 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Barnes v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 495 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ.
App.- Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 19. The section now provides:
If an employee, who has been hired or, if a Texas resident, recruited in this
State, sustain injury in the course of his employment he shall be entitled to
compensation according to the Law of this State even though such injury was
received outside of the State, and that such employee, though injured out of the
State of Texas, shall be entitled to the same rights and remedies as if injured
within the State of Texas, except that in such cases of injury outside of Texas, the
suit of either the injured employee or his beneficiaries, or of the Association, to
set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board of Texas, or to enforce it, as
mentioned in article 8307, sections 5-5a, shall be brought either
a. In the county of Texas where the contract of hiring was made or where the
employee was recruited; or
b. In the county of Texas where such employee or his beneficiaries or any of
them reside when the suit is brought, or
c. In the county where the employee or the employer resided when the
contract of hiring was made or when the employee was recruited, as the one filing
such suit may elect.
Providing that such injury shall have occurred within one year from the date
such injured employee leaves this State; and provided, further, that no recovery
can be had by the injured employee hereunder in the event he has elected to





venue portion of the statute. These minor word changes significantly alter
the existing case law on extraterritorial injury.
The phrase "who has been hired . . . in this state" 40 was interpreted by
the courts as having no reference to the place where the contract of hiring
was made. 4' Rather, the primary question was whether the employee was
hired within Texas to perform services solely within another state or within
another state and Texas.4 2 If hired to perform work in Texas as well as
another state, the claimant was a Texas employee regardless of whether he
began work in the other state before working in Texas.4 3 If hired in Texas to
work only outside of the State of Texas during the term of the employment
contract, the claimant could not claim the status of a Texas employee and
was relegated to the protection of the law of the place of injury." This was
true even if the employee had previously worked for the same employer in
Texas and anticipated working for the same employer in the future 4 5 be-
cause a severance of the employee-employer relationship terminated the
employee's status as a Texas employee.4 Payment of travel expenses from
Texas to the foreign place of employment was also insufficient to bring a
claimant within the extraterritorial provision of the Act.47
The legislature's amendment overrules a substantial portion of prior case
law. The words "recruited in this state"48 should not be difficult to construe
especially since they are modified and limited in application to "a Texas
resident." 49 In view of the energy crisis and the recruitment of oil field and
related workers to work in a variety of foreign countries and on the Alaskan
pipeline, as well as numerous construction workers recruited to work in
different states, this amendment should remedy a rather harsh doctrine that
forced injured workmen to seek compensation in foreign jurisdictions or in
some cases prevented any recourse whatsoever. It must be remembered,
however, that the one year limitation 50 is still applicable to every employee
whether hired or recruited in the State.
While remedying one difficulty related to foreign employment, the legisla-
ture created a possible trap for unwary employers who recruit Texas resi-
dents. If a non-Texas employer recruits a Texas employee to work in a
foreign jurisdiction, the employee, if injured, may claim Texas compensa-
40. Id.
41. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dossey, 402 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1966); Hale v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 215, 239 S.W.2d 608 (1951); Southern Underwriters v.
Gallagher, 135 Tex. 41, 136 S.W.2d 590 (1940); Renner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 516 S.W.2d 239(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ).
42. Id.
43. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dossey, 402 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. 1966).
44. Hale v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 215, 225-28, 239 S.W.2d 608, 614-15
(1951); Southern Underwriters v. Gallagher, 135 Tex. 41, 45, 136 S.W.2d 590, 592 (1940);
Renner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 516 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.- Waco 1974, no writ).
45. Renner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 516 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no
writ).
46. Id.; see Hale v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 215, 228, 239 S.W.2d 608, 616(1951).
47. Renner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 516 S.W.2d 239,241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no
writ).





tion. If the employer is not a subscriber under the Texas Act, there is
nothing to prevent the claimant from asserting a non-subscriber cause of
action against the employer, assuming Texas jurisdiction over the employer,
whereby the employee can collect common law damages and the employer
waives all common law defenses.5 1 The employee, of course, would still be
required to prove negligence on the part of the employer.5 2 Nevertheless, a
prudent employer who recruits Texans to work in foreign jurisdictions
should purchase Texas compensation coverage or make provisions to be
self-insured against potential non-subscriber claims.
In the area of procedure and venue, the legislature passed several amend-
ments affecting compensation practice both at the Board and trial court
level. The first change involved the pre-hearing conference which was first
authorized by the legislature in 1969.53 In 1975 the legislature amended the
statute to require the pre-hearing officer to prepare a report to the Board on
cases not settled at the pre-hearing conference.5 4 In amending the statute,
however, the legislature inadvertently omitted a portion of the second sen-
tence of section 10(b) wherein the Board was authorized to direct "the
parties; [sic] their attorneys or the duly authorized agents of the parties"5 5 to
attend pre-hearing conferences. The amended section simply provided that
the Board could direct "the parties," 56 and not their attorneys or agents, to
appear for pre-hearing conferences.5 7 The legislature has now cured this
defect by again amending section 10 and reinserting the original language. 58
This word change may appear insignificant, but it must be remembered that
Board members have the power to impose sanctions for contempt in the
same manner and to the same extent as district judges. 59 Thus an attorney,
an authorized agent, or the claimant or carrier representative who fails to
appear for a pre-hearing conference without showing good cause may well
be jailed or fined for contempt.
An even more important aspect of the language change in the pre-hearing
statute concerned the Board's statutory power to bar persons guilty of
unethical or fraudulent conduct from practicing before it. 60 In its rules, 61 the
Board has decreed that failure to attend a pre-hearing conference without
good cause will be considered unethical or fraudulent conduct.62 The rule
applies to attorneys or claimants' agents and carrier representatives. 63 Thus,
51. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ I, 4 (Vernon 1967).
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 8307, § 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978). See generally Boykin, Presenting a Claim to
the Texas Industrial Accident Board, 12 TRIAL LAW. F., July-Sept. 1977, at 6; Boykin, The
Texas Industrial Accident Board: An Insider's Point of View, 9 TRIAL LAW. F., Jan-March
1975, at 5; Solomon, The Pre-hearing Conference in Workmen's Compensation, 9 TRIAL LAW.
F., Oct.-Dec. 1974, at 11.
54. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
55. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 18, § 9, at 52.
56. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 430, § i, at 1131.
57. This inadvertent amendment by deletion along with a second amendment by deletion
was discussed in Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw.
L.J. 183, 215 n.17 (1975).
58. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
59. Id. art. 8307, § 4 (Vernon 1967).
60. Id.
61. See Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., Emergency Rules, 2 Tex. Reg. 3214-24 (1977).




the reinsertion of the prior language in the pre-hearing statute provides the
Board with the power to compel attendance at pre-hearing conferences and
to discipline any person who chooses to ignore such orders.
Except for suits which involve extraterritorial injuries 64 or occupational
disease, 65 venue of actions which seek to set aside Industrial Accident Board
awards has been limited to the county where the injury occurred. 66 The
legislature has now broadened the venue provisions of the Act with respect
to accidental injuries, but has not changed the provisions relating to occupa-
tional disease. 67 Effective August 29, 1977, a suit to set aside an award of the
Industrial Accident Board in any case except extraterritorial injury or occu-
pational disease may be brought: (1) in the county where the injury oc-
curred; (2) in the county where the employee resided at the time the injury
occurred; or (3) if the employee is deceased, in the county where the
employee resided at the time of his death. 68 Naturally, the expanded venue
provision will engender numerous races to the courthouse, particularly
when the employee is injured in a conservative county, but resides in a
liberal county or vice versa. Although there is no such provision in the
statute, it would seem logical to assume that the suit filed second in time
would be subject to a plea in abatement or perhaps a motion to dismiss since
all issues can be litigated and resolved in the first suit and since one venue
provision is not dominant over the others. It is conceivable, however, that
one award could be litigated in two different counties at the same time. For
example, assume the Board enters an award denying compensation to an
employee residing in Brazoria County, but allegedly injured in Harris
County. The employee files suit to set aside the award in the county of his
residence, Brazoria County. If an additional claimant, a hospital for exam-
ple, asserts an independent claim for hospital expenses, the employee's suit
does not vacate the award as to the hospital.69 The hospital, moreover, can
pursue a claim independent of the employee 70 by simultaneously filing suit to
set aside the award as to its claim in Harris County, the county where the
injury occurred.
The legislature also passed an amendment formalizing a procedure that
has been used to settle compensation suits for years. Section 12, article
8307,71 requires Board approval of any compromise settlement between the
parties. If suit is filed to set aside a Board award, the statute requires court
approval of any compromise.7 2 Some courts have interpreted the statute to
64. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
65. Id. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967). This venue provision was added in 1947 when
occupational diseases became compensable. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 113, § 11, at 180.
66. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 103, § 5, at 283. The original Act simply provided that suit was
to be instituted in "some court of competent jurisdiction." 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 179, § 5, at
433.
67. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1978). See notes 37-52 supra
and accompanying text.
68. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
69. Latham v. Security Ins. Co., 491 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. 1972).
70. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hendrick Memorial Hosp., 141 Tex. 23, 169 S.W.2d 969 (1943);
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frierson, 455 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1970, no writ).
71. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (Vernon 1967).
72. See, e.g., Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 137 Tex. 449, 154 S.W.2d 450 (1941).
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require personal appearances by the claimant and claimant's attorney in
order to secure approval of a compromise settlement. Other district courts,
however, have routinely accepted the claimant's affidavit in lieu of a per-
sonal appearance. The legislature has now specifically approved the proce-
dure of settling compensation suits by the use of affidavits, 73 although the
court retains the power to order an oral hearing. The affidavit must evidence
the claimant's full understanding of the terms of the settlement and his
agreement to settle the suit. Critics may say that an oral hearing offers the
claimant more protection from overreaching by the carrier, or perhaps his
own attorney, than does the affidavit procedure. This criticism, however,
overlooks the fact that most oral hearings are simply rubber stamp affairs
conducted with a minimum of interest. Moreover, the Industrial Accident
Board for years has routinely approved compromise settlement agreements
without personal appearances and has relied upon the adversary system to
protect the claimant from any overreaching. The courts, too, should demon-
strate faith in the adversary system. After all, once a court has reviewed the
settlement terms and the claimant's affidavit, if there is any question about
the propriety of the settlement, the parties can be ordered to appear for an
oral hearing. In view of the legislative approval of the affidavit procedure, it
is submitted that the courts should rarely require more.
There were also two amendments applicable to compensation insurance
carriers. Article 830871 was amended to add section 20a 75 which requires a
carrier who cancels a policy prior to its normal expiration date to: (1) notify
the subscriber by certified mail at least ten days prior to the date of cancella-
tion; and (2) notify the Board by certified mail or in person on or before the
date of cancellation. Failure to give the requisite notices extends the policy
coverage until such notice is given. The Board had sought the power to
require such notice for years. As far back as 1953, the Board rules have
contained a provision that all policies were presumed to be in effect until a
cancellation notice was received by the Board. 76 Because there was no
statutory authority to support the rules, however, the courts held them
insufficient to bind the carriers. 77 Effective September 1, 1977, with or
without a Board rule, cancellations of workers' compensation policies will
be ineffective until both the subscriber and the Board are notified.
The second amendment that affected compensation carriers increased the
general revenue contributions required by section 28 of article 8306.78 The
prior statute79 created a special workmen's compensation fund to be used by
73. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12a (Vernon Supp. 1978). At the same time the
legislature approved settlements by affidavit, however, the Industrial Accident Board enacted a
new rule requiring the claimant to personally appear before a Board representative who can
recommend the approval of a compromise settlement agreement. The personal appearance
requirement, however, can be waived by the Board representative upon a showing of good
cause. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., Emergency Rule 061.08.00.230, 2 Tex. Reg. 3221 (1977).
74. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8308 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1978).
75. Id. art. 8308, § 20a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
76. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., Rule 2.03 (1953).
77. See, e.g., Johnson v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 398 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1965, no writ); Burton v. I.C.T. Ins. Co., 304 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, no
writ).
78. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 28 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
79. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 28 (Vernon 1967).
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the Board to defray the cost of administering the Act. The tax was one-
fourth of one per cent of the gross premiums collected by each carrier
writing compensation insurance and a like amount of tax on self-insurers
based on total annual medical and indemnity costs. The amendment abol-
ished the workmen's compensation fund, increased the tax to 45/100 of one
per cent and provided that the tax be paid into the general revenue fund. The
legislature also eliminated the $7.50 filing fee which was collected from
employers when they notified the Board that they had become subscribers
under the Act."0 The penalty for failure to report coverage, however, was
not changed. 8
A number of amendments were passed which substantially affect work-
ers' compensation as it applies to employees of the state and its various
institutions, agencies, and political subdivisions. The self-insured compen-
sation program for state employees was amended to exclude several groups
from the employee definition.8 2 Specifically excluded from coverage were:
(1) persons performing personal services for the state as independent
contractors or volunteers; (2) members of the state military forces; (3)
persons who, at the time of injury, were performing services for state or
federal political subdivisions or who were controlled by an agency other
than the State of Texas; (4) employees of the Department of Highways and
Public Transportation covered by article 6674s ;83 and (5) employees of the
University of Texas and Texas A & M University system8
The legislature also provided a method for collecting unpaid compensa-
tion judgments from the state and its political subdivisions. If the state or
any of its departments, divisions, or political subdivisions fail to comply
with a judgment, and if the claimant successfully secures mandamus
compelling compliance, he is also entitled to a twelve per cent penalty on the
amount of the judgment and reasonable attorneys' fees for prosecuting the
mandamus. 5 This article applies to the State Employees' Act,86 Political
Subdivision Act, 7 and Texas A & M employees, 8 University of Texas
employees,89 and highway department employees.90 This amendment was
80. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8308, § 18a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
81. Id.
82. Id. art. 8309g.
83. Id. art. 6674s (Vernon 1977) (individual compensation program for department employ-
ees).
84. Id. arts. 8309b, 8309d (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1978). Strangely enough even though
Texas A & M University, in 1947, was allowed to provide its employees with workers'
compensation coverage, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 1, at 417, and in 1951, the University of
Texas was allowed to do the same, 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 310, § I, at 522, Texas Tech
University's individual workers' compensation program, similar in all respects to those estab-
lished for A & M and Texas, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 252, § 1, at 536, was abolished by the
1977 legislature. All Texas Tech employees are now entitled to participate in the workmen's
compensation program for state employees provided in art. 8309g. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8309g-1 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The employees covered include all employees of Texas
Tech University, Pan Tech Farm, Texas Tech University School of Medicine and all other
agencies under the direction and control of the Texas Tech University Board of Regents. Id.
Presumably, these amendments also include employees of Texas Tech University Law School.
85. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309i (Vernon Supp. 1978).
86. Id. art. 8309g.
87. Id. art. 8309h.
88. Id. art. 8309b (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1978).
89. Id. art. 8309d.
90. Id. art. 6674s (Vernon 1977).
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also made applicable to Texas Tech University employees, but as noted, 9'
Tech employees now come under the State Employees' Compensation Pro-
gram. 9
2
The legislature also amended A & M's program, 93 limiting the University's
special compensation waiver privilege. Originally, A & M,94 Texas, 95 and
Texas Tech' were given the right to have employees and prospective em-
ployees undergo physical examinations to determine if they were "physical-
ly fit to be classified" as workmen. 97 Moreover, each school could require a
worker who failed the physical examination to execute an unlimited waiver
of his rights to compensation!98 The legislature amended sections 13, 14, and
1599 of the A & M program to provide that the University can secure and
retain in its permanent records a complete medical history of a prospective
employee'0° and employ individuals with pre-existing physical conditions.
Most important, the university's special waiver of compensation privilege
was limited to apply only to an injury or death attributable to a specified
condition identified in the waiver. 0 1 Strangely enough, the University of
Texas statute, which is virtually a carbon copy of the A & M statute, was not
amended. Texas still retains the unlimited waiver right.
In 1969 the legislature established a work furlough program for prisoners
confined to the Texas Department of Corrections.10 2 Section 9 of the arti-
cle 1 3 provided that prisoners employed pursuant to the Act were not entitled
to workers' compensation coverage if injured on the job. Section 9 was
amended, however, and now specifically provides that a prisoner is entitled
to collect compensation benefits for on-the-job injuries.' °4
The legislature also restricted coverage related to political subdivisions. 05
Jurors and individuals appointed to conduct elections were excluded from
the employee definition unless specifically declared to be employees by a
majority vote of the governing body of the political subdivision involved.'°6
At the same time political subdivisions were given the discretion to provide
coverage for elected officials.
There were two additional amendments to the compensation program
covering employees of political subdivisions. 07 Section 5(a)108 was amended
to provide that under optional salary continuation plans for municipalities,'
°9
91. See note 84 supra.
92. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309g (Vernon Supp. 1978).
93. Id. art. 8309b (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1978).
94. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 229, at 417.
95. 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 310, at 522.
96. 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 252, at 536.
97. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 13, at 421; 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 310, § 13, at 526-27;
1957 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 252, § 13, at 540-41.
98. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 15, at 422; 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 310, § 15, at 527;
1957 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 252, § 15, at 541.
99. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309b, §§ 13, 14, 15 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
100. Id. § 13.
101. Id. § 15.
102. Id. art. 6166x-3 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1978).
103. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 493, § 9, at 1601.
104. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6166x-3, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
105. Id. art. 8309h.
106. Id. § 1.
107. Id. art. 8309h.
108. Id. § 5.
109. Id. art. 1269m (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1978).
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when an employee's salary is continued, but offset by the payment of
workers' compensation, both the employer and employee shall pay into the
employee's pension fund the amount of money by which the wage was
offset. 0 The section further provides that the employee's pension benefits
will not be reduced because of the on-the-job injury or the compensation
benefits received."' Section 5(b) provides that when benefits are offset the
employer may not withhold the offset portion of the employee's wages until
the compensation benefits are received."'
A new article" 3 allows a municipality a right of subrogation when it has
made salary continuation payments to a workman injured by the tortious
conduct of a third person, unless that third person is an employee of the
same municipality. The fact that the employee has a third party action is not
a ground for denying the employee benefits under the salary continuation
program. "4 The last amendment dealing with political subdivisions is the
amendment of article 2028.115 This article now provides that, in a suit against
a school district, citation may be served on the school board president or the
school superintendent.
Perhaps the most controversial workers' compensation amendment was
Senate Bill 1275,116 which was passed in the waning hours of the 1977
legislative session. This bill amended the Second Injury Fund provisions,"7
the minimum-maximum compensation provisions,"' and added two new
sections to article 8307" 9 dealing with confidentiality of records and fraudu-
lent conduct, and applying a portion of the Administrative Procedure Act to
the Industrial Accident Board.
The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act 20 was enacted in
1975 and became effective January 1, 1976.12 1 Although the Act's purpose
was to provide for public participation in the rule making process of various
state agencies and to ensure adequate and proper public notice of proposed
rules and agency actions, 122 the Industrial Accident Board was specifically
exempted from the Act's provisions. 23 Now, however, new section 4b
24
provides that sections 1 through 12 of the Administrative Procedure and
Texas Register Act' 25 specifically apply to the Board. The Board is exempt
from the provisions of sections 4(a)(3) and 4(b), 126 which provide for public
access to, and indexing of, an agency's final orders, decisions and opinions.
110. Id. art. 8309h, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 5(b).
113. Id. art. 999f.
114. Id.
115. Id. art. 2028.
116. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 801, at 2004-09.
117. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 12c, 12c-1 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
118. Id. § 29(c). See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
119. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, §§ 4b, 9a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
120. Id. art. 6252-13a, §§ 1-23.
121. Id. § 23. See also 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 61, 99 1-23, at 136-48.
122. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1978).
123. Id. § 3(1).
124. Id. art. 8307, § 4b.
125. Id. art. 6252-13a, §§ 1-12.
126. Id. §§ 4(a)(3), 4(b).
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The Board is also exempt. from the provisions of sections 13 through 20127
which basically provide for the procedure, rules and regulations governing a
contested agency hearing.
The portion of the Act applicable to the Industrial Accident Board, 28 deals
with the adoption of agency rules and requires such rules to be published in
the Texas Register. In compliance with the Act the Board promulgated its
emergency rules, effective August 29, 1977.129 These new Board rules delete
a number of rules which were simply restatements of the statute, adopt a
few new rules, and substantially change some existing rules. 130 The new
rules represent an attempt to streamline the Board's rules.'31
The Texas Open Records Act 32 created a confidentiality problem for the
127. Id. §§ 13-20.
128. Id. §§ 1-12.
129. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., Emergency Rules 061.01.00.010-061.14.00.010, 2 Tex. Reg.
3214-24 (1977).
130. For example, rule 061.06.00.020 (previously rule 6.020) makes the procedure for resolv-
ing disputes as to the representation of a claimant by two or more attorneys more definite. Rule
061.07.00.030 (previously rules 7.030-7.060) provides specific procedures to be followed when
the Board is attempting to certify a carrier to the State Board of Insurance for wrongfully failing
to pay or terminating compensation. This procedure has been needed for a number of years.
Another significant change was in the Board's definition of unethical or fraudulent conduct by
carrier representatives. Rule 061.13.00.020, § 9 was amended to include as unethical or fraudu-
lent conduct, conduct "allowing an employer to dictate the methods by which and the terms on
which a claim is handled and settled." The rule further states that the carrier and employer may
freely discuss the claim and its evaluation and that the employer may participate in the pre-
hearing conference.
131. In amending its rules, the Board did away with one particularly objectionable rule. Tex.
Indus. Accident Bd., Rule 8.140 (1974), although ambiguous, provided that no compromise
settlement agreement will be approved by the Board for an amount less than the maximum
weekly compensation rate in effect at the time of the injury. Obviously the rule contravened the
legislative enactment regarding the computation of the compensation rate as it related to the
claimant's wage rate. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 10, 11, 12 (Vernon Supp. 1978);
id. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967). The Board's new rule governing approval of compromise
settlement agreements deleted the offending language. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., Emergency
Rules 061.08.00.010-061.08.00.230, 2 Tex. Reg. 3219-21 (1977). For criticism of other Board
rules and practices see Sartwelle, supra note 6, at 215-18; Sartwelle, supra note 7, at 261-64,
265-70.
One particular requirement in the Board rules is beyond the scope of the Board's power. Tex.
Indus. Accident Bd., Emergency Rule 061.05.00.170(c), 2 Tex. Reg. 3216 (1977). This rule deals
with directed medical examinations pursuant to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4(Vernon 1967). Section 4 provides that at the Board's (Court's) discretion, the carrier may have
the claimant examined by a physician of its choice. See, e.g., Wallace v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 148 Tex. 503, 226 S.W.2d 612 (1950); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Potter,
411 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Jones v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co., Ltd., 405 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965, no writ); Boston
Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 342 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
Board's rule provides, however, as a condition precedent to granting a carrier's request, that
the carrier must make a statement that it has "insurance coverage" of the claim under the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act and this statement is an "admission of coverage by the
named insurer of the named employer." Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., Emergency Rule
061.05.00.170(c), 2 Tex. Reg. 3216 (1977).
The actual wording of section (c) is innocuous even though a review of the statute and cases
reveal absolutely no authority for such an "admission." Due to the ambiguous language,
however, this portion of the rule could be and has been interpreted by an over-zealous pre-
hearing examiner as requiring an admission of liability for the claimant's alleged accident before
a directed medical examination will be granted. Clearly, this is not a statutory requirement.
Unfortunately, carrier representatives may be unaware of the statutory wording and simply
accept the denial without question. To avoid confusion and ambiguity, the requirement should
be stricken. It contributes no relevant information to assist the Board in determining whether to
accept or reject the request, and it has no support in the statute or case law.
132. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1978). See generally Comment,




Industrial Accident Board when a non-profit foundation sought to tie into
the Board's computer system and extract information on every claim ever
filed by a Texas employee. Despite strong opposition by the Board, the
supreme court upheld the public's right to gain access to government
records, including those of the Board.133 In response to the court's decision,
the legislature added section 9a to article 8307134 providing a degree of
confidentiality to Board files. The section declares that information in a
workers' claim file is confidential and may not be disclosed except in
specifically designated instances.' In essence the legislature adopted the
wording of the Board's prior rule 136 which the supreme court rejected as
justification for withholding information from the public under the Open
Records Act. 3
7
One exception to the limited confidentiality established by section 9a(a)
and (b) is section (c), 38 which relates to the controversial fraudulent claim-
133. Industrial Foundation v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
134. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 9a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
135. Id.
136. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., Rule 9.040 (1974). The rule provided:
As a prerequisite for approval of a request for a record check or for the
furnishing of information on a claimant, there must be a workmen's compensation
claim for the named claimant open or pending before this Board or on appeal to a
court of competent jurisdiction from the Board at the time the record search
request or request for information is presented to this Board. . . . The Board will
furnish the requested information or a record check only to the following: (1) the
claimant; (2) the attorney for the claimant; (3) the carrier; (4) the employer at the
time of the current injury; (5) third-party litigants.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 9a(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides:
If there is a workers' compensation claim for the named claimant open or
pending before the Industrial Accident Board or on appeal to a court of competent
jurisdiction from the Board or which is the subject matter of a subsequent suit
where the carrier is subrogated to the rights of the named claimant at the time a
record search or request for information is presented to the Board, the informa-
tion shall be furnished as provided in this section. The first, middle, and last name
of the claimant, age and social security number, and, if possible, dates of injury
and the names of prior employers must be given in the request for information by
the requesting party. The Board will furnish the requested information or a record
check only to the following:
(1) the claimant;
(2) the attorney for the claimant;
(3) the carrier;
(4) the employer at the time of the current injury;
(5) third-party litigants; or
(6) the State Board of Insurance.
A third-party litigant in a suit arising out of an occurrence with respect to which a
workers' compensation claim was filed is entitled to the information without
regard to whether or not the compensation claim is still pending.
137. Industrial Foundation v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977). TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 9a(n) (Vernon Supp. 1978),
in a very limited recognition of the purpose of the Open Records Act, provides that any person
may obtain from the Board all information in any record or file established after September 1,
1971, in statistical form, as long as the name or identity of the claimant is not disclosed except
as otherwise provided in the statute.
138. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 9a(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978). Another exception
to section 9a(a) confidentiality is the section relating to employers seeking claims information
on prospective employees. Id. § 9a(d). This section allows employers to secure written permis-
sion from a prospective employee which allows the employer to obtain from the Board the
person's claim history if the individual has had three or more general injury claims within the
preceding five years in which weekly compensation payments were made. Note that the statute
only refers to general injuries. This reference was probably intentional and will undoubtedly be
interpreted to exclude any specific injuries. As a practical matter, this restriction will likely
make little difference in the accuracy of the individual's claim history since most claimants and
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ant portion of the statute.' 3 9 Actually, the statute relates not only to fraudu-
lent claimants but to any person connected with the compensation system.
The attorney general is authorized to investigate and prosecute any allega-
tion of fraud on the part of any person, including attorneys, whether the
allegations emanate from the Board or through the attorney general's own
efforts. The statute also sets out a detailed prosecution procedure to be
followed by the Board and the attorney general and provides the Board with
broad subpoena power.
A controversial section of the fraudulent claimant statute is section
9a(e)(2). 14 It provides that when an employee makes a fifth claim for
compensation within any five year period, the Board must automatically
notify the attorney general who must investigate to determine if fraud was
involved in any of the claims. If an employee is adjudicated to be a fraudu-
lent claimant, section 9a(c)'4 ' becomes operational. All Board information
collected on that individual becomes nonconfidential and may be furnished
to any person requesting it. Workers' compensation has long needed this
comprehensive investigatory scheme. While it no doubt will be exceedingly
difficult to prove actual fraud in individual cases, the recognition of the
problem and the adoption of specific procedures and penalities, set forth in
plain language, should be an effective deterrent to fraudulent claims. Even if
this comprehensive enactment results in ferreting out only one dishonest
person, it will have served its purpose for the good of all concerned with the
compensation system.
The last and most significant amendment to the Compensation Act in 1977
was the return of the prior injury contribution defense of section 12c.' 42
Long thought dead and buried, 12c has arisen like a Phoenix from the ashes,
as a result of the legislature's compensation amendments. Prior to 1971 12c
allowed the insurer the defense of percentage contribution of prior injuries
to a present incapacity. 43 The statute provided that if the employee had
suffered a previous injury which resulted in incapacity and which contribut-
ed to the subsequent incapacity, then the association was liable only for the
incapacity caused by the subsequent injury, as if there had been no prior
injury.'" In 1971, however, the legislature abolished the defense by provid-
ing "the association shall be liable for all compensation provided by this
attorneys overstate the results of any specific injury in an attempt to extend the injury to the
body generally. Thus, if the Board has classified the injury on the basis of the employee's
report of injury and claim for compensation form, then most, if not all claims should be
disclosed.
139. Id. §§ 9a(e)(1)-(e)(3).
140. Id. § 9a(e)(2).
141. Id. § 9a(c).
142. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1978).
143. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534,357 S.W.2d 744 (1962);
Gilmore v. Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n, 292 S.W. 204 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt
adopted); see Altman, The Status of "Other Compensable Injuries" Under the Texas Work-
men's Compensation Act, 10 TRIAL LAW. F., Oct.-Dec. 1975, at 18.
144. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 349, § 1, at 690-91. The statute, including the reference to the
Second Injury Fund created in 1947 provided:
If an employee who has suffered a previous injury shall suffer a subsequent
injury which results in a condition of incapacity to which both injuries or their
effects have contributed, the association (Texas Employers' Insurance Associa-
tion) shall be liable because of such injury only for the compensation to which the
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act.' 45 During the intervening years, the courts unanimously held that
amended section 12c no longer allowed proof of a prior compensable injury
nor reduced the recovery of a workman because of such prior injury. 146 The
economic impact of this simple change in wording is incalculable. In ess-
ence, the 1971 amendment could be labeled "the workers' early retirement
program." Since prior injuries and the resulting incapacity were inadmiss-
ible, it was theoretically possible for a workman to be injured on the same
job five days in a row and collect five total and permanent awards. The 1977
amendment of section 12c 147 readopts the section's precise language as it
existed prior to 1971.48 In addition the legislature liberalized the employee
claim procedure against the Second Injury Fund) 49
Since the legislature has returned 12c and the Second Injury Fund to its
pre-1971 status, the question arises whether the body of pre-1971 case law
interpreting these sections is still viable. The answer seems to be in the
affirmative. This is unfortunate because the courts in those cases both
misinterpreted the legislative language and ignored the legislative purpose.
The result has been a confusing mass of cases decided on a seemingly
random basis. No rationale can be discovered in any of these opinions for
the unnecessary complication of what could and should be a relatively
straightforward concept.
In order to fully comprehend the source of this unfortunate deviation
from section 12c's original purpose and to understand the section's current
interpretation, it is necessary to trace the history of the section. Some of the
confusion surrounding the 12c contribution doctrine results from the doc-
trinal entanglement of 12c with the Second Injury Fund adopted in 1947.
Thus, it is necessary to review 12c's complete history both prior and subse-
quent to the Second Injury Fund amendment.
The original Texas compensation law'50 was enacted in 1913 but contained
no provision corresponding to 12c. 15' In 1917152 section 12c was adopted in
subsequent injury would have entitled the injured employee had there been no
previous injury; provided that there shall be created a fund known as the 'Second-
Injury Fund' hereinafter described, from which an employee who has suffered a
subsequent injury shall be compensated for the combined incapacities resulting
from both injuries.
145. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 316, § 1, at 1257 (emphasis added).
146. Second Injury Fund v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Teague, 531 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Haunschild, 527 S.W.2d
270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Cres-
well, 511 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
147. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1978).
148. See note 144 supra.
149. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1978). Section 12c is worded
exactly as in 1947 with the exception of the last sentence which is new. See note 144 supra. The
last sentence states: "Provided further, however, that notice of injury to the employer and
filing of a claim with the Industrial Accident Board as required by law shall also be deemed and
considered notice to and filing of a claim against the 'Second Injury Fund.' " Section 12c-1
was also amended to its exact pre-1971 language, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c-1
(Vernon Supp. 1978), which was originally adopted in 1947 when the Second Injury Fund was
created. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 349, § 1, at 691.
150. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 179, at 429.
151. Id. at 429-38.
152. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 103, at 269-94.
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the exact wording as today, without the Second Injury Fund reference.' 53
Until 1927 there were no cases construing section 12c. In that year,
however, the commission of appeals decided Gilmore v. Lumbermen's Re-
ciprocal Association. ' Gilmore lost the sight of one eye in a childhood
accident. In the course and scope of his employment for Lumbermen's
insured, he received a second injury and lost the sight of his other eye. The
Board awarded compensation for the loss of one eye, that is sixty per cent of
the average weekly wage for 100 weeks. The employee appealed contending
he was entitled to statutory total and permanent benefits for the loss of sight
of both eyes. 155 The district court awarded total and permanent benefits, but
the court of civil appeals reversed.
The commission of appeals, faced with the task of determining 12c's
purpose, delved into the history of compensation law and in an extraordinar-
ily lucid opinion set forth the purposes behind the legislature's enactment of
12c:
[W]e have reached the conclusion that the Texas statute under discus-
sion and similar statutes in other states were enacted for the benefit of
persons as a class who enter employment with permanent partial disa-
bility rather than to their detriment. If it were not for such legislation,
then all maimed and crippled laborers would be deprived of employ-
ment in all industrial plants where workmen's compensation insurance
was carried, if those plants were conducted on strictly business princi-
ples.
I .If it may be said that one of this class, who becomes totally and
permanently disabled upon receiving a second injury, is not fairly
treated unless he receives compensation for total permanent disability,
then it is better that the few who happen to [sic] second accidents
should so suffer, rather than the whole class should suffer by being
denied employment. 156
153. William Cameron & Co., Inc. v. Gamble, 216 S.W. 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1919,
no writ).
154. 292 S.W. 204 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).
155. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 103, § Ila, at 275. The injury occurred in April, 1920.
Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Gilmore, 258 S.W. 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1924),
aff'd, 292 S.W. 204 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted).
156. Id. at 206-07. The various courts thoughout the country arrived at two basic solutions to
the dilemma presented by the Gilmore case. One was to hold the employer liable for all
compensation (non-apportionment rule), the other to charge the employer only for the compen-
sation due for the second injury (apportionment rule). The employment of handicapped work-
ers under either rule, however, was a source of concern to all involved in the compensation
system as is indicated by the great debate over the operation of various Second Injury Funds.
See, e.g., Proposed Longshoremen's and Habor Workers' Compensation Act: Hearings on S.
3170 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 69th Cong., I st Sess.
(1926); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR 536 (1931); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR 577 (1933); Scurlock, Enactment of a "State Fund" Amendment,
14 OKLA. B.A.J. 1331 (1943); 44 MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1946).
Professor Larson comments upon the problem and the resulting solution, 2 A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 59.31, at 10-285-88 (1976) (footnotes omitted):
While at first glance it might appear that the apportionment rule favors the
employer and nonapportionment the employee, in practice the nonapportionment
rule proved the worst of the two evils from the standpoint of the handicapped
worker. As soon as it became clear that a particular state had adopted a rule
requiring an employer to bear the full cost of total disability for loss of the
crippled worker's remaining leg or arm, employers had a strong financial incen-
tive to discharge all handicapped workers who might bring upon them this kind of
aggravated liability. When loss of a single eye might mean a compensation liability
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Thus Gilmore only allowed an incremental recovery, that is the employee
was entitled to recover compensation for the incapacity resulting from the
subsequent injury alone and not for the final incapacity attributable to both
the subsequent injury and the preexisting disability.
From the time of the Gilmore opinion in 1927 until 1951, with two undis-
tinguished exceptions, neither the supreme court nor the commission of
appeals considered 12c's implementation. Unfortunately, the interpretation
and application of the statute was left without guidance to the courts of civil
appeals; this resulted in confusing, random, and sometimes undecipherable
opinions. The next opinion after Gilmore was Texas Employers'Insurance
Association v. Heuer.'57 The carrier contended, pursuant to 12c, that it was
entitled to "mitigation"' 158 of the compensation owed in light of the claim-
ant's prior injury. The court noted, however, that section 12c was inapplica-
ble because the injuries involved in the suit were to the left hand, arm, and
shoulder, whereas the prior injury was to the right arm. Thus, the court
affirmed a total permanent incapacity judgment on the ground that the
former injury was not a contributing factor to the present incapacity.
Several months later the Amarillo court reached the same result in a
somewhat offhand manner.159 The court held that a prior arthritic condition
was not an injury as contemplated in 12c. Alternatively, the court held that
12c was inapplicable because there was no evidence that the claimant
suffered from a prior disability which contributed to any subsequent in-
capacity. The commission of appeals simply adopted the lower court's
holding that a prior disease condition was not an "injury" within the mean-
ing of 12c.160 Two more court of civil appeals opinions consistent with
Gilmore were rendered in 1929.161 It was readily apparent from the opinions
that, as indicated in Gilmore, the 12c limitation on compensation recovery
was dependent upon the showing of a causal connection, that is, cause in
fact, between the previous injury's effects and the subsequent incapacity
existing after the second compensable injury.
of $5,000 for a man with two good eyes but $26,000 for a man with only one, the
compensation insurance premium on the latter would naturally be markedly
greater. It has been said, for example, that within the 30 days'following the
announcement of the nonapportionment rule in Nease v. Hughes Stone Company
[114 Okla. 170, 244 P. 778 (1925)], between seven and eight thousand one-eyed,
one-legged, one-armed, and one-handed men were displaced in Oklahoma.
157. 10 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumount, writ dism'd), second motion for rehearing
denied, II S.W.2d 566 (1928).
158. Id. at 759.
159. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Parr, 16 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1929),
aff'd, 30 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted).
160. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Parr, 30 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt
adopted).
161. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Stephens, 22 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1929, no writ) (the court simply held, among other things, that the trial court erred in placing the
burden of proof on the insurer in the special issue regarding whether the prior injury was related
to the subsequent incapacity); Petroleum Cas. Co. v. Bristow, 21 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1929, writ dism'd) (held it was error for trial court to refuse to submit 12c issue since
evidence raised question whether prior injury contributed to subsequent incapacity). The
second Bristow appeal, Petroleum Cas. Co. v. Bristow, 35 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1931, writ dism'd), resulted in a total permanent verdict. The jury failed to find any
contribution by the prior injury. The court simply affirmed the judgment noting its approval of




In the 1930 case of Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Clark162
confusion over the purpose and application of 12c first appeared. Clark
suffered two injuries while working for the same employer on September 1,
1926 and May 26, 1927. He did not miss time from work until July 6, 1927
when, as a result of the injuries, he became paralyzed. The evidence indi-
cated neither blow alone was sufficient to produce paralysis, but the
combined effects had produced the subsequent incapacity.
The 12c question arose when the trial court submitted an issue inquiring
whether either or both injuries resulted in total incapacity. For reasons that
are unclear the carrier objected to the issue and relied on section 12c. After
noting that the combination of the two "licks"' 63 produced the paralysis, the
court responded rather unintelligibly:
Considering the provision [12c] in the light of the purposes of the
Workmen's Compensation Law, we think it clear that, where the word
'injury' is used in the quoted section, the Legislature clearly intended
compensative injury, or injury for which compensation is provided
under the terms of the law. No other injury was the subject of the
legislation. The provision, we think, has application to such cases as
where two separate injuries are received at different times, the first of
which within itself entitles the employee to compensation and not to a
case where neither the previous nor subsequent injury was alone
compensative. '64
The court cited no authority whatsoever to support its statement on the
purpose of 12c. Remarkably, neither Gilmore, nor any other cases or legisla-
tive history were discussed. The court's only motivation was to affirm the
judgment. Yet, in its haste, the court ignored the most obvious reason why
12c was inapplicable, that is there was no evidence of any prior incapacity
resulting from the first injury. The plain words of the statute require the first
injury to produce an incapacity to which is then added a second injury and a
greater incapacity contributed to by both injuries. The evidence in Clark
was undisputed that the first injury did not cause an incapacity and that the
claimant continued to work his regular job until paralyzed several months
after the second injury. Moreover, the court's definition of "injury" was
unwarranted; the term injury was defined in the Act to mean damage or
harm to the physical structure of the body. 65 The Act made the definition of
injury applicable to all sections of the compensation law.166 Without doubt
the Clark court was wrong in its construction of 12c.
For several years Clark was ignored. The courts continued to hold that
the proper test in a 12c case was a "causal connection between the two
injuries."1 67 In 1933, one of the clearest opinions regarding 12c's application
was handed down by the same court and same judge that had decided Clark.
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Leigh I" the jury found the claim-
162. 23 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, writ dism'd).
163. Id. at 409.
164. Id.
165. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 103, § 1, at 291.
166. Id.
167. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Pugh, 57 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933,
writ dism'd).
168. 57 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, no writ).
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ant suffered a prior injury to his left eye which resulted in a twenty-five
per cent loss of vision. The claimant sustained another injury to his left eye
resulting in total loss of left eye vision. The carrier contended the claimant
was only entitled to seventy-five per cent of the compensation provided for
one eye because of section 12c. In rejecting this contention Chief Justice
Hickman wrote:
Where the combined effect of the previous injury and the subsequent
injury is to increase the incapacity of the employee beyond that which
would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone, the statute
would operate. But where, as in this case, the condition of incapacity
following the subsequent injury is the same as it would have been had
there been no previous injury, the statute has no application.169
No more concise restatement of the "but for" test of causal connection
could be desired. Judge Hickman specifically relied upon and cited Gilmore
as authority for the court's holding, 170 a citation conspicuously absent from
the Clark opinion. There was also no reference to whether the prior injury
was compensable or noncompensable. In 1935, however, the same court
resurrected the "compensative injury ' 171 issue in Casualty Reciprocal Ex-
change v. Dawson,7 2 and added an unnecessary distinction between general
and specific injuries. The claimant, as in Clark, received two injuries while
working for the same employer. The first injury occurred on November 6,
1931, and resulted in only four days lost time. The carrier tried to prove that
the first injury was responsible for all or at least a major part of the
claimant's incapacity. 73 The opinion is again unclear as to how the 12c issue
was raised procedurally, but apparently it was on the carrier's no evidence
or insufficiency points. In any event, the court rejected the carrier's attack
based only upon their own opinion in Clark. The court wrote:
We think that the injuries contemplated in said provision [section 12c]
are only those for which the law provides that compensation shall be
paid . . .[citing Clark]. Where an injury is general and not specific, the
liability is to compensate only for incapacity. There may be injury
without incapacity, at least without such incapacity as the law requires
compensation shall be paid, and such. . . was the injury of November
6, 1931. The law makes no provision to compensate for an incapacity of
less than one week. . . . [T]here was less than a week's incapacity
resulting from the former injury. 74
Curiously, in an alternative holding 75 the court, although not citing Leigh,
reverted to the causal connection test which it had correctly applied in
Leigh. The court held that if its interpretation that 12c applied only to
compensable injuries was mistaken, the carrier's position still could not be
sustained because the trial court had found that the first injury had not
169. Id. at 607.
170. Id.
171. See quotation in text accompanying note 164 supra.
172. 81 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935), writ dism'd, 130Tex. 362, 107 S.W.2d
994 (1937). Writ of error was granted by the supreme court but subsequently dismissed because
the motion for rehearing in the court of civil appeals did not properly preserve petitioner's
points of error. 130 Tex. at 362, 107 S.W.2d at 994.
173. 81 S.W.2d at 286.




contributed to the incapacity resulting from the second injury. Therefore it
was unnecessary for the court to expound on general versus specific injuries
and what was or was not compensable. Dawson, nevertheless, was the first
case to mention a distinction between general and specific injuries and this
distinction, though irrelevant, later became the foundation supporting the
present day misapplication of 12c.
In 1936 the supreme court in passing acknowledged the existence of
section 12c. 7 6 Without citing any authorities, the court simply stated that
under 12c if the evidence raised the issue of previous injuries, the carrier
was entitled to an issue whether the claimant's disability was "directly
attributable to causes independent of the alleged injuries. 177 Clearly, this is
an erroneous statement. The court confused sole cause with 12c's percent-
age contribution procedure.
In 1936 the San Antonio court of civil appeals, following Clark, added its
own brand of confusion to 12c. In Texas Indemnity Co. v. McNew, 178 the
court first correctly held that the carrier was not entitled to a 12c issue when
there was no evidence that a prior injury had contributed to his subsequent
incapacity: a clear statement of the causal connection test. Inexplicably,
however, the court attempted to buttress its opinion by citing Clark and
holding that the issue was properly refused since there was no evidence that
the prior injury was compensable. Moreover, the court gratuitously added
that since the jury had also found that the claimant's physical condition was
not due solely to causes independent of his employment, the 12c issue was
properly refused; an obvious reference to the supreme court's erroneous
statement in Williamson.
Two years later the San Antonio court added to the confusion surrounding
12c in Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Wyrick. 179 The claimant re-
covered total-permanent benefits flowing from an injury suffered in May,
1936. Prior to that injury the employee had suffered a hernia, which was
corrected by radical surgery and for which he received compensation bene-
fits. He had also sustained noncompensable injuries in an automobile acci-
dent in 1935. The court remanded the case for failure to submit issues on
partial and temporary total incapacity, but also addressed itself to 12c. The
court held 12c inapplicable because the hernia injury had not contributed to
the subsequent incapacity. The court also noted that the automobile acci-
dent injuries were noncompensable and, therefore, couldt not offset subse-
quent incapacity even if those injuries had contributed to the subsequent
incapacity. In so holding, the court without any authority stated:
The obvious purpose of §12c is to prevent double recovery for the same
incapacity; so that, if an employee receives a prior compensable injury,
and is compensated for the resulting incapacity, and afterwards re-
ceives a second or successive injury, which, together with the prior
injuries, result in total and permanent incapacity, the compensation
received for the prior injury must be deducted from the final award. But
176. Williamson v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 127 Tex. 71, 90 S.W.2d 1088 (1936).
177. Id. at 76, 90 S.W.2d at 1090.
178. 90 S.W.2d 1115 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1936, writ dism'd).
179. 118 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1938, no writ).
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where the prior injury is not compensable and yet merely contributes to
the incapacity following a subsequent injury, the employee will be
entitled to full compensation for his ascertained incapacity. 8 °
Although the court relied upon Dawson and its own decision in
McNew,181 neither opinion supported the statements made by the court.
Despite this, the statements later became, along with other unsupported
statements, the foundation for the present day misapplication of 12c and the
Second Injury Fund. The most shocking aspect of Wyrick was the court's
apparent ignorance of the commission of appeals' decision in Gilmore, ten
years earlier. If Wyrick was correct in stating the purpose of 12c to be
preventing double recovery for the same incapacity, then it is proper to
inquire whether the prior injury was compensable. The error in Wyrick's
hypothesis, as well as Clark, Dawson and McNew, is that the wording of the
statute does not require the prior injury to be compensable and the leading
case, Gilmore, clearly delineates the section's contemporary purpose and
scope. According to Gilmore, the purpose of 12c is to prevent discrimination
against handicapped workers by placing them, from the employers' view-
point, on an equal basis with nonhandicapped workers as relates to
compensable consequences of an industrial injury. Wyrick's purported
rationale of preventing double recovery would only benefit those workmen
handicapped by on the job injuries and exclude those equally handicapped
by congenital defects, illnesses, noncompensable and nonindustrial acci-
dents and injuries. Surely the legislature did not intend to foster that kind of
discrimination.
The Wyrick court's statement that the compensation received for the
prior injury was to be deducted from the final award otherwise recoverable
for the second injury was unsupported by authority and an inaccurate
oversimplification. The compensation paid for the first injury was not the
same as the statutory requirement that only so much of the resulting disabili-
ty as was attributable to the second injury alone be compensated. Subse-
quent to Wyrick the opinions construing 12c continued to apply the causal
connection criteria required by the statute and Gilmore and other cases. 182
One case in particular should be noted, however, because it involved a
contention which, on its face, appeared ludicrous, but which became the law
after 1947. Considering the precise wording of section 12c 83 it is difficult to
180. Id. at 924 (emphasis added).
181. The court also cited Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Parr, 16 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1929), aff'd, 30 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted), and
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Pugh, 57 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933, writ
dism'd). Neither Parr nor Pugh are authority for the court's statement.
182. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Fletcher, 214 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wright, 196 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 193 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1946, no writ); Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Arant, 171 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Southern Underwriters v. Mowery, 147 S.W.2d 834 (Tex.
Civ. App.- Texarkana 1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Griffis,
141 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Pierson, 135 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, no writ); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Watson, 131 S.W.2d 1103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.). The
Watson case was the subject of a student case note in 18 TEXAS L. REV. 243 (1939). The author
is able to harmonize the holdings of Clark, McNew and Wyrick but is unable to explain the
Gilmore holding in relation to the former three cases.
183. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
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imagine a legitimate contention being advanced that 12c applies to injuries
subsequent to the injury made the basis of the particular suit. In Southern
Underwriters v. Grimes,' 84 however, the trial court submitted an issue in-
quiring if a subsequent injury was the sole cause of the claimant's alleged
disability. On appeal the carrier complained that the issue as submitted
denied it the right to have the jury determine if the incapacity was caused
partially by the subsequent injury. The court overruled this contention
quoting section 12c and noting: 85
The provision [12c] plainly refers to injuries occurring before or concur-
rently with the injury for which compensation is sought and not after-
ward, as in the case of the injuries sustained by plaintiff on January 5,
1939 [subsequent to the injury sued upon] (Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. Pierson, Tex. Civ. App., 135 S.W.2d 550), and is therefore inapplica-
ble here.
The Pierson 186 case cited by the Grimes court was not direct authority for
the proposition that 12c is inapplicable to subsequent injuries, but it is clear
that Grimes was correct in its holding. 187
The 50th Legislature amended section 12c in 1947188 by adding the follow-
ing clause: "[P]rovided that there shall be created a fund known as the
'Second Injury Fund' hereinafter described, from which an employee who
has suffered a subsequent injury shall be compensated for the combined
incapacities resulting from both injuries. ' ' 189
A new section, 12c-1,1 90 provided for the liability of the Second Injury
Fund for successive specific injuries:
If an employee who has previously lost, or lost the use of, one hand,
one arm, one foot, one leg, or one eye, becomes permanently and
totally incapacitated through the loss or loss of use of another member
or organ, the association shall be liable only for the compensation
payable for such second injury provided, however, that in addition to
such compensation and after the combination of the payments therefor,
the employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that
would be due for the total permanent incapacity out of the special fund
known as 'Second Injury Fund' hereinafter defined. 191
Section 12c-2192 provided the means for the accumulation of money to be
used to operate the Second Injury Fund. In an unusual emergency clause1 93
the legislature suspended the constitutional rule requiring bills to be read
three separate days in each House:
184. 146 S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
185. Id. at 1061.
186. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Pierson, 135 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1940, no writ).
187. Pierson is interesting in the respect that the facts are somewhat analogous to Texas
Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Clark, 23 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, writ
dism'd). See notes 188-92 supra. In Pierson, as in Clark, the claimant received two injuries
within one month while working for the same employer. The suit was based on both injuries.
The Pierson court, contrary to the Clark court, had little difficulty reaching the conclusion that
section 12c was inapplicable, not because the prior injury was not compensable, but because
there simply was no evidence of any prior incapacity contributing to the incapacity made the
basis of the suit.
188. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 349, § 1, at 690-91.
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The fact that there is an urgent need to facilitate the employment of
handicapped persons including a large number of returning veterans
through the establishment of a special fund out of which such persons
may be compensated when they sustain a subsequent injury, creates an
emergency .... 194
The first case'9 5 interpreting the Second Injury Fund amendments was State
v. Bothe.' 96 ,Bothe sustained a compensable industrial injury in 1941 which
resulted in the amputation of his right leg above the knee. He was paid the
seemingly incredible sum of $100.00 in settlement of his workman's
compensation claim."9 In 1948 Bothe was involved in a second industrial
accident loosing his left leg above the knee. He was paid $3,500.00 in
workman's compensation benefits for the second amputation. He then ap-
plied to the Second Injury Fund for additional compensation and was
awarded $25.00. This represented the difference between the compensation
payable for the loss of each leg at 200 weeks per leg and the compensation
payable for total permanent disability or 401 weeks. The trial court, how-
ever, deducted from the amount payable for total permanent incapacity (401
weeks at $25.00 per week or $10,025.00) the sums actually paid to Bothe for
the two injuries ($100.00 plus $3,500.00 or a total of $3,600.00) and held the
Second Injury Fund liable for the discounted lump sum balance. A third
result, and, it is submitted, the correct result, was reached by Justice
Norvell after carefully reviewing the legislative and social purposes of 12c
and the Second Injury Fund statutes. The court isolated the phrase "that in
addition to such compensation and after the combination of payments there-
for, the employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation for the
combined incapacities"' 98 and indicated that it was the key to the interpreta-
tion of the statute. The court held that "therefor" referred to "such
compensation," "such compensation" referred to the compensation pay-
able for the' secopd injury, and that the phrase "combination of the pay-
ments" referred not to payments for more than one injury, but one injury
only, that is, the second injury for which Bothe was entitled to receive 200
weekly payments of $25.00 or a total of $5,000.00. Thus the employee was
entitled to receive from the Second Injury Fund the difference between total
permanent disability, 401 weeks at $25.00 per week or $10,025.00, and the
194. Id.
.195. During the period from June 1947 to May 1950 there were only two published appellate
opinions dealing with section 12c. Neither opinion, however, discussed the Second Injury Fund
amendments. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 229 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (held the jury's negative answer to the prior injury percentage contribu-
tion issue was supported by sufficient evidence, i.e., no evidence of causal connection between
prior incapacity and subsequent incapacity); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Tanner, 218
S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (carrier waived 12c defense by
failing to request submission of special issues).
196. 231 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, no writ). Actually, the Galveston
court of civil appeals had already rendered an opinion in January 1950 on the Second Injury
Fund amendments in Industrial Accident Bd. v. Miears, 227 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1950). The supreme court granted a writ of error, however, and handed down an
opinion on June 28, 1950. Miears v. Industrial Accident Bd., 149 Tex. 270, 232 S.W.2d 671(1950). See notes 201-05 infra and accompanying text. The Galveston court's opinion, although
lengthy, is not particularly instructive.
197. There is no explanation in the opinion as to why this settlement was for such a small
sum.
198. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 349, § 1, at 690-91. See text accompanying note 191 supra.
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"combination of the payments" for the second injury, 200 weeks at $25.00
per week or $5,000.00 which was $5,025.00. The court also stated that it was
improper to compute the amount due for total permanent disability on a
weekly basis, while calculating the amount payable for the second injury on
a compromise or discounted lump sum basis. In speaking of the purpose of
section 12c-1 as it related to 12c, the court cited and heavily quoted the
Gilmore decision, and agreed with Gilmore's analysis of the social and legal
policies which compelled the enactment of 12c. The court then wrote:
Prior to the 1947 amendment, Texas was operating under a law which
chose the lesser of two evils. A person who had lost an arm, foot or an
eye and was then permanently disabled by the loss of another member
was not adequately compensated for such loss, but it was possible for
such handicapped person to obtain employment and prevent his becom-
ing a charge upon society. The Second-Injury Fund amendment sought
to correct the inadequacy of the compensation award and at the same
time avoid the danger of making it difficult for a handicapped person to
obtain employment. Instead of requiring the previously injured employ-
ee to carry the risk of subsequent permanent and total disability, or
placing that risk upon the employer of the handicapped person (as was
done in Oklahoma), the risk of second injury, resulting in total and
permanent disability was placed upon all employers carrying work-
men's compensation insurance within the State of Texas. Payments into
the second injury fund are made by insurance carriers upon death
claims in cases where no one is entitled to a compensation award under
the statute. The particular employer and his insurance carrier is not
directly penalized for having afforded to a handicapped person the
opportunity of engaging in a gainful occupation and making his own
living. 199
It should be noted that Bothe's prior injury was a compensable injury for
which he was paid workman's compensation benefits. Nevertheless, the
compensability or noncompensability of the prior injury was not a deter-
minative factor in the court's decision. Speaking to this point Justice Norvell
wrote:
In our opinion, neither the compensation provided for nor the compen-
sation actually paid for a prior injury is to be considered in determining
the amount due an injured employee out of the Second-Injury
Fund. . . . It is obviously immaterial whether the prior injury be
compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act or not. This is
clearly indicated by the emergency clause of the amendment. 2°
Miears v. Industrial Accident Board2°0 was decided a little more than one
month after Bothe. The Bothe opinion was not mentioned by the supreme
court since the court was unaware of Justice Norvell's recent writings on the
subject. The Miears facts were nearly identical with those of Gilmore.
Miears lost one eye in a noncompensable accident in 1929. He lost the other
eye in an industrial accident in 1946 and received the statutory 100 weeks
compensation at $25.00 per week. The Second Injury Fund paid Miears for
201 weeks having deducted the 100 weeks which would have been paid for
the first injury had it been compensable, as well as the 100 weeks actually
199. 231 S.W.2d at 457-58.
200. Id. at 458.
201. 149 Tex. 270, 232 S.W.2d 671 (1950).
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paid for the second injury from the 401 weeks payable for total permanent
incapacity. The trial court deducted only the 100 weeks actually paid, but
the court of civil appeals sustained the Fund's calculation and deducted 200
weeks. In an opinion remarkably similar to Bothe the supreme court
construed the statute in the same manner as did Bothe and reached the same
result. 202 In addition to construing the Second Injury Fund statutes, the
court also addressed the operation of section 12c. The court, however,
failed to resolve the conflict between the Gilmore causal connection line of
cases and the Clark, Dawson, McNew and Wyrick opinions. 2 3 The court
did, however, recognize Gilmore's observations regarding the social and
legal purposes behind 12c and noted that the "construction of the statute
[12c] as announced in Gilmore. . . still controls." The court concluded that
the amendments forming the Second Injury Fund did not alter the meaning
of section 12c and that it was certainly operational with respect to Miears'
first noncompensable specific injury just as it was in Gilmore. The court
noted that even though the Gilmore opinion had never been questioned,
there were cases, involving general as opposed to specific injuries, that
required the first injury to be compensable before 12c was applicable. The
court then cited Clark, Parr, Dawson, McNew and Arant.201 The court,
nevertheless, concluded:
We need not attempt to resolve the apparent conflict between the cases
just cited and the Gilmore case, because, in our opinion, the Gilmore
case has settled the law that section 12c is applicable to cases involving
specific injuries such as in this case and there is nothing in the 1947
amendment to show a legislative intent to change the law in this re-
spect. 205
It is unfortunate that the court avoided the issues of compensable versus
noncompensable and general versus specific injury. What is the distinction
between a man handicapped by an amputated limb and one handicapped by
a spinal injury, or an abdominal injury, or chest injury or any number of
disabling, crippling, nonspecific injuries? Moreover, could the legislature
have intended to make the distinction made by Clark, Dawson, McNew, and
Wyrick between a workman disabled by an industrial injury as opposed to
one disabled by a congenital defect, war injury, or any other cause outside
of industry? Those decisions result in a discrimination; in effect, employers
are told that they will not be saddled with the economic burden of a
subsequent accident only if they employ workers previously injured at
work. If the prior injury was compensable, then 12c will operate to allow
consideration of the prior incapacity. Employees disabled by a cause outside
202. Id. at 277, 232 S.W.2d at 675.
203. See notes 154-81 supra and accompanying text.
204. The court's citation to Parr was the Commission of Appeals opinion. Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Parr, 16 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1929), aff'd, 30 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted). Neither of the Parr opinions, however, embrace the
compensable injury premise as indicated by the supreme court.
Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Arant, 171 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943, writ ref'd
w.o.m.), does not concern the compensability of a prior injury. In fact, the carrier relied upon a
prior abnormal back condition which was not identified in the opinion. Although the court
spoke of a prior compensable injury, the reference was dicta only since the court held that the
carrier waived any complaint by failing to request a special issue. Id. at 918.
205. Id. at 276, 232 S.W.2d at 674.
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of industry, however, are hired at a substantial economic risk because a
subsequent injury will not invoke 12c's protection. Miears and Bothe cited
and discussed a United States Supreme Court opinion involving the Second
Injury Fund under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act.2" In Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S. S. Co. 207 the
employee, Davis, lost one eye in a noncompensable accident. Subsequently,
he lost the vision of his remaining eye in a job related injury. He was
compensated for the loss of one eye and the question before the court
narrowed to whether the Second Injury Fund or employer was liable for the
difference between compensation for total disability and compensation for
one eye. Rejecting a contention that the statute intended a distinction
between compensable job related prior injuries and noncompensable non-
job related injuries, the court reviewed a mass of expert testimony2 8 related
to employment of handicapped workers. The court concluded: "A distinction
between a worker previously injured in industry and one handicapped by a
cause outside of industry has no logical foundation if we accept the premise
that the purpose of the Fund is that of aid to the handicapped." 21
Up through the Miears decision it was clear that in successive specific
injuries it was immaterial whether the prior injury was or was not compens-
able. The logic of the result was unassailable and certainly fostered the
legislature's purpose of encouraging employers to hire the handicapped. It
would seem to follow from the precise terms of 12c that there also should
not be any distinction between successive injuries, whether specific or
general. That this conclusion was not accepted in subsequent opinions is
probably attributable to the fact that it is sometimes conceptually difficult to
trace the causal connection between two general injuries as opposed to two
amputated legs or arms. When a leg is amputated, the disability is obvious
and continues during the course of employment leading up to the second
injury. Thus, the amputation of the second leg makes the resulting disability
immediately apparent and by definition the requirements of 12c are fulfilled.
It is more difficult to trace the causal connection between two general
injuries. This proof problem has greatly influenced the courts. The medical
testimony is more ambiguous concerning contribution of a prior general
injury than a specific injury. Even so, the application of 12c depends upon
the causal connection, not the compensable nature of the prior injury. The
compensability issue is merely an escape route to avoid the more difficult
causal connection issue.
206. 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).
207. 336 U.S. 198 (1949).
208. Numerous sources are quoted by the court in the text of the opinion as well as a number
of footnotes. One of the more interesting and revealing comments was quoted as follows:
Perhaps the most impressive evidence .. .is that offered by Mr. L.K. Huber of
Oklahoma. Nease v. Hughes Stone Co., 114 Okla. 170, 244 P. 778, held the
employer liable for total compensation for loss of the second eye. After the
decision, Mr. Huber reports, 'Thousands of one-eyed, one-legged, one-armed,
one-handed men in the State of Oklahoma were let out and can not [sic] get
employment coming under the workmen's compensation law of Oklahoma. ...
The decision displaced between seven and eight thousand men in less than 30 days
in Oklahoma.'
336 U.S. at 203-04 (footnotes omitted).
209. Id. at 204.
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From the time of the Miears and Bothe opinions in 1950 until 1961, 12c
and the Second Injury Fund were the subject of several court of civil
appeals decisions. The first opinion following Miears was Texas Employers'
Insurance Association v. Sevier.2 1° The carrier contended that a prior non-
compensable car accident, which had resulted in leg injuries, contributed to
the claimant's incapacity from general injuries received in the industrial
accident made the basis of the suit. The jury disagreed. The court of civil
appeals overruled the carrier's contention that the jury's negative answer to
the contribution issue was not supported by any evidence or was against the
great weight of the evidence. The court also overruled the carrier's com-
plaint that the claimant's counsel, in jury argument, had discussed the
noncompensable nature of the 1951 car accident. The court noted that no
special issue had been submitted inquiring whether the 1951 accident was
compensable nor had any evidence been produced on that issue. In holding
that the argument was harmless, although clearly outside of the record, the
court stated that it was immaterial whether the accident was compensable
since the only issue involved was whether the prior accident contributed to
the subsequent incapacity. "If a prior injury contributes to a disability
which follows a second injury, recovery is reduced by the amount of the
contribution regardless of whether or not the prior injury was compensable
''211
Unfortunately, the Eastland court did not follow Sevier when it decided
Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Upshaw212 four years later. In
fact in Upshaw the court did not once refer to the Sevier opinion. Upshaw
brought two separate suits which were consolidated for trial. The jury found
he sustained an injury on April 9, 1957 resulting in 16 weeks temporary
partial incapacity, but without any loss in wage earning capacity. The jury
also determined that Upshaw was injured on December 9, 1957 resulting in
total permanent incapacity. The jury further found that the April, 1957
injury was not the sole cause of Upshaw's incapacity after December, 1957
but that the April, 1957 injury did contribute twenty per cent to the Decem-
ber incapacity. Judgment was entered for the claimant for the total perma-
nent incapacity resulting from the December accident. The amount of the
judgment was reduced, however, to reflect the twenty per cent contribution
of the April injury. The Eastland court's opinion can be characterized as
disorganized and illogical; however, the court ultimately relied upon the
authority of Clark, Dawson and McNew21 3 to hold that a prior general injury
must be a compensable injury in order to provide the carrier with a 12c
contribution defense. The court then converted the April, 1957 on-the-job
injury to a noncompensable injury by holding that since the jury had found
temporary partial disability, but no diminished wage earning capacity as a
210. 279 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
211. Id. at 478.
212. 329 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
213. The court also cited the Arant case in its string citation. Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v.
Arant, 171 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.). Arant, however,
does not appear to be authority supporting the proposition that a prior general injury must be
compensable in order to provide the carrier a 12c defense. See note 204 supra.
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result of the injury, the injury was noncompensable. Thus, the jury's twenty
per cent contribution finding was unavailable to offset the total permanent
disability judgment. 214
During the next few years other courts of civil appeals were confronted
with 12c problems. 215 The opinions reflect the continuing confusion between
12c and 12c-1. In 1961, within a week, the supreme court handed down two
opinions involving the Second Injury Fund. In Industrial Accident Board v.
Guidry,21 6 the court, for the first time, held that the thirty day and six month
limitations of section 4a 217 were applicable to a workman's claim against the
Second Injury Fund. Since Guidry had not notified the Fund of his claim
within 30 days of his accident or filed any notice of claim within six months,
judgment was rendered that he take nothing. The court demonstrated its
own confusion by blending together 12c and 12c-1 when it stated that
Guidry's suit was filed to recover benefits from the Second Injury Fund as
provided in sections 12c, 12c-1 and 12c-2. 218 Clearly, 12c has nothing to do
with the operation of the Fund other than to refer to its existence.
In Second Injury Fund v. Keaton219 the court construed 12c-1 to be limited
in application to those cases involving specific injuries which result in total
permanent incapacity. According to the court, no combination of general
injuries or specific injuries resulting only in partial incapacity were
compensable from the Fund. 220 The precise language of 12c-1 permitted no
other construction. It is obvious that when the legislature provided for
compensation from the Fund they made a difficult economic choice as to
who had to bear the burden of subsequent injuries. This was the same choice
made when 12c was first included in the Act. Moreover, the legislature
probably intended to limit claims on the Second Injury Fund to those cases
involving legitimate industrial total permanent incapacity rather than func-
tional total permanent incapacity which is awarded by a jury. Due to the
liberal interpretation of the Act, numerous workers collect total and perma-
nent benefits without being permanently disabled as would be a double
214. The court went on to hold, however, that even though the trial court improperly
reduced the claimant's recovery by 20%, the claimant failed to complain of this by cross-point,
and thereby waived any complaint that the judgment was erroneous. 329 S.W.2d at 147.
215. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Robison, 340 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Brinkley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 S.W. 2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1959, no writ). Robison involved two prior noncompensible injuries which were not designated
as general or specific. The court held that the issues and instructions (not quoted) properly
submitted the percentage contribution defense to the jury citing two cases in support of its
holding, Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. Carrell, 318 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Jolly, 307 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Carrell held that there was no evidence to support the
submission of percentage contribution issues since there was no proof that the prior injuries
contributed to the claimant's incapacity. This was a concise restatement of the proper 12c test,
i.e., causal connection. Jolly, on the other hand, did not even involve prior injuries. The
carrier's defense was based upon pre-existing abnormalities. The court held that this defense
was properly submitted by the court's sole cause issue.
Brinkley held that it was error to allow the claimant to be cross-examined concerning the
amounts he was paid in settlement of 12 prior injuries especially in view of the fact that the
carrier made no effort to connect the prior injuries to the present disability.
216. 162 Tex. 160, 345 S.W.2d 509 (1961).
217. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
218. 162 Tex. at 161, 345 S.W.2d at 510.
219. 162 Tex. 250, 345 S.W.2d 711 (1961).
220. Id. at 253, 345 S.W.2d at 714.
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amputee or a person who is industrially blind. Thus, the court reversed and
rendered judgment that the claimant take nothing. 2 ' Though the court
recited that the intention of the legislature must be ascertained in order to
interpret the statute, the court never acknowledged the legislature's
emergency clause declaration or delved into the amendment's background.
Little more than one year later the supreme court in St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Murphree,222 made the pronouncement which ef-
fectively nullified the legislature's efforts to encourage the employment of
disabled workers. In affirming the trial court and the court of civil appeals,
the court ignored the conflict in the case law as well as the plain wording of
12c and held that a prior general injury must be compensable in order to
reduce a carrier's liability pursuant to 12c:
We hold that the word injury as used in section 12c ... as related to a
general injury, means compensative injury. Unless the prior general
injury is one for which compensation is provided under the terms of the
statute, the insurer's or carrier's liability cannot be reduced byreason
thereof.2
23
In support of this unique interpretation of the statute, the court cited
Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Bledsoe, 224 Texas Employers' Insurance
Association v. Upshaw ,225 Southern Underwriters v. Grimes ,226 and Texas
Employers' Insurance Association v. Clark.227 The court's reliance upon
these "authorities" is demonstrative of the ill-considered manner in which
courts sometimes string citations together without any research into the
holdings of the particular cases. The Bledsoe court did not even mention
12c. The point raised by the carrier in Bledsoe concerned the jury's negative
answer to a sole cause special issue and not a percentage contribution issue.
Upshaw relied upon Clark as authority for its holding228 but directly
conflicted with the Sevier opinion written by the same court less than four
years earlier. 229 There the court held that, "if a prior injury contributes to a
disability . . . recovery is reduced by the amount of the contribution regard-
less of whether or not the prior injury was compensable. ,230 Grimes did not
involve a prior injury at all; it involved a subsequent injury. In an alternative
holding, the Grimes court, relying upon Wyrick,23' did state that a further
reason the subsequent injury was not available as an offset under section
221. Second Injury Fund v. Keaton, 337 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960),
rev 'd, 162 Tex. 250, 345 S.W.2d 711 (1961). In allowing recovery the court liberally interpreted
the statute in a manner similar to the United States Supreme Court in Lawson v. Suwannee
Fruit & S. S. Co., 336 U.S. 198 (1949). See notes 206-09 supra and accompanying text.
222. 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744 (1962).
223. Id. at 542, 357 S.W.2d at 749 (emphasis added).
224. 344 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
225. 329 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See notes 212-14
supra and accompanying text.
226. 146 S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.). See
notes 184-85 supra and accompanying text.
227. 23 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, writ dism'd). See notes 162-66 suprn
and accompanying text.
228. See note 213 supra and accompanying text.
229. See notes 210-14 supra and accompanying text.
230. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sevier, 279 S.W,.2d 473, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
231. 146 S.W.2d at 1062.
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12c was because it was not compensable. It is incredible that the supreme
court cited Grimes as authority because Grimes' primary holding was that
12c was inapplicable to subsequent injuries. In Murphree the carrier
contended that both prior and subsequent injuries were responsible for the
claimant's disability and the supreme court held that a subsequent compens-
able general injury is available as a percentage offset under 12c!232 Grimes
and Murphree, therefore, are in direct conflict.
It was most unfortunate that the supreme court adopted the adjective
"compensative 233 to limit the word injury. This adjective first appeared in
the Clark opinion 234 and was as irrelevant to section 12c in 1962 as it was
thirty-two years earlier in Clark. There is no court opinion to date analyzing,
justifying or rationalizing the reasons for inserting the concept of "compen-
sative" general injury in 12c. The express wording of the statute certainly
does not refer to compensability. Even liberal rules of statutory construc-
tion do not provide any implication or suggestion that the statute refers to
compensable injuries. Insight into the legislative and socio-economic back-
ground of 12c strongly suggests the opposite conclusion.2 35 Analysis of the
Clark opinion reveals no reasoning behind the adoption of the concept other
than that it was necessary in order to achieve the result desired in that
case. 236 Moreover, the compensative injury concept is contrary to the legis-
lative definition of the word injury which was made mandatory for use in all
sections of the Compensation Act. At the time of the Clark opinion, injury
was deemed by the legislature to mean damage or harm to the physical
structure of the body, including diseases and infections naturally resulting
from such damage or harm.237 In 1962, the term "injury" was defined by the
legislature to mean:
Whenever the terms injury or personal injury are used in the workmen's
compensation law . . ., such terms shall be construed to mean damage
or harm to the physical structure of the body and such diseases or
infections as naturally result therefrom . . . . [Sluch terms shall also be
construed to mean and include occupational diseases. . . .The follow-
ing diseases only shall be deemed occupational diseases. 238
Thus, if the phrase "shall be construed to mean" is given effect, section
12c would read as follows:
If an employee who has suffered a previous . . .[damage or harm to
the physical structure of the body] shall suffer a subsequent ...[damage or harm to the physical structure of the body] which results in
a condition of incapacity to which both . . .[damage and harm to the
physical structure of the body] or their effects have contributed, the
Association . . .shall be liable because of such . . .[damage or harm
to the physical structure of the body] only for the compensation to
232. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
233. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 542, 357 S.W.2d 744, 749(1962). See note 223 supra and quotation in text.
234. See note 164 supra and quotation in text.
235. See notes 154-56 supra and accompanying text.
236. See notes 162-66 supra and accompanying text.
237. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
238. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 113, § 2, at 177 (emphasis added). Thereafter followed a list of
specific occupational diseases. In 1955 the list was amended, without any other changes, to
include psittacosis. 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 1, at 662-63.
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which the subsequent. . . [damage or harm to the physical structure of
the body] would have entitled the injured employee had there been no
previous. . . [damage or harm to the physical structure of the body]. 239
The manner in which the supreme court transformed this definition of
injury into "compensative injury" is a feat of magic worthy of Houdini, and
literally defies the imagination. Even more amazing, however, was the
court's ability to deduce from the words in section 12c that the legislature
had determined that subsequent compensable general injuries also were to
be used to reduce a workman's recovery. Prior to Murphree, no Texas court
had ever held that 12c was applicable to subsequent injuries, whether
compensable or not. In fact one of the cases cited by the supreme court
specifically held that the statute referred only to injuries occurring before or
concurrently with the injury for which compensation was sought, and not to
subsequent injuries.24° The supreme court, however, without discussion or
citation wrote, "it is the extent of the prior and subsequent injuries that
reduces the insurer's liability .... 241 There is no hint in the opinion why
the court transformed the 12c words "previous injury" into "prior and
subsequent injuries. ' 24 2 It is obvious from Gilmore's exploration of the
intent behind section 12c that the legislature did not intend subsequent
injuries to reduce a workman's recovery. The statute logically contemplates
that each successive injury be litigated in order, with prior injuries reducing
the subsequent recovery.
More disappointing than the court's compensative and subsequent injury
holdings was the complete disregard for the discriminatory impact resulting
from the distinction created between prior specific and prior general in-
juries; this distinction still exists today. Miears and Bothe held that 12c was
operational for prior specific injuries whether compensable or not.2 43 Mur-
phree held that prior and subsequent general injuries come within the pur-
view of section 12c only if they are compensative injuries. Thus, Texas
employers are placed in a dilemma: hire those persons disabled by specific
injuries, no matter how the injury occurred, and secure the law's protection
from paying full benefits should they be injured again; or hire those persons
disabled by noncompensative general injuries resulting from disease, illness,
congenital defect or injury, and risk uncertain economic consequences if
they are injured again. Employers concerned with escalating compensation
insurance premiums based on injury experience ratings, will quickly
239. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 349, § I, at 690-91. The definition of injury is no different
today except that the legislature has repealed the list of occupational diseases and substituted a
broad definition which encompasses any disease arising out of and in the course and scope of
employment and which causes damage or harm to the physical structure of the body. TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
240. Southern Underwriters v. Grimes, 146 S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.). See notes 184-85 supra and accompanying text.
241. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 540, 357 S.W.2d 744, 748
(1962).
242. "If an employee who has suffered a previous injury shall suffer a subsequent injury
which results in a condition of incapacity to which both injuries . . . have contributed, the
association . . . shall be liable because of such injury [the subsequent injury] only for the
compensation to which the subsequent injury would have entitled the injured employee bad
there been no previous injury .... ." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon
Supp. 1978) (emphasis supplied).
243. See notes 195-205 supra and accompanying text.
19781
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
conclude that they may not be able to hire nonindustrially, generally disabl-
ed workers, despite affirmative action programs of the government for the
hiring of the handicapped.
Equally important to the Second Injury Fund statute and its effect on the
hiring of handicapped workmen is the Fund's present limitation to specific
loss of limbs and eyes. This restriction ignores a vast array of pre-existing
impairments and effectively impedes employment of disabled persons.
Since employers are liable for the aggravation of previously existing condi-
tions, whether congenital, accidental or otherwise, it is no wonder that a
prospective employee with a known cardiac disease, prior degenerative disc
disease with resulting laminectomy and/or fusion, or a history of spinal
arthritis, finds it difficult, if not impossible to secure gainful employment.
Part of the discrimination that now exists against workers afflicted with
these types of general problems would vanish if the legislature would amend
12c and 12c-1 to allow a broader range of claims against the Second Injury
Fund thereby reducing the individual employer's economic burden.
Plainly, the prior contribution-Second Injury Fund concept is fraught
with difficult problems, social, economic, moral, legal and business, but
above all, human. As Justice Norvell said in Bothe: "It is generally recog-
nized that the failure of society to make use of the services of handicapped
persons is not only an injustice to the individuals involved but also consti-
tutes an economic waste and is the mark of an inefficient social and econom-
ic organization." '12" The point is the wording of the current Texas statute,
even if the courts had not construed it illogically, is insufficient to solve the
realities existing in today's industrial world. Added to this initial problem is
the fact that the Texas courts have construed the statute in such manner as
to further limit an already archaic remedy. The solution, however, will
probably not come from courts reluctant to admit past mistakes and correct
results already explained by hyperbolic, verbose rationalizations.
Although legislative change in the current statutes is a possibility, in order
to determine the manner in which 12c and 12c-1 will function now that they
have returned to their pre-1971 status, the decisions occurring after Mur-
phree must be analyzed.
In 1962 after the surpeme court's decision in Murphree, it was clear that
with respect to 12c and specific injuries, it was immaterial whether the prior
specific injury was or was not compensable. 25 Based on Murphree, it was
equally clear that with respect to general injuries and 12c, only those prior
general injuries for which compensation was provided were available to
reduce the carrier's liability. 246 Section 12c was also applicable to both prior
and subsequent injuries "inasmuch as it is the extent of the prior and
244. State v. Bothe, 231 S.W.2d 453, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, no writ). See
generally, 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 59.31-.43 (1976).
245. See, e.g., Miears v. Industrial Accident Bd., 149 Tex. 270, 232 S.W.2d 671 (1950);
Gilmore v. Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n, 292 S.W. 204 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt
adopted); State v: Bothe, 231 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, no writ).
246. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 542, 357 S.W.2d 744, 749




subsequent injuries that reduces the insurer's liability. "2 47 It was established
that the Second Injury Fund only applied in cases of successive specific
injuries resulting in total permanent incapacity.214 Moreover, the employee's
claim against the Fund was subject to the same time limitations applicable to
any other compensation claim.
249
In 1962 section 12c had been part of the Compensation Act for 45 years.
Despite numerous court opinions interpreting the section, confusion among
the courts persisted. There were numerous unanswered questions regarding
the application of 12c. Did compensable mean any type of compensation
such as collecting a judgment against a negligent automobile driver or store
owner who caused the prior injury? Did compensable mean actually collect-
ing money? For example, suppose the employee is clearly entitled to
compensation benefits but fails to file a timely claim, is this injury compen-
sable? How does a carrier prove compensability or an employee disprove
compensability? What specific mathematical calculation is required to re-
duce an employee's benefits if a prior injury contributed twenty-five, thirty-
five, fifty-five or ninety-five per cent to his present disability? Is the calcula-
tion the same for total incapacity as it is for partial incapacity and for
specific injuries? Fortunately, before the legislature reversed section 12c in
1971, some of these questions were answered, others, however, remain
unanswered.
In both St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Murphree250 and Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. McCardell,251 the supreme court addressed the
problem of documentary evidence that a prior or subsequent injury was
compensable. Murphree held that under a 12c defense, proof of the mone-
tary amount paid to a claimant in a compensation settlement had no bearing
on the extent of injury or disability and was, therefore, inadmissible. 252 In
McCardell the court considered the admissibility of petitions, affidavits,
247. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 540, 357 S.W.2d 744, 748
(1962). Contra, Southern Underwriters v. Grimes, 146 S.W.2d 1058, 1061 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
248. Second Injury Fund v. Keaton, 162 Tex. 250, 254, 345 S.W.2d 711, 714 (1961).
249. Industrial Accident Bd. v. Guidry, 162 Tex. 160, 164, 345 S.W.2d 509, 512 (1961).
250. 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744 (1962).
251. 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963).
252. In Murphree the carrier also contended that the jury's finding that the claimant's
subsequent accident contributed 5% to the disability he suffered as a result of the accident
being litigated was in irreconcilable conflict with the finding that the accident made the basis of
the suit resulted in total permanent incapacity. The court avoided the question by holding the
carrier waived any potential conflict by failing to assign the alleged error in its motion for new
trial. 163 Tex. at 539-40, 357 S.W.2d at 748-49. In a similar case involving one prior injury, the
Dallas court of civil appeals held that such findings were not conflicting. In General Ins. Co. v.
Hughes, 193 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1946, no writ), the claimant was injured on
June 28, 1944. The jury found temporary total incapacity for 16 weeks and temporary partial
incapacity for 66 weeks. The jury further found that a prior injury in March 1943 contributed
50% to the incapacity existing after the June 28, 1944 injury. The trial court granted the
employee's motion for mistrial alleging a fatal conflict in the jury's findings. The carrier sought
mandamus to compel the trial court to enter judgment based on the jury's answers to the special
issues. The court held that there was no conflict in the jury's findings because the June 1944
injury was only a producing cause of the subsequent incapacity not the sole producing cause.
Id. at 232. An incapacity may result from more than one producing cause and the jury's finding
of incapacity simply meant that the disability existing after the June 1944 injury was the result
of the June injury and whatever other physical conditions existed. The jury found the incapaci-




notices of injury, and claims for compensation arising out of five prior
accidents. In a lengthy opinion the court concluded that the admissibility of
such documentary evidence was governed by the rules of evidence relating
to impeachment and admissions of a party opponent. Thus, the court al-
lowed the introduction of documentary evidence in those instances when
they were inconsistent with the claimant's testimony, and condemned the
introduction of such documents when there was no inconsistency demon-
strated between the documents and the employee's testimony.
In Sowell v. Travelers Insurance Co. 253 the supreme court held that a prior
compensable specific injury was available as a section 12c percentage offset
to a general injury. The court also discussed special issue submissions in 12c
cases. Sowell injured his back in November, 1960. He had suffered a natural
arthritic condition "in his back"25 4 for several years prior to the 1960 injury,
broken his left leg in a compensable accident in 1950, and injured his back in
another compensable accident in 1956. The jury answered 25% to a special
issue inquiring as to the percentage of the disability due solely to the
November, 1960 injury.255 On appeal, the claimant contended that the word
"solely" in the percentage issue did not allow the jury to consider the
aggravation of the pre-existing arthritic condition in assessing the incapacity
from the November, 1960 injury. Based upon the well-established proposi-
tion that an employee is entitled to compensation notwithstanding the fact
that a pre-existing disease or condition may have contributed to the resulting
incapacity, the court held that the percentage issue prevented the jury from
considering the arthritic condition in assessing disability. In order to protect
the claimant's right to a consideration of a pre-existing disease or condition
and the carrier's right to a percentage defense the issue should have inquired
as to what percentage of the incapacity resulted from the prior injuries. 256
The issue submitted would have been appropriate had there not been any
evidence of aggravation of a previously existing disease.
Since the case was to be remanded for new trial, the court also considered
Sowell's contention that it was inappropriate to set off a prior compensable
specific injury against a subsequent general injury. 257 The court rejected this
contention and held that there was some evidence that the prior specific
injury had contributed to the incapacity after November, 1960. The court
further stated: "Section 12c makes no distinction between specific and
general injuries, and we are unwilling to write such a distinction into the
statute. The fact that the legislature has applied different methods in
compensating general and specific injuries cannot be said to alter the clear
terms of §12c." 258
253. 374 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1963).
254. Id. at 413.
255. The issue was: "From a preponderance of the evidence, what percentage, if any, of
plaintiff's incapacity, if any you have found, is due solely to the alleged injury of November 12,
1960? Answer by stating the percentage, if any." Id.
256. Id. at 415.
257. Id. at 415-16. The basis of the contention was that the legislature provided that general
injuries were to be compensated on a loss of earning capacity theory while specific injuries
were compensated according to the schedule of injuries regardless of any loss of earning
capacity. Thus, the legislature could not have intended a prior specific injury to offset a general
injury since they involved two different concepts.
258. Id. at 416. The court's rejection of the claimant's argument regarding the distinction
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The meaning of this statement is unclear. Obviously, 12c does not make a
distinction between the two types of injuries. The courts, however, have
judicially legislated such a distinction. Thus, the only meaning the statement
could possibly have is that specific injuries may be used to offset disabilities
resulting from general injuries and vice versa; and a combination of general
and specific injuries may be used to offset disabilities from general or
specific injuries or disabilities from combinations of general and specific
injuries, subject to the court's "compensative" rule.
The supreme court's final opinion on 12c came in Transport Insurance
Co. v. Mabra .219 The employee injured his back in 1969 and underwent
surgery. He had previously injured his back in 1958 while working for the
same employer and had undergone surgery on that occasion as well. The
jury found that permanent partial incapacity had resulted from the 1969
injury, with the 1958 injury contributing fifty per cent to that incapacity. The
trial court reduced the employee's recovery in accordance with the jury's
finding; the court of civil appeals, however, found no evidence that the prior
injury was compensable and accordingly, awarded full benefits to the claim-
ant. 260 The supreme court agreed with the trial court and held that there was
evidence that the prior injury was compensable. In the course of the opin-
ion, the court quoted rather meager testimony elicited from the claimant on
cross-examination concerning the compensability of the prior general in-
jury. 261 The testimony was that the employee had been injured on the job,
had been paid some weekly compensation while off work and had received a
"little" lump sum compensation settlement after returning to work. The
claimant contended that the reference to compensation could easily have
referred to compensation other than workmen's compensation. The su-
preme court rejected this argument because the jury could have reasonably
inferred from the testimony, the pleadings, and the context of the questions
that the compensation referred to was workmen's compensation. Thus, the
court held that there was some evidence on the issue of compensability.
A more difficult problem for the court was that the jury had not been
requested to find whether the prior injury was compensable. The only issues
submitted regarding the prior injury were whether the prior injury had
contributed to the present disability and the percentage of the contribution.
The court held, however, that since the claimant had not specifically object-
ed to the court's failure to submit an issue on compensability, the missing
issue would be deemed to support the judgment rendered. Thus, the trial
court's jugment reducing compensation was affirmed.
between specific and general injuries actually reinforces Gilmore's original causal relation
concept of 12c. In essence the Sowell court held that the label placed on the prior injury is
irrelevant as is the manner and amount in which it was compensated. Thus the only relevant
inquiry is the contribution the incapacity from the prior injury might have made to the
incapacity existing after the subsequent injury. This is nothing more than a causal relation
inquiry.
259. 487 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1972). The opinion was handed down subsequent to the legislative
amendment reversing the operation of 12c which was effective September 1, 1971. 1971 Tex.
Gen. Laws ch. 316, § 1, at 1257.
260. Mabra v. Transport Ins. Co., 474 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), rev'd, 487
S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1972).
261. The testimony is quoted in question and answer form as it appeared in the statement of
facts. 487 S.W.2d at 706-07.
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The court's holding on the special issue question is vitally important to the
operation of 12c in a procedural setting. It is clear from the Mabra opinion
that percentage contribution is an affirmative defense upon which the car-
rier has the burden of pleading, proof, and persuasion. 262 Thus, Mabra
clarified a conflict among several courts of civil appeals relating to burden of
proof.
263
A few years before, and for several months after the Mabra opinion
various courts of civil appeals added to the extensive writings concerning
12c and its application to a variety of factual settings. In Jones v. Specific
Employers Insurance Co. ,2 the Eastland court was faced with the problem
of justifying the supreme court's Murphree holding allowing an offset for
subsequent compensable injuries. In view of 12c's unambiguous language,
the Eastland court had a very difficult problem which the opinion does not
satisfactorily solve.
Jones was injured November 17, 1963. A jury found that the injury
resulted in total permanent incapacity and fifty per cent of the incapacity
was contributed to by three prior injuries. The jury also found that a
subsequent injury on February 10, 1964 contributed to the incapacity from
the November, 1963 injury to the extent of forty per cent. The trial court
reduced the award by ninety per cent and the claimant appealed. The only
issue on appeal was the forty per cent reduction because of the subsequent
injury. The court of civil appeals examined the Murphree opinion which had
allowed a reduction for a subsequent injury. The Eastland court was
troubled, however, by the supreme court's statement that prior and subse-
quent injuries reduce a carrier's liability for a present incapacity2 65 and
labeled the statement dictum. 266 Despite obvious misgivings, the Eastland
court held that "such dictum and the language in the first part of section 12c
tend to support . . .deducting the 40% incapacity contributed by the subse-
quent injury .... "267 The court did not specify the language in 12c that
allows a subsequent injury to reduce a present incapacity. Realizing the
conceptual difficulties of inserting the word "subsequent" into 12c, the
Eastland court abandoned reliance upon Murphree and in an incomprehen-
able manner compared the Second Injury Fund's legislative purpose relative
to prior injuries with its own socioeconomic theories. The court then
262. The court's only reference to the burden of pleading, proof and persuasion, other than
the iiference to be drawn from the holding relating to the issue deemed found in support of the
trial court's judgment, was this statement: "In order to reduce the recovery of a workman
because of a previous injury under the above statute [12c], the insurance carrier must prove (1)
that the previous injury was compensable, (2) contributed to the present incapacity, and (3) the
amount or percentage of such contribution." 487 S.W.2d at 707. Since this particular fact
situation was related to a prior injury, it can only be assumed that the same burden is on the
carrier when a subsequent compensable injury is involved.
263. Compare Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Robison, 340 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Tanner, 218 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Perdue, 64 S.W.2d 386
(Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1933, writ ref'd), with Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Van Pelt, 68
S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934, no writ), and Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Stephens, 22 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1929, no writ).
264. 416 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
265. See text accompanying note 241 supra.




concluded it would simply not be right for the law to allow a double recovery
for the same incapacity:
In this case . . . the trial court knew that . . . [the employee] had
previously settled . . . with another employer's . . . carrier for that
subsequent injury . . . . If the court had included said 40% in the
recovery granted, it would have allowed a double recovery for the same
accident and incapacity. Furthermore, it would cause . . . [the carrier]
to pay for 40% of [the employee's] incapacity caused by a subsequent
injury while he was employed by a different employer and insured by a
different insurer. 26 8
The Eastland court was obviously attempting to produce what it believed
would be a just result in that particular case. This opinion, however, cannot
be justified. No matter how unfair the result, section 12c does not refer to
any allowable reduction because of a subsequent incapacity. Try as they
might, the courts will never be able to justify the judicial insertion of the
word subsequent in the provisions of 12c. Moreover, the long range effects
of Murphree and Jones will undoubtedly produce still more confusion. For
example, in both Murphree and Jones the subsequent injuries were
compensable, and final settlements were made before the suits which gave
rise to the appeals were tried. Suppose the court is faced with a subsequent
compensable injury wherein the employee has received no compensation
payments. Will the court's justification, or rationalization, be the same?
Probably not, because the conceptual situation will be entirely different.
Assume, for example, a jury finding of a ninety per cent contribution and a
total permanent disability. The recovery will be reduced by ninety per cent.
When a subsequent injury is tried before a different jury, the prior compen-
sable injury is admissible to offset the incapacity resulting from the subse-
quent injury. If the second jury finds total permanent incapacity from the
second injury, but also finds that the prior injury contributed eighty per cent
to the present incapacity, in theory, the claimant will only have recovered
ten per cent of the total due for the first injury's incapacity and twenty
per cent of the total due for the second injury's incapacity. This totals only
thirty per cent of what both juries found to be total permanent incapacity.
Thus, it appears that the courts will be compelled to further confuse this
area by attempting to legislate and rationalize a method whereby the claim-
ant can recover at least once the total due for his total permanent incapacity.
In Alvarez v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association2 69 the court was
concerned with proof that the prior injury was compensable. The employee
worked for the same employer for seventeen years. In 1966 he sustained the
injury involved in the appeal. Nine years earlier he had fallen off of a truck
but testified that he had not been injured, although he had seen the company
doctor and had undergone three weeks of physical therapy. There was no
268. Id. The reference to preventing a double recovery is only the second time that rationali-
zation has appeared in an appellate opinion. The first such reference was in Traders & Gen. Ins.
Co. v. Wyrick, 118 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1938, no writ). The Wyrick
court's statement concerning double recovery is unsupported by any authority, as is the Jones
court's similar statment. Curiously, Jones did not cite Wyrick for support and Jones used the
double recovery rationale to aid the carrier in a subsequent injury situation whereas Wyrick
used the same rationale to defeat the carrier in a prior injury situation.
269. 450 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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evidence of any missed time from work or that a claim for compensation had
been made. In fact, the court emphasized there was not even evidence that
the employer was a subscriber to the Act at the time of the prior injury. The
court held that there was no evidence that the prior injury was compensable
and that the trial court should have disregarded the jury's finding that the
prior injury had contributed to the claimant's incapacity.
The opinion is not instructive as to what proof is needed to demonstrate
compensability and, in fact, conflicts with the supreme court's subsequent
opinion in Mabra270 on the issue of proving whether an employer involved in
both accidents is a subscriber. The Alvarez opinion is, however, consistent
with the restrictive holdings of Upshaw,271 Dawson272 and Clark273 as to
what type of disability constitutes a compensable disability available as a
percentage offset under section 12c.
A few months later Alvarez was cited and followed in Charter Oak Fire
Insurance Co. v. Dewett . 74 The facts were similar to Alvarez. Dewett,
however, testified that the prior injury to his back troubled him from time to
time and forced him to seek first aid from the company nurse or stay home
for a few days. This difficulty persisted until the occurrence of the second
injury. The court held the prior injury to be noncompensable relying on the
fact that there was no evidence that the claimant had been incapacitated for
even a week, no evidence that he had filed a claim for benefits, and no
evidence that the employer was a subscriber at the time of the prior injury.275
In Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Monroe276 the court placed an
impossible burden on the carrier regarding the percentage that the prior
injury contributed to the present disability. In affirming the trial court's
270. Transport Ins. Co. v. Mabra, 487 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1972). See notes 259-63 supra and
accompanying text.
271. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Upshaw, 329 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
272. Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Dawson, 81 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1935), writ dism'd, 130 Tex. 362, 107 S.W.2d 994 (1937). See notes 172-75 supra and accom-
panying text.
273. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Clark, 23 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930,
writ dism'd). See notes 162-64 supra and accompanying text.
274. 460 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
275. In Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Martin, 478 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), the carrier attempted to introduce hospital records of eight prior hospitaliza-
tions for various physical and mental problems: 1948-factured cervical vertebra; 1951-
alcoholism; 1952-injuries received in an automobile-motorcycle accident; 1956- knee injury
from an automobile accident; 1957-psychopathic personality; 1960-alcoholic gastritis; 1963-
broken ankle from an automobile accident; and 1964-shotgun wound to left leg. The court held
that the records related to the noninjury hospitalizations were inadmissible because there was
no evidence that any or all were the sole cause of the present disability. Id. at 208-09. The
hospital records relating to the prior injuries were likewise inadmissible, according to the court,
because there was no evidence that the prior injuries were compensable and no evidence of any
causal connection between the prior injuries and the disability resulting from the on-the-job
injury. Id.
Wright v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 486 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ), appears
to be in conflict, in one of its holdings, with both Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963), and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163
Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1962). In Wright the court stated that a petition relating to a
prior injury was inadmissible hearsay unless it was supported by proof that the attorney signing
the instrument was acting on the employee's behalf with the express or implied authority to file
the petition. 486 S.W.2d at 134. The opinion does not indicate if the claimant's testimony was
inconsistent with the contents of the petition, but if it was, then the court's statement regarding
hearsay clearly conflicts with McCardell and Murphree.
276. 495 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App.- Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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denial of percentage contribution issues with respect to a prior injury the
court said: "Although the record contains evidence that the injury of De-
cember 1st [prior injury] contributed to Monroe's incapacity, we find no
evidence of the amount or percent of such contribution. For this reason the
defendant's requested issues were properly refused." 277
In support of this statement, the court cited Transport Insurance Co. v.
Mabra. 27s In Mabra the supreme court listed "the amount or percentage of
such contribution" as one element of proof required of a carrier. 279 The
supreme court did not, however, discuss the evidence submitted by the
carrier which supported the jury's finding that fifty per cent of Mabra's
disability was due to the prior injury. The Monroe court literally interpreted
the Mabra statement and misapplied the requirement. If the Monroe court is
correct, then a carrier is required to produce an expert who is willing to
quantitatively and qualitatively reduce his opinion to a percentage figure, for
example, 53.58%, 85.6384%. Such testimony is not binding on a fact finder
because it is the opinion of an expert and will only create a fact issue. 280
Thus, while evidence of a specific percentage may be helpful to the fact
finder, it certainly should not be mandatory to support the submission of an
issue. If the court were called upon to review the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a percentage finding, it would have to review all of the evidence,
not just a portion thereof. 281 Thus, all circumstances surrounding the prior
injury, including extent of the injury, medical treatment, work record after
the injury, reduction in wages, and all other relevant testimony, should be
considered as part of the evidence bearing on the ultimate percentage
contribution of the prior injury to the present incapacity. 282
The last published opinion regarding the operation of 12c prior to its
amendment in 1971 was Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Haddock.283
The opinion illustrates the confusion which will again abound when the
appellate courts begin writing on 12c with its myriad of problems. Haddock
277. Id. at 627.
278. 487 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1972). See notes 259-62 supra and accompanying text.
279. Id. at 707.
280. See, e.g., Board of Fireman's Relief & Retirement Fund Trustees v. Marks, 150 Tex.
433, 242 S.W.2d 181 (1951); Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345
(1948); Blackmon v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 485 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
281. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEXAS L.
REV. 361 (1960).
282. Subsequent to Monroe, the Houston [1st Dist.] court also used the absence of evidence
of the amount of percentage of incapacity to avoid a difficult subsequent injury problem. In
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Contreras, 498 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list
Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court recognized the inherent difficulties lurking in the
subsequent injury dilemma created by the Murphree holding. In order to avoid these obvious
difficulties, the court held, citing Mabra and Monroe, that the carrier waived the § 12c
subsequent injury defense by failing to request an issue as to whether the injury was compens-
able. Id. at 428. The court further said that although the carrier tendered the issues to the trial
court, which were based upon the issues found in 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN JURY
CHARGES § 25.05 (1970), the issues were improper since they placed the burden of proof upon
the claimant and not the carrier as required by Mabra. 498 S.W.2d at 428. Almost as an aside,
the court stated that there was no evidence of the amount or percentage of the present
incapacity attributable to the subsequent injury. Id. It can only be assumed that this is a
reference to Monroe since there was no citation to any authority or any other hint that could be
used to place this seemingly extraneous comment into the context of the opinion.
283. 511 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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was a mechanic who developed a severe contact dermatitis to petroleum
products. The dermatitis spread to the various parts of his body making it a
general injury. One of the numerous points raised by the carrier on appeal
concerned the jury's failure to find that a prior injury was compensable. The
carrier alleged that several weeks prior to the injury the employee had
injured his hands and that that injury had contributed to the present in-
capacity. The court's only discussion of this prior injury concerned whether
the injury was compensable. The court held that the evidence did not
conclusively demonstrate the injury to be compensable or that the jury's
answer to the special issue was against the preponderance of the evidence.
It is disturbing that the court and the carrier assumed that the prior injury
had to be compensable even though it is clear from the opinion that the prior
injury was a specific injury! If the opinions in Miears2'8 and Sowell 85 are
considered together, then a prior specific injury, whether compensable or
not, should be available to offset disabilities arising from general injuries.
This assertion must be qualified, however, because Sowell involved a prior
compensable specific injury contributing to a general injury while Miears
involved two successive specific injuries. Thus, it is conceivable that the
Haddock court, unintentionally announced a new 12c rule that noncompens-
able prior specific injuries cannot be used to offset disabilities arising from
subsequent general injuries.
The court-made rules applicable to 12c are confusing and irrational. Based
upon the court opinions to date, there are a total of twenty-four possible
combinations of injuries which may or may not affect an employee's recov-
ery. This does not include those rare situations in which the employee seeks
to recover for both general and specific injuries arising out of the same
accident.
What are the rules of the game? To determine the rules, general and
specific injuries must be considered separate from each other. If an employ-
ee sues to recover disability from a general injury, prior and subsequent
compensable general injuries may be used to offset recovery. 286 This state-
ment, however, must be limited to include only those subsequent general
injuries for which compensation has been paid since Murphree287 and
Jones21 both involved subsequent general injuries for which the claimant
had received a compensation settlement. Prior specific compensable injuries
may be used to offset disabilities from a general injury, 289 but it is question-
284. Miears v. Industrial Accident Rd., 149 Tex. 270, 232 S.W.2d 671 (1950).
285. Sowell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1964).
286. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744
(1962); Jones v. Specific Employers Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.- Eastland 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Gen. Indem. v. Savell, 348 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1961, no writ); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Wyrick, 118 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1938, no writ); Texas Indem. Co. v. McNew, 90 S.W.2d 1115 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1936, writ dism'd); Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Dawson, 81 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1935), writ dism'd, 130 Tex. 362, 107 S.W.2d 994 (1937); Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Clark, 23 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, writ dism'd). Contra,
Southern Underwriters v. Grimes, 146 S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App.- San Antonio 1941, writ
dism'd jdgmt cor.).
287. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744 (1962).
288. Jones v. Specific Employers Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
289. Sowell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1964).
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able whether prior noncompensable specific injuries are accorded the same
status. 219 There are not yet any guidelines as to whether subsequent specific
injuries, whether compensable or noncompensable, can be used to reduce
recovery for general injuries.
All that is really known about specific injuries is that prior specific
injuries, whether compensable or noncompensable, reduce recovery for
disabilities arising from subsequent specific injuries. 29' The broad nature of
this rule is questionable, however, because the rule is derived from those
cases in which the prior specific injury and the specific injury made the basis
of the claim involved loss of vision or extremity amputation. There are not
yet any rules for the remaining specific injury situations. Does a prior
compensable or noncompensable general injury affect recovery for a specif-
ic injury? Does a subsequent compensable specific injury reduce recovery
in a specific injury claim? Does a noncompensable specific injury reduce
recovery for a specific injury? These questions must await future court
consideration.
It is now clear, though, that the burden of pleading, proof, and persuasion
are on the carrier with respect to compensability and contribution of injuries
to present incapacities. 292 The carrier is also frequently required to produce
specific proof of the exact percentage that the prior or subsequent injury
contributed to the present incapacity. 293 The nature of the proof required to
demonstrate the compensative nature of the prior or subsequent injury is
somewhat obscure. The courts appear to have proceeded on an ad hoc basis
and this has provided no useful rationale for analyzing and reconciling the
decisions. 29 4 The courts, however, go to greater lengths in an individual case
to find a particular injury in question noncompensable and it is probable that
most of the unanswered questions regarding what constitutes a compensable
injury will be resolved in favor of claimants and not carriers.
Thus far, the problem of mathematically reducing the claimant's recovery
because of a contributing incapacity has been ignored. Strangely enough,
until 1964 the courts had never definitively approached the problem. A few
cases mentioned the manner in which a trial judge computed the reduction in
recovery, but none established any guidelines to be followed. It can only be
290. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Haddock, 511 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
291. Miears v. Industrial Accident Bd., 149 Tex. 270, 232 S.W.2d 671 (1950); Gilmore v.
Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n, 292 S.W.204 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); State
v. Bothe, 231 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, no writ).
292. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mabra, 487 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1972).
293. Id.; Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Contreras, 498 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Texas v. Monroe, 495"
S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
294. E.g., Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Dewett, 460 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Alvarez v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 450 S.W.2d 114(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brinkley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331
S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Upshaw, 329 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Wyrick, 118 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1938, no writ); Casualty
Reciprocal Exch. v. Dawson, 81 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935), writ dism 'd, 130
Tex. 362, 107 S.W.2d 994 (1937); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Clark, 23 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, writ dism'd).
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assumed that the claimants, carriers, and trial courts agreed upon the
method of deduction, and no one thought to complain.
The very first case to mention the computation involved in the reduction
formula was Jones v. Travelers Insurance Co. 295 In Jones the court held,
without discussion or citation to authority, that the claimant would recover
for permanent partial disability ninety per cent (the prior injuries contribut-
ed ten per cent) of sixty per cent of the difference in the average weekly
wage before injury and the average weekly earning capacity during the
period of partial incapacity. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Depoister2%
the carrier complained that the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's
findings that two prior injuries contributed twelve per cent to the claimant's
incapacity. The court of civil appeals agreed, but held that the error was
harmless because the result would not change. The court reasoned that the
claimant's average weekly wage was to be reduced before computing the
compensation rate, that is reduce the average weekly wage by twelve per
cent, then use sixty per cent of that reduced figure to determine the compen-
sation rate. In Depoister, the claimant's compensation rate was in excess of
the maximum under all calculations, therefore, the court affirmed an award
for total permanent benefits at the maximum compensation rate. The carrier
of course argued that the twelve per cent should be deducted from the
maximum compensation rate to which the claimant's average weekly wage
entitled him before calculating the total permanent award, that is, twelve per
cent of $35.00 multiplied by 401 weeks. The court rejected this contention
stating that there was no authority for the argument. In support of its
calculations the court cited Associated Indemnity Corp. v. McGrew, 97 Tex-
as Employers' Insurance Association v. Upshaw298 and Traders & General
Insurance Co. v. Robinson. 299 These cases, however, fail to support the
court's holding. McGrew involved a wage rate issue, not a contention that
another injury had contributed to the employee's incapacity. Upshaw held
that the trial court erred in reducing the recovery because the prior general
injury was noncompensable; however, since the claimant had not com-
plained of the trial court's judgment, it was affirmed. Thus, the Upshaw
court's discourse on the reduction of the claimant's recovery amounts to
nothing more than dicta. Robinson was also a case that did not involve a
prior injury contributing to a present incapacity. In Robinson the trial court
required the jury to find the amount of partial incapacity in terms of
percentage rather than the accepted method of the difference between
average weekly wages and average weekly earning capacity during the
period of partial incapacity. Robinson furnishes absolutely no support for
the Depoister court's proposition. Despite the lack of authority supporting
295. 374 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This case and
following cases were tried before the compensation factor was changed in 1973 to 66 2/3% of
the average weekly wage. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 8a, 10, 11, 12 (Vernon Supp.
1978). Prior to 1973 the compensation factor had always been 60% even in the original Act. 1913
Tex. Gen Laws ch. 179, § 1, at 431-32.
296. 393 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
297. 138 Tex. 583, 160 S.W.2d 912 (1942).
298. 329 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
299. 222 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949, no writ).
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its conclusions, Depoister has now become the authority followed by all
courts of civil appeals considering the question. The supreme court has not
yet written on the subject.
In Consolidated Casualty Insurance Co. v. Jackson3°° the court con-
sidered the mathematical computation necessary to reduce a recovery for
partial disability. To date Jackson is the only opinion that discusses the
partial calculation in explicit detail. Jackson had suffered four prior
compensable general injuries which the jury found contributed a total of
twenty-five per cent to his present incapacity. The jury also found that the
claimant had been temporarily totally incapacitated for ninety-six weeks as a
result of the current injury and later awarded permanent partial incapacity.
Jackson's average weekly wage was $150.00, and his earning power while
partially incapacitated was $100.00 per week. The trial court disregarded the
prior injury findings and entered judgment for the full amount of compensa-
tion due the employee. After concluding that the trial court had erred in
disregarding the contribution of the prior injuries, the court of civil appeals
was faced with the problem of reforming the judgment.
The court held that the compensation for the ninety-six weeks of total
incapacity should amount to $150.00 per week, the difference between the
employee's average weekly wage and his average weekly earning capacity
of zero dollars. The court's conclusion as to total incapacity is unclear. The
court stated:
Since 60% of $150.00 per week exceeds the maximum compensation
rate of $35.00 per week, the [trial] court's allowance of the maximum
rate during that unpaid portion of the period of his total incapacity is
consistent with our computation of his compensation rate during his
partial incapacity.30'
With respect to the partial disability calculations, the court reasoned that
the claimant's incapacity was the difference between his average weekly
wage before the injury and his average weekly earning capacity during the
partial incapacity. The jury found this figure to be $50.00. Since the prior
compensable injuries contributed twenty-five per cent to his partial incapac-
ity, the $50.00 difference was reduced by twenty-five per cent; this made the
claimant's wage earning capacity during the period of partial incapacity
$37.50. Following the formula, the court calculated sixty percent of $37.50
and arrived at a weekly compensation rate of $22.50 for the period of partial
incapacity. In support of this calculation, the court merely cited Jones v.
Travelers Insurance Co. 30 2 despite its meager discussion and authority.
Jackson did mention the Depoister decision, but stated that nothing in the
opinion or the "authorities" cited by Depoister was inconsistent with its
calculations.
In Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Kirchoff3 3 the jury found that
the employee was totally permanently disabled and that a prior compensable
300. 419 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
301. Id. at 237.
302. 374 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See note 295 supra
and accompanying text.
303. 427 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ).
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back injury had contributed seventy-five percent to the incapacity. The
appellate court held, on the authority of Jackson and Depoister, that the trial
court correctly determined the compensation rate to be $21.60 per week.
The calculation was performed as in Depoister, that is twenty-five per cent,
100% minus seventy-five per cent, times the stipulated average weekly wage
of $144.00 times sixty percent equals $21.60, the compensation rate.
In Jones, Depoister, Jackson, and Kirchoff all involved general injuries
which resulted in either total permanent or partial permanent disabilities. In
addition, both the prior and current injuries were litigated. These decisions
furnish no guidance for the calculation of percentage offset in specific injury
situations. Compensation for total disability is governed by section 10, 3°,
partial disability by section 11305 and specific injuries by section 12. 306 Each
section provides a different method for computing the compensation rate,
though the total and partial sections are somewhat similar. The only guid-
ance offered by the Texas courts on the subject of percentage offset for
specific injuries is found in cases involving the total loss of vision or
amputation of an extremity. 0 7 There are no cases providing a method of
calculation for a specific injury resulting in, for example, a ten per cent
permanent disability to the arm or a sixty per cent partial disability with a
prior specific injury contributing fifty per cent to the current incapacity. Nor
are there guidelines available regarding computation of a percentage offset
for a prior compensable general injury contributing to a current specific
incapacity, or a subsequent compensable general or specific injury
contributing to a current specific disability. 3° 8 The courts will undoubtedly
soon be forced to face these along with other problems associated with
section 12c.
An analysis of the court decisions interpreting 12c and the Second Injury
Fund statutes clearly reveals that the legislature's principle purpose of
aiding the handicapped has been progressively impeded, debased, or
completely ignored. Moreover, only convoluted, hyperbolic, enigmatic
rationalizations have been offered by the courts to justify this frustration of
the legislature's intent. In order to effectuate the original stated purpose of
the statutes, the legislature must do more than merely change the statutes to
their pre-1971 wording. To compensate for the courts' distorted interpreta-
tions and escape from the present chaos, a comprehensive statutory rewrit-
ing is necessary.
304. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
305. Id. § 11.
306. Id. § 12.
307. Miears v. Industrial Accident Bd., 149 Tex. 270, 232 S.W.2d 671 (1950); Gilmore v.
Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n, 292 S.W.204 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); State
v. Bothe, 231 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, no writ).
308. One writer has set forth an analysis of the mathematical calculations related to section
12c as well as reviewing some of the other court doctrines applicable to this section. See Davis,
The Legal Effect of Prior and Subsequent Injuries in a Texas Workmen's Compensation
Lawsuit, II S. TEX. L. J. 191 (1969). The calculations as well as the various authorities cited
throughout the article are questionable and should be carefully considered. Other articles
dealing with 12c and the Second Injury Fund have not fully developed the confused nature of
the statute as it has been applied by various court decisions and should be considered in light of
the entire body of case law surrounding these statutes. See Doran, Second Injury Fund, 27




Idiopathic3°9 Falls. The Texas Supreme Court faced the troublesome
concept of idiopathic falls in one of the few opinions it wrote in the compen-
sation area during the survey year. Unfortunately, the court chose a short
sighted, artificial rationale to solve the dilemma, a rationale which will
undoubtedly be subject to future exaggerated extensions. In Texas Employ-
ers' Insurance Association v. Page3 10 the claimant worked as a bank security
guard. Each morning he was required to walk from the main bank building,
across the bank parking lot to open the motor bank teller windows. One
morning as the employee proceeded across the parking lot, his right knee
"buckled" and he fell to the pavement allegedly striking his right knee and
wrist, and left arm. Three and one half years earlier, while working for
another employer, the employee had sustained a compensable right knee
injury. Two weeks before his second accident the claimant had taken two
weeks sick leave to rest his swollen right knee. Subsequent to the second
accident, the employee underwent a total knee implant operation.
The trial court granted the carrier an instructed verdict. The court of civil
appeals reversed and remanded and the supreme court affirmed the court of
civil appeals judgment. Because Page reached the appellate court on an
instructed verdict the court only examined the claimant's evidence to deter-
mine whether there was probative force to raise a fact issue. 1
The question before the supreme court was whether there was any evi-
dence that Page's injury was sustained in the course of his employment as
defined in article 8309, section 1.112 Course of employment in Texas requires
the employee to meet two prerequisites: (1) the injury must have occurred
while the employee was engaged in or about the furtherance of his employ-
er's business; and (2) the injury must have been of a kind and character
for Prior Injuries, 12 TRIAL LAW. F., Oct.-Dec. 1977, at 21; Comment, Prior "Compensable"
Injury and Section 12c of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act-What is a "Compensable"
Injury?, 8 Hous. L. R. 610 (1971). An excellent article, analyzing the court decisions up to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Miears, is Clark, Second Injuries in Texas: The Bothe and Miears
Decisions, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 497 (1951).
309. Idiopathic is defined as: "Peculiar to the individual .... Arising spontaneously or
from an obscure or unknown cause .. " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1123 (1966). The Supreme Court relied upon the AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
(22d ed. 1951) and defined idiopathic fall as: "a fall due to a diseased state of spontaneous origin
which is neither sympathetic nor traumatic; that which is self-originated; of unknown causa-
tion." Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Page, 553 S.W.2d 98, 100 n.2 (Tex. 1977).
310. 553 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1977).
311. Id. at 102. It made little difference in the result, but the instructed verdict required the
appellate courts to consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the most
favorable light supporting the claimant's position, disregarding all contrary evidence and
inferences. Id.; see also Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1976).
312. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967):
The term 'injury sustained in the course of employment,' as used in this Act,
shall . . .
...include all other injuries of every kind and character having to do with and
originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received by
an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business
of his employer whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere.
The Texas coverage formula differs significantly from most other states. Other jurisdictions
adopted the "arising out of and in the course of employement" formula. See I A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.10 (1976). The arising concept is primarily concerned
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having to do with and originating in the employer's business. 3 3 Obviously,
the employee was engaged in his employment duties at the time of the
incident. Thus, the court focused upon the question of whether the injury
originated in the employment.31 4 In deciding that there was a fact issue
presented as to the "causal connection between the conditions under which
* . . [Page's] work was required to be performed and his resulting in-
jury, 3 5 the court relied upon and discussed the three prior Texas cases
dealing with idiopathic falls, Garcia v. Texas Indemnity Co. ,316 General
Insurance Corp. v. Wickersham317 and American General Insurance Co. v.
Barrett.3'
In Garcia an employee standing on a driveway leading to the employer's
loading dock suffered an epileptic seizure causing him to fall and strike his
head on a post.319 The supreme court held the injury arose out of his
employment since the employment had a " 'causal connection with' his
injuries, 'either through its activities, its conditions, or its environment.' "321
In Wickersham a janitor fell on a level tile floor in his employer's restau-
rant and expired because of head injuries. The court specifically noted that
the cause of the fall was unknown, but assumed it was because of a dizzy
spell. 321 The court of civil appeals affirmed a judgment for the beneficiary
and did not distinguish between falls on level floors, falls from heights, and
falls against posts, tables, and machines. 322
with causal connection. The "originating" concept in the Texas formula should have alleviated
many of the conceptual problems faced by courts interpreting the arising concept. But the
Texas courts did not seem to appreciate the distinction between the Texas formula and the
arising formula. A good example is a court of civil appeals' opinion wherein the court confused
the crucial question, i.e., origin of the accident, with an irrelevant inquiry into the moment of
manifestation. American Motorists ins. Co. v. Steel, 229 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
313. 553 S.W.2d at 99. The court cited the standard cases supporting these two prerequi-
sites: Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v.
Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963); Smith v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex. 573, 105
S.W.2d 192 (1937).
314. The court first disposed of the carrier's contention that the knee injury was noncom-
pensable because it resulted solely from the pre-existing injury to the same knee, citing the well
established proposition that a prior injury, unless it is the sole cause of the disability, cannot
defeat an employee's claim for compensation. Since there was no evidence that the prior injury
was the sole cause of the disability, and since the carrier failed to plead sole cause, the
contention was overruled. 553 S.W.2d at 100. This sole cause contention and the court's
disposition of the point on a no evidence, no pleading ground completely misses the vital issue
in an idiopathic fall case. By definition, an idiopathic incident is solely caused by the employ-
ee's pre-existing physical or mental weakness whether resulting from a prior compensable or
noncompensable accident, injury or disease or from a congenital condition or illness. The focal
point of such a case, therefore, is whether the admittedly personal origin of the accident is
overcome by some employment contribution to the end result, i.e., the incapacity, which then
makes the injury compensable. To contend that the accident or injury resulted solely from a
pre-existing condition seems to place the cart before the horse.
315. 553 S.W.2d at 102.
316. 146 Tex. 413, 209 S.W.2d 333 (1948).
317. 235 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
318. 300 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
319. The facts recited in the supreme court's opinion are vague and extremely confusing.
The court of civil appeals' description of the employee's position vis-a-vis the concrete post is
much clearer. Garcia v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 205 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1947), aff'd, 146 Tex. 413, 209 S.W.2d 333 (1948).
320. 146 Tex. at 419, 209 S.W.2d at 336 (quoting Industrial Comm'n v. Nelson, 127 Ohio 41,
186 N.E. 735, 736 (1933)).
321. 235 S.W.2d at 217.
322. Falls from heights and falls on level floors should be distinguished because of the
probable contribution to injury attributable to the work related height.
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In Barrett a workman struck his head after blacking out while walking on
his employer's shell and gravel road. The employee fractured his skull and
died from a subarachnoid hemorrhage. The appellate court affirmed a death
benefits award because the "hard-surfaced road was an instrumentality
essential to the work of the employer and falling against it was a hazard" 32 3
to which the employee was exposed because of his work.
The supreme court in Page expressly held the three cases to be indistin-
guishable and to have properly applied the Texas law of idiopathic falls.
Since there was a fact question existing whether the "parking lot surface
contributed to Page's injury and if so, whether the surface represented...
a hazard within the scope of Page's employment as to allow recovery for the
fall and resultant injury," 324 the court affirmed the court of civil appeals
judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
The Page court did not attempt to identify any particular doctrinal theory
to explain its holding. The language used by the court, however, is sugges-
tive of what Professor Larson describes as the "contact-with-the-premises"
exception in act-of-God cases. 325 This contact-with-the-premises doctrine is
that a claimant cannot recover for injuries directly resulting from lightning,
tornados, et cetera, unless the force of the event first causes a wall, for
example, to fall, and the wall falls on the employee. 26 This doctrine has
been extended to other areas, such as idiopathic falls, where causation has
been divided into two parts: (1) the initial cause, that is the fall due to an
idiopathic reason such as epilepsy or heart attack; and (2) the final event
producing the injury, that is the impact with some part of the employer's
premises. The last event, the fall of the body upon the premises, is sufficient
employment contact to render the entire event compensable. 327
On the other hand, the court's approval of the Wickersham and Barrett
opinions and the court's own holding, indicates that it may have opted for
some type of pseudo-positional risk doctrine. This pseudo-positional risk
doctrine says that but for the fact that the employee suffered the idiopathic
event on the job, he would not have suffered the precise injury received,
therefore, the employment contributed something to the resulting injury,
and the injury is compensable. Regardless of the court's basis, the fact
remains that Page's fall occurred because of a condition intensely and
admittedly personal to him which he brought to his employer's premises
without the employer's knowledge, permission or acquiescence. What,
therefore, did the employment contribute to the fall and the resulting in-
juries? It is not a satisfactory answer to suggest that the injury would not
have occurred when it did had the employee not been at work. This sugges-
tion simply restates the known fact that the injury did occur at work.
Additionally, this answer does not identify the contribution that the employ-
ment made to the fall or the injuries. Followed to its logical conclusion, this
rationale allows any event to become compensable if it occurs at work.
323. 300 S.W.2d at 363.
324. 553 S.W.2d at 101.
325. 1. A. LARSON, supra note 244, § 8.30.
326. Id.
327. Id. Consider the Page court's approval of Garcia's causal connection language as well
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An even more unsatisfactory answer is Wickersham's rationale, adopted
by the Page court, that refused to distinguish between a fall from a height
and a fall on level ground. Professor Larson has observed:
[O]nce it is decided to compensate idiopathic, level-floor falls, how is
the basic principle which connects such an injury with the employment
to be phrased? This entire line of cases is based on one simple theory:
although the cause of the fall Was originally a personal one, employment
conditions contributed some hazard that lead to the final injury. This
theory can be stretched to the breaking point, as it indeed has . . . but
having reached that point by virtue of this theory, one then cannot
throw away the entire test because it is painful to have to draw the final
line, and because the stretching of the test has made it difficult to
defend the ultimate distinctions that must be made.
[I]f a general statement of the rule applied should ever be
attempted, it would have to be this: when an employee falls, solely
because of an internal disease or weakness, the effects of the fall arise
out of the employment even if the conditions of employment reduce the
hazards of such a fall below what they would otherwise be. This, of
course, few courts would be willing to say; but several have already in
effect said that the effects of such a fall arise out of the employment
even if the conditions of employment add nothing to the hazards that
would otherwise be encountered. 2
The majority of courts32 9 have rejected the illogical result of the Texas
idiopathic fall cases. These courts require that the employment really con-
tribute to the hazard causing the fall. 330 The fact question of how great the
added hazard must be remains open and leaves room for legitimate differ-
ences of judgment. The requirement of an added hazard is simply a recogni-
tion of Professor Larson's categories of risk causing injuries as risks as-
sociated with the employment, risks personal to the employee, and neutral
risks. 33I The personal risk is noncompensable unless the employment adds
enough to the risk to compel the employer to bear the cost of injury through
compensation. Granted this doctrine is difficult to apply to real world facts,
but it at least allows a court to draw a legal line based on common sense. It is
submitted that Professor Larson and the vast majority of courts have con-
tributed a great deal more logic and reason than have the Texas courts.
Texas will eventually be required to draw a legal line, and it will be inter-
esting to observe where the line is drawn as well as the justification prof-
fered for its location.
Borrowed Servant. The supreme court's second foray into the compensa-
as its own statement: "the trial court's order ... [does not dispense] with the issue of whether
the parking lot surface contributed [caused?] to Page's injury . 553 S.W.2d at 101.
328. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 244 § 12.14, at 3-270-271.
329. Id. §§ 12.10, 12.11.
330. The contribution required to convert the idiopathic fall, initiated by a personal noncom-
pensable heart attack, epileptic fit, fainting spell, weakened joint, et cetera, into a compensable
event is a contribution which places the employee in a position that increases the dangerous
effects of a fall. Examples include falls from heights, falls near machinery or objects with sharp
unyielding corners and falls from moving vehicles. While this contribution of employment
concept does not always result in a satisfactory conclusion, it is certainly better suited to
rational, logical results than is the Texas approach. See id. §§ 12.11-.14.
331. !d. § 7.
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tion field during the last survey year produced an opinion devoid of legal
principle and a result only slightly less satisfactory than Page. In Dodd v.
Twin City Fire Insurance Co.332 the court was confronted with a simple
borrowed servant problem but solved the problem by ignoring established
legal principles and past precedents. Dodd was employed as a general
laborer by Lone Star Phosphate Company which was insured, for compen-
sation purposes, by Twin City Fire Insurance Company. The other corpora-
tion involved, Texas Farm Products Company, did not have workmen's
compensation insurance. The two corporations were located adjacent to
each other, occupied the same business office, and had the same owners,
officers, personnel manager, and except for two individuals, the same board
of directors. Lone Star manufactured phosphate which was "moved next
door" 333 to be used in the manufacture of its primary product, fertilizer. One
individual, McShan, supervised laborers at both plants. Employees, fore-
men and supervisors, were frequently interchanged by the companies, but
Texas Farm reimbursed Lone Star for the employees' time. Dodd always
received his paycheck from Lone Star, and he was carried on Lone Star's
books as an employee for income and social security tax purposes. Dodd
testified, however, that his immediate superior was McShan, and he was
subject to McShan's control and did whatever McShan told him to do. Prior
to the injury, Dodd had worked on the Texas Farm premises on several
occasions.
On the day of Dodd's injury, he worked at Lone Star performing his
regular duties. McShan requested Dodd to terminate his work and go next
door to Texas Farm to move potash. While Dodd was moving the loosened
potash with a payloader he was partially buried. At trial the jury found that
Dodd was a Lone Star employee, and the trial court entered judgment
against Twin City. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judg-
ment for the carrier holding there was no evidence to support the jury's
employee finding.
The only borrowed servant principle referred to by the supreme court was
that in the absence of a written contract the test is which of the two
employers had the right to control the manner and details of the employee's
work. The only borrowed servant cases cited by the court were in support of
this well established proposition.33 4 In reviewing the evidence the supreme
court made several undeserved critical observations with respect to numer-
ous uncontradicted details of the carrier's proof. For example, McShan, the
foreman, testified, without contradiction, that on the day of the accident,
both he and Dodd were working for Texas Farm. The court, however,
noted, "as will be indicated below, in view of McShan's testimony and the
interlocking workings of the two companies, we are of the view that rea-
sonable minds could differ as to whether McShan had been working on the
day of the accident for Lone Star or Texas Farm." 335 The court never
332. 545 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1977).
333. Id. at 768.
334. Id. at 768-69. The cases were Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.
1968), and Insurors Indem. & Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 148 Tex. 219, 223 S.W.2d 217 (1949).
335. 545 S.W.2d at 769.
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indicated why reasonable minds could differ with respect to the uncon-
troverted evidence. The court did note that McShan had also testified that
he [McShan] was working as the foreman for Lone Star on the day of the
injury and had entered Dodd on the time records as working for Lone Star.
The supreme court, however, dismissed uncontroverted testimony of the
personnel director that Texas Farm reimbursed Lone Star for the time Lone
Star employees spent doing Texas Farm work. The court simply said, as if
the testimony would disappear, "[n]o records were produced to substantiate
this testimony, and there was no corroborating proof that Texas Farm
actually reimbursed Lone Star on this occasion." 336
Countering the carrier's uncontroverted testimony was the claimant's
admittedly contradictory testimony wherein he stated "they [Texas Farm]
borrowed me up there." 337 The court noted that this testimony was correct-
ed on redirect examination when Dodd made it clear that he did not mean to
imply that he was a borrowed servant in the legal sense. Based on this
review of the evidence, the court concluded there was some evidence to
support the jury's finding that Dodd was Lone Star's employee at the time
of the accident.
The court's opinion and reasoning was, to say the least, unsatisfactory.
Although the court recited the well established principle that the determina-
tive factor in borrowed servant cases is the right to control and direct the
details of the employee's work at the time of the incident in question, 338 it
simply dismissed conclusive evidence of the actual exercise of control by
Texas Farm in order to reach the desired result. The real reason for the
result can be gleaned from a portion of the opinion immediately preceding
the court's conclusion that there was some evidence to support the jury
verdict:
It is possible, and legally permissible by the use of corporate veil, for a
group of people to operate separate companion corporations and to
protect the workers of only one of its 'departments' with workmen's
compensation. No imputation of improper conduct is intended to be
cast here. It is disturbing that it elects not to carry compensation
coverage on the part of the operation which engages in the use of
dynamite and other dangerous activities, and then 'borrows' workmen
from its protected department to go do its dangerous work without
insurance coverage. It is understandable that the courts would look
carefully at such 'borrowed servant' operations. 339
A review of the court of civil appeals opinion 340 makes one wonder
whether the two courts passed upon the same case. Overall, the court of
civil appeals opinion is much more astute and considerably more persuasive.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 1968); Producers Chem.
Co. v. McKay, 366 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1963); Hilgenberg v. Elam, 145 Tex. 437, 198 S.W.2d 94
(1946); Home Indem. Co. v. Draper, 504 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rotge v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 502 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ).
339. 545 S.W.2d at 769-70.
340. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Dodd, 535 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976), rev'd,
545 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1977).
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Perhaps the impact of the supreme court's opinion will be diluted by the fact
that it reached the court as a no evidence case.
Death Benefits-Beneficiaries. The statute 4' provides an exact list of the
persons entitled to recover death benefits in the event of the employee's
death from an accidental injury. One class of beneficiaries, who may claim
benefits should preceding classes be absent,342 is dependent adult children.
Cases involving this beneficiary class rarely reach the appellate courts.
When they do, the issues generally involve the meaning of the term "depen-
dent" and the proof necessary to demonstrate dependency.343 In Industrial
Accident Board v. Lance3" two married adult daughters of a deceased
workman were vying with the Second Injury Fund345 for death benefits. The
evidence revealed "small but regular cash contributions from the deceased
to his married daughters, . . . over a period of several years and up to the
time of his death.''346 In addition the deceased father had occasionally
provided various gifts and larger cash contributions for rent, tires and on
one occasion, a baby bed.
The Fund's primary complaint on appeal was that the evidence was legally
and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that the adults
had depended upon the contributions from their father to increase their
standard of living. 47 A secondary complaint was that the admission of
evidence of the decedent's support, gifts and contributions to the daughters
prior to the year of his death was impermissable. The court of civil appeals
overruled both complaints and held that the evidence was sufficient to
support the trial court's finding of dependency and that when support is
continuous and uninterrupted, evidence of prior support is admissible.
348
The court did not provide a sufficient summary of the evidence to allow a
critical analysis of the opinion. Based upon the meager evidence recited, it
appears that the court correctly decided the case, though it failed to articu-
late the elements of dependency. The Texas courts have uniformly sub-
scribed to the test that the would-be dependent must have relied, in whole or
in part, upon contributions or assistance of the deceased employee. 349 The
focus of the examination to ascertain dependency, therefore, is aimed at the
341. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 8, 8(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
342. Id. § 8a.
343. See, e.g., Stanaland v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 145 Tex. 105, 195 S.W.2d 118 (1946);
Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Hall, 143 Tex. 36, 182 S.W.2d 703 (1944); Lumbermen's
Reciprocal Ass'n v. Warner, 245 S.W. 664 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, opinion adopted); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cassavaugh, 486 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Postal Mut. Indem. Co. v. Penn, 165 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
344. 556 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
345. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c-2 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Dependent
adult children are, of course, limited to 360 weeks in death benefits as opposed to lifetime
benefits for a widow or widower. Id. § 8(b). If there are no beneficiaries, the carrier must pay
360 weeks to the Second Injury Fund. Id. § 12c-2.
346. 556 S.W.2d at 103.
347. The fund's contention that the dependent must produce evidence of reliance and
dependency to increase their standard of living is incorrect. See Federal Underwriters Exch. v.
Hall, 143 Tex. 36, 182 S.W.2d 703 (1944).
348. The court cited and relied upon Georgia Cas. Co. v. Campbell, 266 S.W. 854 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1924, writ dism'd).
349. Stanaland v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 145 Tex. 105, 195 S.W.2d 118 (1946); Federal
Underwriters Exch. v. Hall, 143 Tex. 36, 182 S.W.2d 703 (1944); Lumbermen's Reciprocal
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alleged dependent and not the deceased employee.3 50 Additionally, the al-
leged dependent must establish that the contributions relied upon were
necessary for support.351 Thus, without evidence of the alleged dependent's
reliance or the character of the contributions, it would be mere speculation
to assume dependency. In Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Hall35 2 the
supreme court ruled, as a matter of law, that a regularly employed sister of a
deceased employee, though receiving twenty percent of her brother's salary
each week "was not relying upon her minor brother at the time of his death
to furnish any part of the support requisite to enable her to live consistent
with her position in life."3 5
3
Third Party Actions-Statute of Limitations. The statutory scheme of
subrogation and recovery from third parties was completely rewritten in
1973 when the legislature amended section 6a of article 8307. 351 The amend-
ed statute provides that a compensation claimant can simultaneously pursue
his compensation claim and any potential third party action without waiving
his right to compensation. Prior to 1973 an employee was required to
conclude his compensation claim before filing a third party suit or waive
compensation benefits. The statute of limitations on a third party claim,
however, did not begin to run until the compensation claim was
concluded. 355 The question'naturally arose whether, under the amended
statute allowing simultaneous filing of the compensation of third party suits,
the two year statute of limitation on the third party action began to run on
the date of the injury. The supreme court intimated as much in Campbell v.
Sonford Chemical Co. ,356 an opinion construing the pre-1973 subrogation
statute. The court strongly urged the legislature to amend the statute to
allow simultaneous suits in order to avoid the injustice inherent in delaying
the third party action.35 7
The first court confronted with the statute of limitation question raised by
amended section 6a held that the two year statute of limitation did begin to
run on the date of the employee's injury. In Burkhart v. Concho Industrial
Supply, Inc. 358 the employee was injured on September 14, 1973. The
compensation suit was settled on March 8, 1974, and the third party action
commenced on December 12, 1975. The Austin court, relying in part on
Campbell, concluded that the two year statute of limitations began to run at
the time of the claimant's injury. The employee argued that the Campbell
pronouncement was merely dicta and not binding upon the court; the Austin
Ass'n v. Warner, 245 S.W. 664 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Postal Mut. Indem.
Co. v. Penn, 165 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
350. Id.
351. Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Hall, 143 Tex. 36, 43, 182 S.W.2d 703, 706 (1944).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 707.
354. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
355. See Campbell v. Sonford Chem. Co., 486 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1972); Fort Worth Lloyds
v. Haygood, 151 Tex. 149, 246 S.W.2d 865 (1952); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Brandon, 126
Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936); Yeary v. Hinojosa, 307 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
356. 486 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1972).
357. Id. at 934.
358. 549 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
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court, however, replied: "[I]n our judgment, it is dicta that we would be
prudent to heed. 3
59
Two other cases arose during the survey year involving the statute of
limitations and its application to third party suits. In both Potter v. Crump
36°
and Robinson v. Buckner Park, Inc.,361 the injuries occurred prior to Sep-
tember 1, 1973, the effective date of section 6a. 362 The question in both cases
was whether amended 6a applied retroactively causing the two year statute
to begin to run on the accident date and thus terminating the third party
causes of action. Both courts, relied in part on the general legislative savings
clause in section 3b, article 8309,363 and held that amended section 6a applied
prospectively.
364
Accidental Injury Versus Occupational Disease. In 1971 the legislature
expanded the concept of occupational disease by transforming the previous
specific and exclusive list of compensable diseases 365 into a broad definition.
This new occupational disease definition included any disease arising out of
359. Id. at 470.
360. 555 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
361. 547 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
362. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
363. Id. art. 8309, § 3b:
No inchoate, vested, matured, existing or other rights, remedies, powers,
duties or authority, either of any employee or legal beneficiary, or of the board, or
of the association, or of any other person shall be in anyway affected by any of
the amendments herein made to the original law hereby amended, but all such
rights, remedies, powers, duties and authority shall remain and be in force as
under the original law just as if the amendments hereby adopted had never been
made, and to that end it is hereby declared that said original law is not repealed,
but the same is, and shall remain in full force and effect as to all such rights,
remedies, powers, duties and authority; and further this law in so far as it adopts
the law of which it is an amendment is a continuation thereof, and only in other
respects a new enactment.
364. Potter v. Crump, 555 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.- Fort Worth 1977, no writ), also
involved what would appear to be a unique argument. The employee, in a third party action,
sued several doctors and a hospital for allegedly negligent medical care resulting from surgery
to repair a right inguinal hernia sustained in an on-the-job accident. In addition to asserting the
two year statute of limitation defense, the physicians argued that a medical malpractice action
was not a third party action within the meaning of § 6a. The court went to great length to dispose
of the contention. The issue had not previously been raised directly although it had been
decided by inference. See McKelvy v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1964); Hoffman v. Houston
Clinic, 41 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1931, writ dism'd); Pedigo & Pedigo v.
Croom, 37 S.W.2d 1074 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd). It is well settled that an
employee is entitled to recover for any disability resulting from consequences and sequelae of
the medical treatment initiated to cure or relieve the effects of the injury on the theory that the
disability is considered to be proximately caused by the original injury and is, therefore,
compensable. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thurmond, 527 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pool, 449 S.W.2d
121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sosa, 425
S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); I A. LARSON, supra note
244, §§ 13.00-. II. Thus, it would seem to follow that the liberal terms of § 6a unquestionably
encompassed a medical malpractice claim as a third party suit and allows the carrier to pursue
its subrogation claim.
The subrogation issue was decided favorably to the carrier in a 1974 opinion by the Eastland
court of civil appeals. That court found, without difficulty, that the carrier had a right of
subrogation to the employee's recovery in a malpractice case arising out of treatment for an on-
the-job injury. The more difficult and interesting portion of the opinion concerned the amount
of the subrogation claim that the carrier was entitled to recover. Unfortunately, the court
withdrew this excellent opinion from publication after the writ of error was dismissed by
agreement. Weishman v. Herron, formerly in advance sheets, Texas edition, at 512 S.W.2d 789
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ dism'd by agr.) (opinion withdrawn from publication at
request of court).
365. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 113, § 2, at 176.
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the employment situation and diseases induced by repetitious physical
traumatic activity.3" Unaccountably, the expanded occupational disease
concept has generated very little litigation. From 1971 to this survey year,
only three cases directly construed the disease portion of the statute, 367 and
only five other cases inferentially involved even an interpretation of the
definition. 3"
The 1971 occupational disease amendment raised the question whether
the long recognized distinction between accidental injuries and occupational
diseases had been abolished by the legislature. On the surface, one might be
tempted to conclude that there is no distinction. In fact in 1974 one court
gratuitously commented, "it is no longer necessary to allege and prove
either an event traceable to a definite time, place and cause or a listed
compensable occupational disease."3 69 The last comment was correct, but
the former was never a requirement of an occupational disease. Neverthe-
less, the comment was subject to a construction that no distinction is to be
made under the amended statute between accidental injury and occupational
disease. The court's comment remained unchallenged until 1976 when the
Waco court of civil appeals held that occupational diseases were an excep-
tion to the specificity and tracing requirements of accidental injury. 370 The
holding directly contradicted the dictum appearing in the prior opinion, but it
is doubtful that the Waco court was aware of the significance of its holding.
This year, however, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Shreve, 371 a court of
civil appeals directly confronted the issue and held that the previous distinc-
tion between accidental injuries and occupational diseases is indeed viable.
Shreve involved conflicting jury findings that the claimant sustained not
only an accidental injury but an occupational disease as well. The claimant
alleged that he was saturated with a diluted acid compound on October 11,
1974. Several days later he began experiencing breathing problems and chest
pain. Controverted medical testimony supported the employee's claim that
366. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
367. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ratcliff, 537 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no
writ); Mueller v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). Both of these cases are reviewed by Sartwelle, supra note 7, at 272-76. The third
case is Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 509 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1974), reviewed by Sartwelle,
supra note 5, at 193-94.
368. English v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1975, no writ); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Luker, 511 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 511 S.W.2d 583 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Murphy, 506 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Travel-
ers Ins. Co. v. Rowan, 499 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Two
other opinions have cited amended § 20 but held it was not applicable because the case under
consideration arose prior to the effective date of the statute. Haley v. Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n, 487 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Legate v. Bitumin-
ous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 483 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
369. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 511 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The comment was clearly dictum since the carrier's
contention on appeal was only that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support
the jury's finding of injury occurring on the particular day in question. Id. at 584-85.
370. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ratcliff, 537 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976,
no writ).
371. 551 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
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the inhalation of the acid fumes during the October 11 incident caused
chronic obstructive lung disease. In defense of this accidental injury claim,
the carrier asserted that the employee did not suffer disability from any
accidental injury, but rather that his chronic obstructive lung disease result-
ed from forty years of cigarette smoking. The carrier produced extensive
expert medical testimony supporting its position. Alternatively, the carrier
ingeniously asserted that if the claimant's lung condition was not due solely
to cigarette smoking, then it was caused by the prolonged breathing of
various toxic fumes while working in his employment. In other words the
carrier alleged the employee suffered from a compensable occupational
disease!372 At first blush, this defense may seem absurd; that is pleading an
affirmative theory that will result in the claimant recovering a judgment if
the defense is successful. It must be remembered, however, that one of the
distinguishing factors between the two theories of recovery is that section
22, 373 which was not repealed in 1971, provides that the occupational disease
must be the sole cause of the disability in order to make a full recovery. If
the occupational disease is aggravated by any noncompensable condition or
if a noncompensable condition is aggravated by the occupational disease,
recovery can be reduced. In Shreve the carrier elicited testimony from the
claimant's doctor as well as its own medical expert regarding the harmful
effects of forty years of cigarette smoking and proceeded to convince the
jury to answer special issues to the effect that only seventy-five per cent of
the claimant's permanent partial disability was due to an occupational dis-
ease. Thus, had the trial court correctly submitted the accidental injury
definition and had the jury answered only the occupational disease issue, the
judgment against the carrier for permanent partial disability would have
been seventy-five per cent of $70.00 per week for 300 weeks rather than full
benefits. It was not to be, however, because the jury affirmatively answered
both the accidental injury issues and the occupational disease issues.
Special issue 1 inquired whether the employee had sustained an accidental
injury on October 11, 1974. 374 The definition of injury submitted with the
issue, however, simply defined injury as damage or harm to the physical
structure of the body, including the concept of aggravation. 375 Special issue
2 inquired whether the employee incurred an occupational disease during his
employment, defining occupational disease in terms of the statutory defini-
372. This resourceful defense is reminiscent of the old "occupational disease" defense used
before occupational disease became compensable. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 113, §§ 2-9, at 176-
180. Prior to 1947 only accidental injuries were compensable, i.e., events traceable to a definite
time, place and cause. Thus, any other injury, sickness or disease acquired other than by
accidental injury was a complete defense. See Barron v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 36
S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted).
373. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (Vernon 1967). The obvious distinction
between accidental injury and occupational disease because of § 22 was clearly pointed out by
Mr. Justice Garwood in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Etheredge, 154 Tex. 1, 12-13, 272
S.W.2d 869, 876 (1954). See note 395 infra.
374. Brief for Appellant at 5, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Shreve, 551 S.W.2d 79, 83 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
375. Brief for Appellant, supra note 374, at 20. The definition submitted was verbatim the
definition of injury contained in 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES § 20.01(1970).
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tion. 376 Neither issue was dependent upon the answer to the other.377 Special
issue 20 inquired as to the percentage of the employee's incapacity attribut-
able to his employment.378 The jury answered virtually every issue finding
that the employee sustained an accidental injury, incurred an occupational
disease in his employment, sustained a permanent partial disability and that
only seventy-five percent of his permanent partial disability was related to
the occupational disease. The trial court, nevertheless, without any party
filing a motion to disregard or motion for judgment n.o.v.379 entered judg-
ment for full permanent partial benefits at the maximum compensation rate.
On appeal the carrier contended that because of the obvious distinction
between accidental injury and occupational disease the jury's affirmative
finding with respect to both theories constituted an irreconcilable conflict.
The conflict resulted, the carrier argued, because a different judgment
would have to be entered if the accidental injury finding was used rather
than the occupational disease finding.38 0 The court of civil appeals specific-
ally recognized the inherent difference between accidental injury and occu-
pational disease under the amended statute:
There is a distinction between an accidental injury and an occupational
disease. An industrial accident can always be traced to a definite time,
place and cause, whereas an industrial disease is a slow and gradual
development, and the time place and cause thereof are not susceptible
of definite ascertainment.3sl
Despite the recognition of this clear, logical distinction, the court of civil
appeals held that there was no conflict in the verdict. Thus, in the court's
view the employee was entitled to recover for the longest period of incapaci-
ty that could be supported by the jury's findings, that is the period which
produced the largest money judgment.
The court began its analysis of the conflict by observing that the jury
could have believed the claimant suffered from an occupational disease
which was aggravated or accelerated by the occurrence of the accidental
injury. Therefore, the fact that Shreve experienced a nondisabling occupa-
tional disease prior to the accidental injury would not prevent his recovery
for the injury which may have aggravated the previously existing disease.
Clearly, this is a correct legal proposition. The case cited by the court in
support of this proposition, Texas Employer's Insurance Association v.
Bradford,382 however, does not support the court's conclusion. Bradford
specifically stated that the case was tried and submitted to the jury on the
theory of accidental injury and not occupational disease.3 83 The case in-
volved section 27, 384 repealed in 1971, which concerned a disease or allergy
376. Brief for Appellant, supra note 374, at 5-6. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §
20 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
377. Brief for Appellant, supra note 374, at 6.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 17-18.
380. This is the famous conflict test set forth in Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148
Tex. 197, 205-06, 222 S.W.2d 985, 991 (1949).
381. 551 S.W.2d at 81-82.
382. 381 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
383. Id. at 235.
384. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 113, § 9, at 179.
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which could be arrested by a change in employment or medical treatment
and provided for compensation only during the acute stage of the disease or
allergy. The Shreve court may have found more support for their statement
in the well-settled proposition that a disease may become an accidental
injury if it is traceable to a specific event as in Guthrie v. Texas Employers'
Insurance Ass'n.385 The fact remains that the Shreve jury found both acci-
dental injury and occupational disease existing at the same time and causing
the same incapacity, though to a different degree, that is accidental injury
100% and occupational disease seventy-five percent.
The court's ultimate holding on the conflict issue was that when the jury
findings support a judgment for both a general injury and occupational
disease, the employee is entitled to receive compensation for the longest
period of incapacity. This statement is unique to Texas compensation law,
particularly in view of the jury findings in the case.
In order to justify this peculiar holding the court quoted a phrase from an
unidentified section of article 8306. Perhaps the failure to identify the
particular section was an oversight, however, it is obvious that the phrase is
from section 12386 which exclusively applies to specific injuries, not general
injuries or occupational disease. This phrase is the portion of section 12
dealing with concurrent specific injuries and providing that for concurrent
injuries resulting in concurrent incapacities, the employee shall receive
compensation only for the injury producing the longest period of incapacity.
The last portion of the phrase, which the court failed to quote indicates the
true purpose of the statute; that is that section 12 does not affect liability for
concurrent loss of specific members which are cumulative as to time but not
concurrent.387
The portion of section 12 quoted by the court of civil appeals has been
construed by the Texas Supreme Court as applying only to cases involving
"temporary loss or loss of use of specific members resulting from injuries
received in one accident .... ''388 The unquoted portion of section 12,
according to the supreme court, applies only to total loss, permanent partial
loss, or permanent total loss of use of specific members. 389 Obviously,
section 12 is irrelevant to any statement or holding in the Shreve opinion. In
fact the court's incomplete quotation and failure to identify the section
quoted, appears to be an attempt to bolster an anemic, unsupported holding
and amounts to nothing more than intellectual deception.
The court of civil appeals also cited that portion of the injury definition
which states that the term injury means damage and harm to the physical
structure of the body, et cetera, and includes occupational disease as later
385. 146 Tex. 89, 203 S.W.2d 775 (1947); accord, Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408
S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Robison, 241 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Wade, 197 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
386. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (Vernon 1967).
387. Id.
388. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. London, 379 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1964).
389. Id. Cf. Goldman v. Torres, 161 Tex. 437, 341 S.W.2d 154 (1960) (involving concurrent
injuries to the same specific member); Herrin v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.




defined.3" It is impossible to determine how the injury definition supports
the court's holding on the conflict issue or even leads to an analogous
conclusion. The court merely quotes the statute without referring to its
language or attempting to analyze how it might affect the outcome of the
decision. In other words the definition of injury was immaterial to the issues
that were before the court.
In support of its holding, the court of civil appeals cited the supreme court
opinions in McCartney v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.39' and Texas General
Indemnity Co. v. Scott3 92 Neither case offers even vague support for the
court's holding. Both opinions involved recovery for incapacity resulting
from the combined effects of a specific injury and a general injury received in
the same accident. Even a cursory review of either opinion reveals the cases
are not even remotely similar to the Shreve case. In holding that the jury
findings were not in conflict, the court of civil appeals not only miscited its
alleged authority, but it also ignored its own holding distinguishing the two
concepts, as well as several other cases declaring analogous findings to be in
conflict.
Occupational disease has long been recognized to be a disease which is
acquired in the usual and ordinary course of employment, normally over a
period of time.3 93 This in itself distinguishes an occupational disease from an
accidental injury because an accidental injury must be traceable to a definite
time, place, and cause. 394 A more important distinction, which was ignored
by the Shreve court, is that section 22395 is only applicable to occupational
disease cases. Thus by definition it would appear that accidental injury and
occupational disease are mutually exclusive. In Shreve section 22 was ap-
plied and the jury found that only seventy-five percent of the permanent
partial incapacity was related to Shreve's employment. It is obvious that the
Shreve jury's answers to the special issues are irreconcilable if one requires
the entry of a judgment different from the judgment actually entered. 39
Thus, if the accidental injury finding is excluded and judgment entered on
the occupational disease and section 22 findings, the judgment would be for
390. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
391. 362 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1962).
392. 152 Tex. I, 253 S.W.2d 651 (1952).
393. See, e.g., Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. McKay, 146 Tex. 569, 210 S.W.2d 147 (1948);Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio1961, writ ref'd); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Cowan, 271 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rudd v. Gulf Cas. Co., 257 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-ElPaso 1953, no writ); American Sur. Co. v. Ritchie, 182 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.- Waco
1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
394. See, e.g., Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972);Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd).
395. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (Vernon 1967). In Texas Employers' Ins.Ass'n v. Etheredge, 154 Tex. 1, 12, 272 S.W.2d 869, 876 (1954), the significant distinction
between the two theories as involves § 22 was pointed out:
This section [section 22] appears to make a deliberate and radical difference
between the law applicable to occupational disease and that concerning industrial
accident, where the erstwhile compensable event or disability may be affected by
a noncompensable factor. There is no comparable provision in the law concerning
industrial accident.
396. See Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985 (1949).
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only seventy-five per cent permanent partial benefits. The actual judgment
entered by the trial court, however, was for full permanent partial benefits.
In Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Murphree397 the jury found that the
employee would have lost the sight of one eye due to a compensable injury
even had he not suffered a noncompensable subsequent injury to the same
eye. In answer to other issues, however, the jury found that the employee
would have lost only eighty-five percent of his vision had he not subsequent-
ly injured the eye. The court held these answers to be in conflict since the
jury's verdict could have supported either a judgment for a 100% loss or an
eighty-five per cent loss. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. McLaughlin39" the
jury found the employee sustained fifty-nine weeks of temporary total
incapacity prior to trial, fifty-two weeks of temporary total incapacity after
the trial began and seventy-five per cent permanent partial disability. The
trial court entered judgment for the seventy-five per cent permanent partial
disability benefits without including any temporary total benefits. The su-
preme court noted that the findings were in conflict because the finding of
total incapacity was 100% disability while the permanent partial incapacity
was only seventy-five per cent. Since the claimant in the supreme court
agreed to accept a judgment based on seventy-five percent incapacity, the
trial court judgment was affirmed. Had the employee not agreed to the
judgment, however, the court noted that the case would have been remand-
ed for new trial.
Shreve can be distinguished from both Murphree and McLaughlin and
involved jury findings unique to Texas compensation law. Applying estab-
lished conflict principles to the findings indicates that the jury's answers
were inconsistent with the trial court's final judgment. 399 This conflict would
not have arisen had the trial court defined the term accidental injury, used in
special issue 1, to include accidental injuries traceable to a definite time,
place and cause. As submitted, special issue 1 simply used the term acciden-
tal injury as it is usually defined in the routine compensation case. 4° ° The
carrier contended throughout the trial that the employee did in fact inhale
fumes on the day in question, but that such inhalation occurred during
normal work days. The claimant, of course, recognized that it was tactically
more advantageous to proceed on the single accident theory in order to
397. 88 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935, writ dism'd).
398. 134 Tex. 613, 135 S.W.2d 955 (1940).
399. The trial court's judgment was entered based upon the jury's finding that the employee
sustained an accidental injury resulting in permanent partial disability. The trial court disregard-
ed the jury's finding of occupational disease as well as the 75% finding in the § 22 issue. No
motion to disregard or motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was filed by either party.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 374, at 17-18. It is, of course, well established that a court may
not simply disregard material answers to special issues or pick and choose among conflicting
issues those that the court approves nor render judgment n.o.v. on its own motion. TEX. R. Civ.
P. 301. See Annotation to Rule 301, 3 TEXAS RULES ANNOTATED (Vernon 1977). The court of
civil appeals, however, ignored this minor procedural error and never held the occupational
disease answers to be immaterial. The court did state, at the beginning of the opinion, that the
trial court apparently disregarded the findings as immaterial. In the trial court's judgment,
however, there is no such finding set forth. Brief for Appellant, supra note 374, at 18.
400. Brief for Appellant, supra note 374, at 20. The usual definition of injury, as submitted




avoid the effect of section 22. While the accidental injury phrase is normally
used only in contradistinction to intentional injury, other excluded risk or
hazards not arising out of the employment, and occupational disease,
normally need not be submitted to the jury,"°  it must be distinguished from
occupational disease under facts similar to Shreve in order to properly
submit the carrier's defense. Otherwise, a jury has no guidance whatsoever
in distinguishing between accidental injury and occupational disease.
Occupational Disease-Repetitious Physical Traumatic Activity. The first
case to consider the ordinary diseases of life exception in the occupational
disease definition4 °2 was Teague v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co.4°3 Tea-
gue claimed compensation for a back injury allegedly resulting from repetiti-
ous physical traumatic activities during sixteen years of employment. Tea-
gue's work primarily consisted of heavy lifting, digging and operating an air
hammer. He claimed he experienced back pains on the job on several
occasions but did not become disabled until April, 1975. After consultation
with physicians, his condition was diagnosed as a chronic lumbosacral strain
superimposed on degenerative disc disease. The jury failed to find that
Teague sustained an injury as defined by the trial court and the court entered
a take nothing judgment. On appeal Teague's sole complaint was that the
trial court's injury definition did not allow the jury to consider, as an injury,
the incitement, acceleration or aggravation of an ordinary disease of life.
The claimant's physician testified that degenerative disc disease is an ordi-
nary disease of life to which all people are exposed regardless of their
particular job. The doctor never testified that Teague's work incited, ac-
celerated or aggravated his degenerative disc disease. The trial court sub-
mitted the following injury definition:
401. A similar controversy arose in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Murphy, 506 S.W.2d 312
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, no writ). The Murphy court, the same court writing
the Shreve opinion, in order to allow the claimant to avoid § 22, came to the conclusion that the
claimant had sustained a three day accidental injury.
See Continental Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 506 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no
writ); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Agan, 252 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1952, writ ref'd).
402. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978):
Wherever the terms 'Injury' or 'Personal Injury' are used in the Workmen's
Compensation Laws of this State, such terms shall be construed to mean damage
or harm to the physical structure of the body and such diseases or infections as
naturally result therefrom. The terms 'Injury' and 'Personal Injury' shall also be
construed to mean and include 'Occupational Diseases,' as hereinafter defined.
Whenever the term 'Occupational Disease' is used in the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws of this State, such terms shall be construed to mean any disease arising
out of and in the course of employment which causes damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body and such other diseases or infections as naturally
result therefrom. An 'Occupational Disease' shall also include damage or harm to
the physical structure of the body occurring as the result of repetitious physical
traumatic activities extending over a period of time and arising in the course of
employment; provided, that the date of the cumulative injury shall be the date
disability was caused thereby. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except
where such diseases follow as an incident to an 'Occupational Disease' or 'Injury'
as defined in this section.
403. 548 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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'Injury' means damage or harm to the physical structure of the body
occurring as the result of repetitious physical traumatic activities ex-
tending over a period of time and such diseases or infection as naturally
result therefrom, or the incitement, acceleration, or aggravation of any
disease, infirmity or condition, previously or subsequently existing, by
reason of such damage or harm.
'Injury' does not include ordinary condition [sic] of life to which the
general public is exposed outside of the employment except where such
conditions follow as an incident to an injury as defined herein °. 4
The court of civil appeals overruled the claimant's point of error affirming
the trial court's judgment. The court acknowledged that it could find no
authority on point, but held that based on an examination of the wording of
section 20 the trial court's definition was proper. The court summarized its
holding as follows:
The jury was permitted to find as an injury the incitement, acceleration,
or aggravation of a previously existing ordinary condition of life so long
as Teague could show that such incitement, acceleration, or aggravation
resulted from repetitious physical traumatic activity. The jury was not
instructed that an ordinary condition of life, though aggravated by work
activity, was not an injury. To the contrary, the jury was instructed that
ordinary conditions of life are not injuries, unless damage or harm to
the physical structure of the body results from the incitement, accelera-
tion, or aggravation of that previously existing condition.
°5
The court of civil appeals' holding that an ordinary disease of life is
compensable when there is an incitement, acceleration or aggravation of the
disease by repetitious physical traumatic activity was erroneous. The explic-
it wording of section 20 provides that an ordinary disease of life is compens-
able only if it follows as an incident to an occupational disease or injury. In
fact, the Compensation Act does not deal with discovery for the aggrava-
tion-acceleration of any pre-existing condition. The aggravation-accelera-
tion doctrine is a judicial creation stemming from a liberal interpretation of
the Compensation Act. Moreover, this doctrine is limited in application to
accidental injury, not occupational disease.
The only statutory reference to aggravation-acceleration is section 22,
which draws a clear distinction between accidental injury and occupational
disease.' Section 22, rather than allowing recovery for the aggravation of
an occupational disease by a noncompensable condition or for the aggrava-
tion-acceleration of a noncompensable condition by an occupational dis-
ease, in fact reduces recovery. Thus, an ordinary disease of life aggravated
by repetitious physical traumatic activity is not compensable. Only that
portion of the total disability due solely to the repetitious physical traumatic
activity is compensable. 40 7
404. d. at 957.
405. Id. at 959.
406. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (Vernon 1967). See Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Etheredge, 154 Tex. 1, 12-13, 272 S.W.2d 869, 876 (1954). The Etheredge case is
quoted in note 395 supra.
407. Section 22 provides:
Where an occupational disease is aggravated by any other non-compensable
disease or infirmity, or where incapacity or death from any other non-compens-
able cause, is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated or in anywise contributed to by
an occupational disease, the number of weeks of compensation payable by the
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The trial court's error in defining the term injury resulted from its inclu-
sion of the court-made aggravation-acceleration claim which is not a part of
the statutory definition of occupational disease. In a case where the claim-
ant's theory of recovery is repetitious physical traumatic activity, such as in
Teague, the aggravation-acceleration doctrine is a defense not a ground of
recovery. Such defense is implemented by proof that the claimant's condi-
tion is an ordinary disease of life which is not compensable, or that such
ordinary disease of life was aggravated by repetitious physical traumatic
activity thus raising a section 22 apportionment issue.
Course and Scope of Employment-Deviation. In Ranger Insurance Co. v.
Valerio408 the deceased employee was employed by Newcomer Butane &
Oil Company whose principle business was home delivery of butane and
butane tanks. On the day of the occurrence the deceased employee and two
co-workers were directed to pick up ten or so large butane tanks from a local
farm. The three employees were of equal status, none of them having been
designated as supervisor or foreman. The employer testified that he allowed
his employees to take coffee breaks when and where they desired, without
supervision.
After arriving at the farm the three workers secured one tank, placing it on
one of the employer's trucks. While the employees were lifting the second
tank, a rabbit ran from under the tank and into an irrigation pipe forty or
fifty yards away. After securing the second tank, the deceased employee
and one of his co-workers lifted the irrigation pipe in order to dislodge the
rabbit. The pipe contacted an overhead power line and electrocuted the
deceased. The employer testified that the workers had not been instructed to
move any pipe and shaking the rabbit out of an irrigation pipe was not part of
their assigned duties.
The court analyzed the fact situation in view of the two well known
requirements of course and scope: (1) the injury must be of a kind and
character that has to do with and originates in the employer's business; and
(2) at the time of injury, the employee must be engaged in or about the
furtherance of his employer's affairs or business.4" The beneficiary argued
that the employee was on the job immediately prior to the incident and was
simply engaged in an innocent form of relaxation similar to taking his
employer-approved coffee break. Furthermore, the deviation, if any, was so
slight both in time and distance as to be no deviation from the employment at
all.
The court of civil appeals recognized that slight deviations and common
habits of people in general are frequently held not to be material deviations.
Association shall be reduced and limited to such proportion only of the total
number of weeks of compensation that would be payable if the occupational
disease were the sole cause of the incapacity or death, as such occupational
disease, as a causative factor, bears to all the causes of such incapacity or death,
such reduction in compensation to be effected by reducing the number of weekly
payments of compensation for which the Association is liable.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (Vernon 1967).
408. 553 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1977, no writ).
409. See cases cited at note 313 supra.
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After analyzing several such Texas cases the court rejected the benefi-
ciary's position and held that the risk involved in raising the irrigation pipe
was a personal risk foreign to the employee's employment duties.
Course and Scope of Employment-Travel. Generally injuries suffered by
employees while traveling on public streets and highways while going to and
returning from work are not compensable. 410 An exception to this general
rule is found in article 8309, section lb.41' In addition to section 1b, the
employee must prove that his injuries originated in and related to the
employer's business and were suffered while the employee was engaged in
the furtherance of the employer's affairs. In other words, the employee
must come within the terms of section 1 of article 8309.412 Last year the El
Paso court of civil appeals decided two factually similar cases involving
transportation of oilfield workers to and from rig sites. 413 In both cases the
court upheld awards of compensation finding that the employees met all the
requirements of section 1 and lb.
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Adams 4t4 the mother of a
deceased oilfield worker sought death benefits as a result of a one vehicle
accident on the way to a drilling site in which her son was killed. The dispute
involved a $10.00 per day payment to the driller, who was the driver of the
vehicle, and the purpose for which he was paid. The carrier, of course,
argued the payment was not related to travel expense, while the beneficiary
contended the payment was for driving time and expenses for the seventy
mile trip to the rig site. The Amarillo court of civil appeals, relying upon the
El Paso opinions, upheld the jury verdict in favor of the beneficiary.
Course and Scope of Employment-Assault by Co-employee. The Texas
Compensation Act defines the term "injury" by excluding from its coverage
four classes of injuries and including all other injuries that originate in the
employer's business and occur while the employee is in the furtherance of
the employer's affairs.415 One excluded class of injuries is injuries caused by
personal acts of third persons which are not motivated by the employment
relationship.4"6 The Texas courts have construed this exclusion to be appli-
cable to co-employees as well as third persons unconnected with the em-
ployment or the employer. 4 7 Another excluded class of injuries are those
410. See, e.g., American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377, 303 S.W.2d 370 (1957).
411. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967):
Unless transportation is furnished as a part of the contract of employment or is
paid for by the employer, or unless the means of such transportation are under the
control of the employer, or unless the employee is directed in his employment to
proceed from one place to another place, such transportation shall not be the basis
for a claim that an injury occurring during the course of such transportation is
sustained in the course of employment.
412. Id. § 1. See, e.g., Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Dryden, 398 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1965); Shelton
v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381
S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
413. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Byrd, 540 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesnut, 539 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.- El Paso
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
414. 555 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ filed).
415. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
416. Id.
417. See, e.g., United States Cas. Co. v. Hardie, 299 S.W.871 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927,
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caused by the employee's willful intention to unlawfully injure some other
person.1 8
In Chatman v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association419 the origin of
the fight between the employee and his foreman was disputed. The employ-
ee contended that the fight arose out of a dispute over the manner in which
the work was being done. The foreman testified, however, that while there
was some pushing and shoving as a result of a verbal altercation concerning
work, that disagreement had been concluded and later, while the foreman
was getting a drink of water, the claimant attacked him with a Coke bottle. A
fight ensued and the claimant lost it as well as the jury verdict.
The carrier defended solely on the statutory provision excluding injuries
resulting from an employee's attempt to injure a third person. The trial court
submitted a special issue defining injury in the usual terms and including the
statutory language on which the carrier's had based exclusion. The court of
civil appeals upheld this submission and overruled the claimant's legal and
factual insufficiency points of error.
In Moore v. Means420 the employee collected compensation benefits for
injuries received in an assault by a co-employee and then instituted a
common law damage suit against the co-employee for personal injuries. The
trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The employ-
ee-plaintiff, an administrative assistant to the county judge of Hardin
County, also operated a small newspaper. In a news story the plaintiff made
what the co-employee-defendant, a county commissioner, considered insult-
ing remarks relating to kickbacks. Heated words were later exchanged, and
the co-employee-defendant assaulted the employee-plaintiff. The employee-
plaintiff filed a claim for compensation since Hardin County was a subscrib-
er to the Act. After collecting compensation benefits by way of a final
Industrial Accident Board award, he filed the personal injury suit against the
co-employee-defendant. On appeal, the employee-plaintiff asserted that his
damage suit was not barred by the fact that he had accepted compensation
benefits unless the co-employee was acting in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the assault. Since there was, according to the
employee-plaintiff, a fact issue as to whether the co-employee-defendant
was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the
altercation, the summary judgment was improper.
The court of civil appeals, in affirming the trial court's judgment, took the
position that the employee-plaintiff, in order to recover compensation bene-
fits, had admitted that his injury occurred as a result of an assault directed at
him by a co-employee in the course and scope of his employment or at least
jdgmt adopted); Vivier v. Lumbermen's Indem. Exch., 250 S.W. 417 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923,
jdgmt adopted); Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cheely, 232 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1950, writ ref'd); Associated Employers Lloyds v. Groce, 194 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Consolidated Underwriters v. Adams, 140 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Mills, 108 S.W.2d
219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, writ dism'd); Richardson v. Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n, 46 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1932, writ ref'd).
418. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
419. 555 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
420. 549 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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for reasons connected to the employment. Thus, the employee-plaintiff
could not, after recovering money benefits as a result of his admission, take
an inconsistent position. This was especially true because the Industrial
Accident Board's award was judicial in nature, and the employee-plaintiff
would be estopped from asserting inconsistent positions in two judicial
proceedings. The majority relied primarily upon article 8306, section 3,421
which provides that if the employer is a subscriber, then the employee has
no right of action against the employer or any fellow employees, but must
look solely to the Association for compensation. This section has been
interpreted to bar employee suits in similar situations, and the majority cited
two analogous cases to support its holding.4 22
Specific Injury-Extent and Affect. To convert a specific injury, compen-
sated by a specified, limited, weekly benefit, 423 into a more lucrative general
injury compensable as either total or partial incapacity, 424 the employee
must follow the precise guidelines set forth in a number of supreme court
opinions handed down through the years. 425 With only one notable excep-
tion, 426 the supreme court has consistently applied the same concepts to this
somewhat complex area of compensation law; a pattern which the San
Antonio court of civil appeals followed in Gallegos v. Truck Insurance
Exchange .427
Gallegos sustained almost complete loss of vision in his left eye as the
result of battery acid dripping into it. Subsequent to the injury, the employee
complained of frequent severe headaches and occasional "watering" of the
right eye. Expert medical testimony revealed that Gallegos' injury was a
condition of chronic uveitis limited to the left eye. The symptoms of uveitis,
however, include pain, headaches, swelling and spasms around the affected
eye as well as tearing and blinking of both eyes. Although the jury had found
that the eye injury extended to and affected Gallegos' head and had resulted
in total permanent incapacity, the court of civil appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment of loss of one eye only. 42 The court recognized that
Gallegos' evidence was almost identical to that presented in Texas Employ-
421. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
422. The court cited Heibel v. Bermann, 407 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, no
writ), and Jones v. Jeffreys, 244 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ ref'd). 549
S.W.2d at 419.
423. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
424. Id. §§ 10, II.
425. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Wilson, 522 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1975); Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shannon, 462 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1970); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marmolejo,
383 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. 1964); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Espinosa, 367 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.
1963); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brownlee, 152 Tex. 247, 256 S.W.2d 76 (1953); Consol-
idated Underwriters v. Langley, 141 Tex. 78, 170 S.W.2d 463 (1943).
426. The exception is the supreme court's recent opinion in Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Gonzales, 518 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975), aff'g 506 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1974). A thorough study of the evidence recited in both the supreme court opinion and the court
of civil appeals opinion indicates that the supreme court's result is undoubtedly correct, but it is
based on very poor reasoning. Gonzales represents one explainable aberration in a long line of
consistent supreme court opinions on the extend to and affect doctrine.
427. 546 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
428. The carrier stipulated that the claimant was entitled to compensation for total, perma-
nent loss of vision in the left eye. Id. at 668.
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ers ' Insurance Association v. Espinosa 29 where the supreme court held that
subjective complaints of pain following a specific injury are insufficient to
extend the injury to other parts of the body. Thus, the court of civil appeals
held that Gallegos failed to sustain his burden of proving an extension of his
left eye injury to his head so as to convert the specific injury into a general
injury.
Specific Injury-Pleading. The importance of the employee to specifically
plead a specific injury is illustrated by Morales v. Texas Employers Insur-
ance Association 30 where due to lack of a specific pleading, the claimant
almost lost the compensation due him for permanent partial loss of use of his
right leg. In the claimant's petition, he alleged an injury to "his right knee,
back and general health . . . resulting in an imbalance of the back from
limping on the knee." 431 The trial court submitted general as well as specific
injury issues overruling the carrier's objection that there was no pleading to
support the specific injury issues. The jury found that the claimant's only
injury was to his right knee, but the trial court overruled the employee's
motion for judgment for the compensation due for the knee injury and
resulting disability. Instead, the trial court entered a take nothing judgment,
apparently concluding that the carrier's no pleading objections to the specif-
ic injury issues were well taken. Forunately for the claimant, the court of
civil appeals, as the general rule requires, construed the pleadings liberally
in the pleader's favor. Although noting that the petition was "hardly a model
plea, '432 the court held the pleading sufficient to support the submission of
specific injury issues.
Specific Injury Versus General Injury. It is well settled that a claimant is
entitled to recover compensation for the total effects of concurrent specific
and general injuries, subject to the proviso that the recovery be limited to
the longest period of incapacity to which the employee would be entitled to
recover. 43 3 It is equally well settled that a carrier may limit a claimant's
recovery in concurrent injury situations by pleading and proving that the
effects of any concurrent injuries are confined to an injured specific mem-
ber.4 4 The same is true when the claimant seeks to extend a specific injury
to a greater member, or the body generally. 435
In Heard v. Houston General Insurance Co. 436 the Waco court of civil
appeals either became confused over the application of these rules or ig-
nored them altogether. In any event, the carrier was compelled to pay
approximately 201 weeks of compensation it did not owe. The sparse
evidentiary record indicated that the claimant injured his left leg and/or knee
"which injury necessitated surgery, and a prosthesis applied to his left
429. 367 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1963).
430. 554 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
431. Id. at 52.
432. Id. at 53.
433. McCartney v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 362 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1962).
434. Id.
435. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marmolejo, 383 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. 1964).
436. 553 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
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knee." 437 The claimant asserted a claim for a specific injury to his left knee,
as well as injuries to his body generally. The jury found that the injury was a
producing cause of permanent total incapacity. In answer to extension
issues, the jury found that the injury to the left leg did not affect any other
part of the body and was confined to the left leg. The trial court granted the
carrier's motion for a take nothing judgment, the carrier having already paid
full benefits for the loss (or loss of use?) of the leg.
The claimant appealed, contending the trial court should have entered a
judgment for total permanent incapacity. According to the court, the carrier
in response to the claimant's argument, asserted only legal and factual
insufficiency points to the jury's total permanent finding. In a three para-
graph opinion, the court of civil appeals reversed the trial court's judgment
and remanded with instructions to render judgment for the claimant for total
permanent incapacity.
The court first held that the jury's answers to the first four issues relating
to general incapacity entitled the claimant to a total permanent judgment,
while the jury's answer to the fifth issue, the confinement issue,4 38 entitled
the claimant to a judgment for the loss of his leg. How the court concluded
that the answer to the confinement issue entitled the claimant to a judgment
for the loss of a leg is a mystery. The court cited no authority and did not
elaborate on the holding. Having concluded that the claimant was entitled to
one of two judgments, the court cited McCartney v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. ,'49 to support the conclusion that the claimant was entitled to the
largest sum recoverable under the jury's verdict, that is, total permanent
incapacity.
The court's holding is, in short, erroneous. While it is true that a claimant
may recover for concurrent general and specific injuries, the special issues
quoted by the court do not indicate that the jury found any concurrent
injuries. Moreover, the jury's answer confining the injury to the left leg is a
complete defense to any other incapacity the jury found in previous is-
sues."
0
Causation. In recent years the supreme court has slowly diluted the rea-
sonable medical probability test of causation; the evidentiary link required
437. Id. at 831 (emphasis added). Perhaps it makes little difference to an analysis of the
holding, but this statement by the court that the prosthesis was applied to the left knee is
illustrative of the difficulty encountered in attempting to analyze this opinion. Did the court
mean that the claimant's leg was amputated? If so, was the amputation above or below the
knee? Did the court perhaps mean that the knee joint itself was replaced with a knee implant?
Did the court refer to a prosthetic device when it actually intended to indicate that a permanent
knee brace was applied to the knee? Did the court really mean that the distal femur was
fractured or perhaps the tibial plateau was fractured which in turn required orthopedic screws
or a plate?
438. For the fifth issue the court asked: "Did the injury to the left leg of Mike Heard extend
to and affect any part of his body other than his left leg, or was such injury confined to his left
leg?" To which the jury answered: "It was confined to his left leg." Id.
439. 362 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1962).
440. Id.; Banks v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 476 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1972, no writ); Hardegree v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 449 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1969, no writ); Coleman v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 297 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956, writ ref'd).
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to establish the connection between the injury and the resulting disability."'4
In 1975 in Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gonzales442 the court crushed
any remaining vitality from this concept and now only requires surmise,
suspicion, speculation or guesswork from any hired testifier to link the
injury to the disability. The plaintiff in Lucas v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co.443 was a diabetic. For several years prior to the injury he was
frequently treated by his personal physician for foot and toe infections,
twice resulting in surgery. Eighteen months before the accident, Lucas'
doctor told him he could only work at a sedentary job because of the foot
and toe problems. Lucas changed jobs and was doing light work on the day
of the incident when he accidentally scratched his left ankle. The scratch
became infected and he was treated by his personal physician, but subse-
quently developed thrombophlebitis in both his left leg and right leg.4" The
jury rendered a total permanent incapacity verdict. The court of civil ap-
peals reversed and rendered judgment holding that the testimony of one
physician regarding the connection between the original scratch and the
thrombophlebitis amounted to no evidence." 5 The court of civil appeals
quoted the doctor's testimony at length, 446 noting that there was no allega-
tion of aggravation of any pre-existing disease or injury. Summarizing the
testimony, the court of civil appeals observed: "As to the causal connection
between the injury in question and the thrombophlebitis, the doctor's tes-
timony is couched in terms of 'I think,' 'I thought,' 'possible,' 'who knows'
and 'it can.' "47
The supreme court brushed aside the doctor's qualiying phrases, and
held that the testimony satisfied the reasonable medical probability criteria.
The court did not cite any of its prior opinions, but only the McCormick and
Ray Evidence treatise." 8 Despite the supreme court's attempt to dignify the
inept conclusions offered as medical evidence in Lucas, it is apparent that
the testifying physician was less than candid in his approach to the causal
connection problem. While it is true that the doctor's ineptness affects the
weight given his testimony by the jury, once allowed to go to the jury, the
carrier has no protection except for factual insufficiency arguments which
are not often sustained. Moreover, the court's recent holdings in the area of
441. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gonzales, 518 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975); Griffin v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 450 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1969); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Kneten, 440
S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969); Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969);
Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968); Insurance Co. of N. America v.
Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966); see Steakley, Expert Medical Testimony in Texas, I ST.
MARY'S L. J. 161 (1969).
442. 518 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note 6, at 222-24.
443. 552 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1977).
444. The supreme court's factual recitation is meager. The facts set forth herein have been
gleaned from the court of civil appeals' first opinion. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Lucas, 547 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977), rev'd, 552 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1977).
445. 547 S.W.2d at 386.
446. Id. at 389-90.
447. Id. at 390.
448. 552 S.W.2d at 797. The court used "see" to introduce the citation which was to I C.
MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 531 (2d ed. 1956). The court did refer to two
of its prior opinions apparently relied upon by the carrier. This reference was only a notation of




causation are not limited in application to compensation cases. They apply
generally to any causation problem and encourage plaintiffs to seek out a
doctor who is willing to venture guesses and speculate as to cause. The court
is encouraging plaintiffs to gamble on a favorable verdict through purchased
expert testimony thus substantially increasing the cost of litigation and
increasing the time required to try the case. While the phrase "reasonable
medical probability" may not deter those determined to prove a causal
connection at any cost, it would provide a reasonably understandable
guideline to those concerned with the propriety of gambling on a favorable
outcome based on mere guess and speculation.
The subsequent history of the Lucas case exemplifies the cost increasing
effect of the supreme court's liberalized causation rule. After reversing the
court of civil appeals the supreme court remanded the case for a con-
sideration of the carrier's factual insufficiency points. On remand, 449 the
court of civil appeals again reviewed the doctor's testimony, as well as all of
the evidence and concluded that the verdict was against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the case was remanded for a new
trial.
In Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Taylor450 the issue was whether
a hernia was job related. The jury concluded that it was, that the surgery
was unsuccessful, and that the employee was totally permanently disabled.
Even the court of civil appeals candidly admitted that there was no medical
testimony connecting the hernia to the employment. Taylor had sustained
two prior on the job hernias, both surgically repaired. On the occasion in
question, he was seated in the company pickup truck. As he got out of the
truck he felt a sharp pain, examined himself, and discovered a knot in his
groin which was subsequently diagnosed as a hernia.
The carrier's attack on the jury verdict was centered on the lack of
evidence that Taylor sustained an accidental injury, that is an undesigned
event traceable to a definite time, place and cause. 45' The court of civil
appeals correctly recognized that "accidental" is a creature of the courts
not the compensation statute. In fact there has never been a statutory
requirement that an injury be accidental in order to be compensable. 452 The
only reason "accidental" crept into Texas law was to distinguish injuries
resulting from occupational diseases before occupational diseases became
compensable. Thus, the inquiry in Taylor should be whether the employee's
job related activity led to the resulting injury. The court of civil appeals
recognized this issue when it observed: "The question in this case narrows
itself to whether or not the hernia was in any way job related . . . .Was
• . .[claimant's] raising up out of the seat with the left foot down on the
449. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Lucas, 556 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977, no writ).
450. 540 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
451. See generally cases cited note 394 supra.
452. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Agan, 252 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1952, writ ref'd).
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pavement . . .a producing cause of the hernia and total and permanent
incapacity?" '' 5
The court concluded that jurors should be entitled to decide causation
problems "with or without medical testimony in areas of common experi-
ence. 4 54 Thus, without medical evidence on causation, the court upheld the
jury's verdict arrived at by the jury's "common experience and knowl-
edge." The unanswered question is just how much medical experience
and/or knowledge did these twelve jurors possess? The only information any
juror could possibly have regarding a medical causation connection would
be rank hearsay. Moreover, the court failed to indicate why causation as
related to hernias is a common experience when causation related to heart
attacks, cancer, strokes and other maladies common to mankind in general
are not decided without medical proof of causation.
4 55
Causation-Heart Attack. As usual, a heart attack case reached the appel-
late courts during the survey year and as usual, the beneficiary's recovery
was affirmed. What was unusual about Travelers Insurance Co. v. Allen
4 56
was that it was tried and submitted to the jury on the basis of what is, at the
present time, the minimum criteria for a compensable heart attack, that is
overexertion and strain.457 In recent years the special issues submitted in
many heart attack cases have been in the form contained in Texas Pattern
Jury Charges. 458 These issues define heart attack as occurring in the scope of
employment if precipitated by the employee's work or the conditions of his
employment. 459 The pattern jury issues were not submitted in Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Allen, 460 but the beneficiary still recovered death benefits.
Allen is a typical heart attack death opinion premised upon the overexertion
theory. It differs from other recent opinions, however, because the issues
submitted to the jury appeared to have compelled the jury to consider over-
exertion in determining if the heart attack was job related. 46' Unfortunately,
the opinion does not indicate whether a definition of overexertion was also
given in the charge. It is essential to submit a definition of this term because
implicit in the term overexertion is a comparison of the employee's usual
employment exertion with the exertion causing the heart attack. Thus, if the
exertion is unusual, the injury is compensable, 462 whereas if there is no more
453. 540 S.W.2d at 834.
454. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
455. See Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1976); Insurance Co. of N.
America v. Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969); Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440
S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969); Carter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 120 S.W.2d 581 (1938).
456. 554 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
457. See, e.g., Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973); Olson v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972); Whitaker v. General Ins. Co.,
461 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co.,
449 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
458. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PATrERN JURY CHARGES §§ 20.02, 21.11, 29.02, 29.04 (1970).
459. Id.
460. 554 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
461. The jury's answers to the special issues are summarized by the court rather than being
quoted verbatim. Id. at 810.
462. See, e.g., Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973); Carter v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 120 S.W.2d 581 (1938); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scruggs, 413
S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ); Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner,
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than usual exertion, it is not compensable. 63 If overexertion is not defined in
terms of usual versus unusual, a heart attack or stroke case is not properly
submitted in accordance with the established minimum compensable factors
required to render a heart attack compensable.
Partial Incapacity-Conflict. A recurring problem in the trial of compen-
sation cases is a jury finding that partial incapacity exists, but that the
claimant's wage earning capacity after the injury is the same as the average
weekly wage before injury. This results in a mistrial because of the conflict
in the issues.1 Partial incapacity is defined as a loss of wage earning
capacity, therefore, such a finding presupposes a loss of earning capacity. If
the jury finds that a partial incapacity exists but that there was no loss of
earning capacity, one of the answers is wrong, and a mistrial results. Such
was the holding by the San Antonio court of civil appeals in an original
mandamus proceeding in Home Indemnity Co. v. McKay. 465 Under the
issues and definitions submitted"66 the court could reach no other result than
to uphold the mistrial order entered by the trial court. A significant concur-
ring opinion was written by Justice Cadena. 467 The opinion is a scholarly
criticism of the supreme court's arbitrary "judicial rewriting" 46 of section
11 of article 8306469 governing compensation for partial incapacity. It is
unlikely that the supreme court will rectify this error though it potentially
plagues every compensation trial. It is at least some solace to know that one
appellate judge is sensitive to this problem.
Compromise Settlement Agreement-Suit to Set Aside. The law has tradi-
tionally favored voluntary settlements. The general rule is that in order to
set aside a compromise settlement agreement, a claimant must prove (1) a
meritorious claim for compensation in an amount greater than the amount
paid; (2) false representations made to him even if made in good faith; (3)
reliance upon the false representations; and (4) inducement to participate in
the settlement agreement by reason of the false representations. 470 The
Industrial Accident Board has never had the authority to set aside a compro-
370 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Gant, 346 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ).
463. See, e.g., Whitaker v. General Ins. Co., 461 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co., 449 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Monks v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 425 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
464. See, e.g., Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d 605
(1961); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Craik, 162 Tex. 260, 346 S.W.2d 830 (1961).
465. 543 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
466. The issues and definitions were those found in 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN
JURY CHARGES § 22.02 (1970). 543 S.W.2d at 172.
467. Home Indem. Co. v. McKay, 543 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976,
no writ) (Cadena, J., concurring).
468. Id. Justice Cadena is, of course, criticizing the majority opinion in Employers Reinsur-
ance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d 605 (1961).
469. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 11 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
470. See, e.g., Brannon v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 224 S.W.2d 466 (1949);
Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Johnston, 123 Tex. 592, 72 S.W.2d 583 (1934); Alvarez v. Employers'
Fire Ins. Co., 531 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ); Mullens v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 507 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bullock
v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 254 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, writ ref'd).
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mise settlement agreement.47 1 Despite these well settled rules, the claimant
in Luersen v. Trans-America Insurance Co. ,472 after the Board approved his
compromise settlement agreement, returned to the Board, seeking to set
aside the settlement on the ground that there had been a change of condition.
The Board properly rejected the claim, as did the district court. On appeal,
the claimant asserted that the Board's power to set aside a compromise
settlement agreement arose from section 12(d) of article 8306. 41 3 This section
allows the Board to change an award or order under certain circumstances,
but has no relevance to compromise settlement agreements since approval
of a compromise settlement agreement is not an award or order of the
Board. 74 The court of civil appeals in Luersen followed these well estab-
lished principles affirming the trial court's judgment. In Texas Employers'
Insurance Association v. Baeza475 the claimant alleged he was induced to
enter into a compromise settlement agreement by a promise from the car-
rier's adjuster that the employer would provide the claimant steady employ-
ment as long as he wanted the job. The court of civil appeals upheld the jury
verdict in the claimant's favor.
In Home Insurance Co. v. Dickey ' 76 a plea of privilege appeal, the court
sustained the trial court's order overruling the carrier's plea of privilege.
The court reaffirmed the proposition that the false statement relied upon by
the employee need not be made with actual knowledge of its falsity or with
malicious intent or in bad faith. 47 The court also acknowledged the rule that
a physician's false statements are not attributable to the carrier if the
claimant chose the doctor who is ultimately charged with the false state-
ment.478 On the other hand, if the employer or carrier chose the doctor or if
the doctor is the agent of either, the false statement is chargeable to the
carrier. 9 In Dickey the employee testified he chose the treating doctor from
a list of three doctors whose names were onthe employer's bulletin board,
and he would not have consulted that doctor had his name not been listed.
Based upon the fact that the insurance adjuster specifically used the doc-
tor's incorrect report to induce the claimant to enter into the settlement, the
court held that the doctor's report was attributable to the carrier insofar as
its use in the settlement was concerned.
Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Oliverez480 also involved the
issue of false representations made by a doctor. Oliverez, however, was
471. See, e.g., Brannon v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 292, 224 S.W.2d 466,
468 (1949); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 126 Tex. 497,500,87 S.W.2d 1081, 1082 (1935),
modified, 89 S.W.2d 1116 (1936).
472. 550 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
473. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12(d) (Vernon 1967).
474. See, e.g., Brannon v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 292, 224 S.W.2d 466,
468 (1949); Lowry v. Anderson-Berney Bldg. Co., 139 Tex. 29, 34-35, 161 S.W.2d 459, 463
(1942); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 126 Tex. 497, 501, 87 S.W.2d 1081, 1082 (1935);
Pearce v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 403 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), writ
ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1967).
475. 552 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
476. 552 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
477. Id. at 556 and cases cited therein.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. 550 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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referred to the physician by his employer. The carrier did not question the
fact that the referral by the employer charged it with responsibility for the
incorrect report, but rather attacked the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury findings that the claimant relied upon the representations
and was induced to settle his case by reason of that reliance. The court
reviewed the claimant's testimony, which was somewhat contradictory, and
affirmed the judgment setting aside the compromise settlement agreement.
Suit to Set Aside Board Award. In recent years the most frequently
litigated issue in compensation law has been the propriety of dismissing suits
to set aside the Board's award when one of the parties has named the wrong
claimant or carrier as the defendant. 4 '! Fortunately the courts have shown
mercy on those claimants and carriers making inadvertent mistakes which
are not misleading to the other party. Such was the result in Sanchez v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 482 where the carrier misnamed itself. Although
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. was the proper carrier named in the Board
award, the suit to set aside the award was filed in the name of the parent
company, Aetna Life & Casualty Company. A copy of the Board's award
which was sought to be set aside and which referred to the proper company
was attached to the petition and referred to in the body of the petition.
Subsequently, after both parties filed pleadings naming the correct carrier,
the claimant sought a dismissal of the suit because it had been instituted by a
company who was not a party to the Board award. The claimant contended
the award was final since the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
award entered by the Board. The claimant's motion was overruled and after
a jury trial a take nothing judgment was entered. The employee appealed
solely on the ground that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction to set
aside the Board's award.
The court of civil appeals analogized the facts in Sanchez to those in two
recent supreme court opinions, Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Hill-
and48 3 and Price v. Estate of Anderson.4" In each case, the plaintiff mis-
named the defendant and did not correct the mistake until after the expira-
tion of the statute of limitation. In Price the court held the statute inapplica-
ble because the defendant had not been mislead or prejudiced with respect
to its defense, while in Continental the court remanded for a determination
as to whether the defendant had been mislead. The court of civil appeals
found that in Sanchez the claimant had not been mislead or prejudiced with
respect to the prosecution of his affirmative claim for benefits. Accordingly,
the court held that the original petition filed by Aetna Life & Casualty
481. See, e.g., Transport Ins. Co. v. Jaegar, 534 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Sarver, 531 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Square, 526 S.W.2d 635
(Tex. Civ. App.- Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garcia v. Employers Cas. Co., 519 S.W.2d 685
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Carpenter v. Gulf Ins. Co., 515 S.W.2d 60
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Martin, 501 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), jdgmt modified per curiam, 505
S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1974).
482. 543 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
483. 528 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1975).
484. 522 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1975).
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Company did indeed vest the trial court with jurisdiction to determine the
merits of the controversy.
Extraterritorial Injury-Venue. As previously noted, the legislature ex-
panded the Act's extraterritorial coverage to include employees recruited in
Texas as well as those hired in the state.485 The legislature did not change the
separate venue portion of section 19486 except to add a phrase which includes
those employees recruited in Texas. 487 Thus, the appealing party has three
choices as to venue of a suit to set aside an award involving extraterritorial
injury: (1) the county where the contract of hiring was made or the employee
was recruited; (2) the county where the employee or beneficiary resides at
the time of filing suit; or (3) the county where the employee or employer
resided when the contract was made or employee recruited. 48 8 A question
left unanswered by the legislature, which has engendered conflict among the
courts of civil appeals, is whether the statute's provisions are mandatory
and jurisdictional or simply subject to a plea of privilege. 489 This survey year
the El Paso court of civil appeals has held that section 19 is a matter of venue
and should be raised by a plea of privilege rather than a motion regarding
jurisdiction. 49°
Federal Court-Diversity Jurisdiction. Section 1332(c) 491 of the United
States Code provides that in a direct action against a liability insurer, when
the insured is not joined as a party defendant, the insurer is deemed a citizen
of the state of which the insured is a citizen as well as any state in which the
insurer has been incorporated or has its principal place of business. In 1974
an unwary Texas claimant filed suit to set aside an award of the Industrial
Accident Board in a federal district court. The Fifth Circuit held that the
statute was applicable to workers' compensation insurers thereby making
the carrier a Texas resident; since diversity of citizenship did not exist, the
employee's complaint was dismissed. 492 Moreover, since the appeal was not
filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, the claimant forfeited his right to
compensation because of the failure to file his appeal within twenty days of
the date notice was given to the Board.4 93 This year an insurance carrier also
attempted to file suit in federal district court to set aside an Industrial
Accident Board award and ran afoul of the same statute. In Campbell v.
485. See notes 37-52 supra and accompanying text.
486. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Compare Baker v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 209 S.W.2d 979 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Davis v. Petroleum Cas. Co., 70 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ.
App.- El Paso 1934, no writ), with Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Thomas, 415 S.W.2d 18
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, no writ), and Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Nardman,
376 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1964, no writ).
490. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ellis, 543 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, no writ).
491. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1971).
492. Hernandez v. Travelers Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974).
493. Although the precise subsequent history of the Hernandez case is unknown, probably
any attempt to refile the appeal in state court was unsuccessful as was the claimant in Castillo v.
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Insurance Co. of North America49 4 the carrier attempted to distinguish the
prior case asserting that the suit it filed was not a direct action against an
insurer as provided in the statute since it initiated the suit against the
employee. The court rejected this distinction as being "valid, but too
thin ' 495 and diversity jurisdiction was destroyed.
Medical Expenses. If an employee sustains an on-the-job injury and re-
ceives treatment at a Veteran Administration hospital, is he entitled to
recover the cost of that treatment from the compensation carrier? Suppose
the Veterans' Administration takes an assignment of the employee's poten-
tial claim against the carrier for medical services, can the Veterans' Admin-
istration recover the amount of its subrogation interest from the carrier?
These heretofore unanswered questions were answered affirmatively by the
Fifth Circuit in Texas Employers 'Insurance Association v. United States.496
The injured workman, Adams, was admitted to the Veterans' Administra-
tion Hospital after his injury. He was admitted as a veteran with a non-
service connected disability which meant that the Administration deter-
mined he was unable to pay the expense of necessary medical care. After
surgery at a private hospital, Adams recuperated in the Veterans' Adminis-
tration Hospital for two weeks. The VA obtained an assignment of his claim
against the compensation carrier to the extent of the cost of the medical and
hospital services. The carrier negotiated a settlement with Adams whereby it
became obligated to pay all accrued medical and hospital expenses. The
settlement was approved by the Board, and the carrier promptly paid the
private hospital bill but refused to pay the VA claim. The Board ordered
payment of the bill, the carrier appealed and the government removed the
suit to federal court. The district court entered judgment for the carrier.
The Fifth Circuit noted that section 7 of article 8306497 clearly provided the
employee the sole and exclusive right to select the persons and facilities to
furnish medical aid and hospital services and was equally clear in providing
that the carrier was obligated to pay for such services. Since there was no
question that the Texas Compensation Act applied to Adams' injury, and the
purpose of the Act was to provide medical care for injured workers, and
since the Veterans' Benefit Act was only intended to provide free care to
those unable to pay, the court held that the employee could recover from the
Allied Ins. Co., 537 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Castillo's
federal court suit was also dismissed because of the lack of diversity of citizenship resulting
from the operation of the statute. Castillo's state district court suit was also dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. On appeal the claimant attempted to invoke the provisions of TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958), which provides that if a suit is dismissed for want of
jurisdiction and refiled in a court of proper jurisdiction within 60 days, the period between the
first filing and second filing shall not be counted as a part of the period of limitation. The
claimant further argued, in the alternative, that TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307a (Vernon
1967), was applicable. This part of the Act simply provides that a suit may be transferred to the
county of injury if it is originally filed in another county without disturbing the jurisdiction of
either court. The court of civil appeals rejected both arguments holding that neither statute was
applicable. Thus, the dismissal of the claimant's cause of action was affirmed.
494. 552 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1977).
495. Id. at 605.
496. 558 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1977).
497. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
1978]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
carrier the cost of the medical care furnished by the VA and the VA in turn
was entitled to recover the cost from the employee pursuant to the assign-
ment.
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Wells498 a workman was allowed to recover
twice for the same medical and hospital expenses. The court of civil appeals
seemed most anxious to hold otherwise, but the insurance carrier did not
preserve the proper legal theories which would have assisted the court to
favorably dispose of the issues.
The injured employee, Wells, suffered a heart attack allegedly resulting
from job connected overexertion and strain. After undergoing open heart
surgery, the claimant's group major medical carrier, Aetna Life Insurance
Company, paid a portion of the medical and hospital expenses. When the
employee filed a compensation claim, however, Aetna refused to pay any
additional expenses because of an exclusion in the policy limiting coverage
to nonoccupational conditions for which the insured is entitled to recover
workers' compensation benefits. The employee prosecuted his claim for
compensation benefits through the Board and into district court after the
carrier, Highlands Insurance Company, filed an appeal from the Board's
award. The compensation suit was subsequently settled with the approval of
the court. The employee was paid $15,000.00 in compensation in addition to
$5,368.01 as past medical and hospital expenses and the medical account
was left open for one year. The employee then filed suit against Aetna
seeking recovery for the same medical and hospital bills for which he had
received payment from the compensation carrier. The jury found that the
employee's heart attack was not an accidental injury incurred in the course
and scope of the claimant's employment. Judgment was entered in favor of
the employee for the total of the medical expenses plus penalty and attor-
neys' fees.
On appeal, Aetna's only argument was that the employee's contentions,
pleadings, and "testimony" during the various stages of his compensation
claim, at the Board level and in district court, were judicial admissions that
the heart attack was an accidental injury in the course and scope of his
employment and, therefore, he was, as a matter of law, judicially estopped
from asserting that the heart attack was nonoccupational. As the court of
civil appeals specifically noted, Aetna did not assert, on appeal, or in the
trial court, estoppel by judgment, collateral estoppel or equitable estoppel.
Nor did Aetna complain that the jury verdict was against the overwhelming
weight and preponderance of the evidence.
Because Aetna only raised judicial estoppel, the court was powerless to
intervene and correct an obvious injustice. As the court noted, judicial
estoppel is applicable to sworn statements made in a judicial proceeding
such as verified pleadings, affidavits, sworn testimony in open court, or oral
depositions. Despite numerous claim forms, pleadings and judgments
wherein the employee asserted that his heart attack occurred in the course
and scgpe of his employment, none of these items were sworn to or verified.
498. 557 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ filed).
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Moreover, although the employee testified that he believed he gave sworn
testimony at his pre-hearing conference, the court noted that the pre-hearing
statute499 specifically provides that pre-hearing officers are not empowered
to take testimony. Thus, the pre-hearing conference could not be construed
as a judicial proceeding. Since Aetna failed to establish the basis for invok-
ing the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the court was forced to conclude that
the employee's inconsistent positions amounted to no more than prior incon-
sistent statements which did nothing more than raise a fact issue which was
resolved in the claimant's favor.
IV. PROCEDURAL LAW
Evidence-Formal Statement of Position. As noted,5" the Amarillo court
of civil appeals affirmed the beneficiary's award of death benefits in Texas
Employers' Insurance Association v. Adams °1 a case involving travel to
and from work. In the course of the trial, the beneficiary introduced into
evidence, as an admission against interest, a portion of the carrier's formal
statement of position filed with the Industrial Accident Board while the case
was pending at the Board level. Article 8307, section 10(b) 502 requires the
carrier and the claimant, if represented by an attorney, to file a response to
the pre-hearing officer's recommendations formally setting forth their re-
spective factual and legal positions. In Adams the carrier's formal position
statement quoted from a written statement allegedly taken from the driller
involved in the accident wherein the driller alleged he was paid for driving
the crew to and from the rig site. The carrier's position at trial was that the
driller's payment was for other things, not driving the crew members. The
trial court admitted the carrier's formal statement over the carrier's hearsay
objection.
The court of civil appeals held that the admission of the formal statement
was proper in view of the fact that the carrier was taking a position at trial
contrary to that reflected in its statement to the Industrial Accident Board.
Thus, since the statement was an admission against interest, the carrier's
hearsay objection was invalid. This holding reiterates what has been estab-
lished by prior cases,50 3 that is both carriers and claimants must carefully
evaluate their positions before filing any written instruments at the Board.
Presumably, oral statements made during Board proceedings are also admis-
sible. The lone exception is the pre-hearing conference. In order to establish
a candid atmosphere in which to discuss settlement, the legislature specific-
ally provided that nothing occurring during the pre-hearing conference is
admissible against any party or the subscriber except in other proceedings
499. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
500. See notes 410-14 supra and accompanying text.
501. 555 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ filed).
502. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
503. See Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Scott, 152 Tex. 1, 253 S.W.2d 651 (1952); Charter Oak
Fire Ins. Co. v. Adams, 488 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Beseda, 443 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.- Corpus Christi 1969, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Weber, 386 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Liberty Universal Ins. Co. v. Burrell, 386 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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before the Board. 504
Frivolous Appeal. Recently, employees have been seeking damages for
appeals which are allegedly made without sufficient cause and for delay
only, pursuant to the provisions of rules 435 and 438.505 Additionally, the
courts of civil appeals have been awarding damages against carriers for
frivolous appeals." ° During this survey year substantial damages were as-
sessed against the carrier in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v.
Thornton.07 The court of civil appeals in awarding damages, noted that
even the testimony of the doctors called on the carriers' behalf supported
the jury's total permanent finding. Thus, the court awarded more than
$2,300.00 to the employee because of the delay caused by the carrier's
groundless appeal.
Sufficiency of Evidence on Appeal. There were a number of cases during
the survey year involving the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. A
majority of the cases were appealed by carriers from substantial awards in
favor of claimants508 and were affirmed. There were two cases appealed by
employees which were reversed and remanded 509 and surprisingly three
appeals by employees in no injury and insufficient incapacity finding cases
which were affirmed.5 10 These cases were affirmed or reversed on a seem-
ingly random basis, and thus it seems that the Beaumont court of civil
appeals was correct in observing that it would be virtually impossible to
reconcile all of the decisions of the various courts of civil appeals that have
written opinions on factual sufficiency points of error in workers' compen-
sation cases.5 11
504. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
505. TEX. R. Civ. P. 435, 438.
506. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dempsey, 508 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Adams, 488 S.W.2d 548
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
507. 556 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
508. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Thornton, 556 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1977, no writ) (affirming total and permanent verdict); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Moore, 549 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ) (affirming permanent partial
verdict); University of Tex. System v. Haywood, 546 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, no writ) (affirming total and permanent verdict); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Cox, 544
S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (affirming temporary total, permanent
partial verdict).
509. Robinson v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no injury verdict against great weight and preponderance of evidence);
Macias v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 546 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (no injury verdict against great weight and preponderance of evidence).
510. Macias v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 545 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no
writ) (take nothing judgment affirmed after jury found 23 weeks of temporary total incapacity
and carrier had previously paid 25 weeks); Mejia v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 690
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ) (no injury verdict affirmed); Martinez v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 543 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ) (no injury verdict
affirmed).
511. See generally Transport Ins. Co. v. Kennon, 485 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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